Search

The India-Russia military technical relationship has withstood the test of time. Despite strains since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship has remained highly critical both in terms of the level of trust between the two states and the imperatives of sustaining a military-technical relationship to counter the growth of Chinese power. A more synergistic military-technical is possible, and Moscow and New Delhi must explore ways to con

New Delhi’s relations with Moscow continue to be good, but the long-term prognosis is complicated, especially by China.

Global energy markets have battled continuous uncertainty over the past three years, disrupted first by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, and by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. India has been adept at navigating both these disruptions, using economic diplomacy to position itself favourably in the geopolitics of oil. New Delhi’s delicate balancing of its political relationship with both Washington DC and Moscow has been accompanied

Delhi wants to remain an Eurasian power, swinging between East and West according to its priorities. Its military ties with Moscow. The economic importance of Beijing. America as a strategic counterweight – as long as it works.

This paper explains Russian co-option of India into the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) at a high level of participation in September 2019 and the range of agreements involved. It argues that the co-option was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes so far for the Russian Far East of “northeast Asian regional cooperation.” Moscow related this behaviour to skewed priorities of East Asia’s �

Kerry's Russia visit signals Washington reaching out to Moscow and is the first sign towards normalising the US-Russia relationship. However, it will be prudent to say nothing more than that for now.

The Russia-India-China trilateral meet is New Delhi’s attempt to overcome challenges in ties with Moscow and Beijing

When a government yields to every pressure group at home, its capacity to pursue national interests abroad inevitably erodes. The UPA government's diplomacy in the final months of its decade-long tenure is a good example of the costs of violating this canon. The failure to clinch a commercial agreement on Kudankulam with Moscow is not a reflection on India's diplomatic skills.

If efforts to dilute tensions between the West and Russia fail, Delhi will have to intensify its engagement with Moscow to develop the relationship as leverage against what is perceived to be India's primary strategic challenge - the rise of China. India and Russia will have to creatively use various forums to circumscribe Chinese power.

The Chinese and Russians have replaced the US and the West as the lead singers in the international orchestra for Indo-Pak amity. Instead of telling them to mind their own business, Modi appears to have recognised that he can use the weight of Beijing and Moscow to facilitate India's engagement with Pakistan.

Like Moscow and New Delhi, Riyadh and Islamabad are old allies. There are numerous issues which will ensure that closeness between New Delhi and Riyadh will not cause bilateral ties to spiral downward. If Riyadh gives up on Islamabad, the latter will move closer to Tehran, something the Saudis want to avoid.

The Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and the Experimental Creativity Centre, Moscow have initiated a collaborative research project on Radical Islam. The first meeting under this project took place in Moscow on the 8th and 9th of October, 2009.

The third meeting of ORF's Indo-Russian dialogue was held in Moscow on 5 - 6 October 2009. India's Russian partner in this dialogue is the Russkiy Mir Foundation headed by Mr. Vyacheslav Nikonov who is also President of the Unity for Russia Foundation.

The First Meeting of the ORF-Russia non-official Dialogue jointly organised by ORF and two Russian NGOs, Public Chamber of the Russian Federation and the Polity Foundation was held in Moscow in October 2007.

The Indian President's presence at the 70th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II in Russia on May 9 is in part about extending New Delhi's solidarity with Moscow at a time when many Western leaders have decided not to show up in protest against Russian President Vladimir Putin's policy in Ukraine.

Moscow took serious note of the event and President Dmitry Medvedev sent his envoy to the northwest region Ilya Klebanov and Deputy General-Prosecutor Aleksandr Gutsan to Kaliningrad for an emergency meeting

The US would be foolish to deepen the new Cold War atmosphere by trying to isolate Russia over Ukraine developments. As for China, that option is simply not open to them any more. The reason is that the Americans need cooperation from Moscow to deal with Syria, Iran and Afghanistan.

Desperate to get around international isolation and seeking to co-opt new ‘friendly states’, Moscow seems ready to make allowance for the region�

Pakistan, which has seen military assistance from US frozen during the Trump administration and a worsening of overall ties, has been eager to embrace

Will the course and the outcome of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war alter New Delhi's foreign policy towards Moscow?

While Russia has been very careful of not antagonising China, which has emerged as Moscow's second largest trading partner in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing is uncomfortable by the nature of Moscow's involvement in Hanoi.

It is important that Berlin and Moscow take steps to address the deterioration in bilateral ties. There exist mutual areas of cooperation that need th

Africa has become essential to Russia’s geostrategic posture as Moscow seeks to overcome the backlash to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, in the face of isolation and a contracting economy, Russia has realised that cultivating an entry point in Africa through conventional means such as foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, development assistance, or cultural and educational exchanges may not be its best option. Instead, Mosc

This paper outlines the development of Russia’s relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, focusing on the years after 2014. As relations with the West reached a new post-Cold War low, Moscow has intensified its efforts at building stronger ties with the East. The paper deals with the impact of these developments on the state of its political, economic and defense engagement in Southeast Asia, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It will s

Moscow is interested in continuing the SCO's expansion — primarily by making Iran a member.

The Ukraine crisis may have effectively ended the rapprochement between the USand Russia, and in turn affecting relations such as those of Japan and Russia. Prior to this crisis,and the subsequent Western sanctions on Russia, Tokyo and Moscow had been reaching out toeach other, and hope flickered for a resolution to the territorial dispute over the NorthernTerritories or Southern Kurils. This paper argues that with nationalist governments in powe

In Moscow’s calculus, the Crocus attacks require a thorough investigation to ascertain the actors involved in the attacks, apart from the Islamic St

Russia’s policy towards South Asia has been the subject of much speculation lately. With closer cooperation between Russia and China and the former’s warming up to Pakistan, it is becoming increasingly evident that Russia is moving away from its India-centric approach in the region. This brief studies the changes, and continuity, in Moscow’s foreign policy towards South Asia as it transitioned from the Soviet Union into the Russian Federati

Russia is now the world’s most heavily sanctioned country, with unprecedented punitive action targeting its energy exports, central bank, and other sectors. Given Russia’s economic resilience amid such economic restrictions and India’s dependence on Russia for its defence and energy requirements, this issue brief highlights the economic rationale for New Delhi to maintain existing trade ties with Moscow despite continued geopolitical pressu

By opposing 'unilateralism in international affairs' and evincing a 'common interest' in the evolution of a multipolar world based on 'cooperative security order' while in Moscow this week, Prime Minister Vajpayee has addressed issues going beyond bilateral ties and regional politics in South Asia. To the extent, Vajpayee and India have been consistently focussing on multipolarism, particularly after the US war in Afghanistan, and on Iraq.

Xi Jinping's foreign policy gives acute emphasis to the development of silk roads. The closer Moscow and Beijing get, the more Russia will have to adjust to China's interests. It is important to understand that while Moscow depends heavily on Beijing, the situation is not true in the reverse.

Given the complexity of the current conflict between Israel and Hamas, Russia will most likely expand its diplomatic efforts to bring the tensions to

For Ukraine to win this war, successful diplomatic and military approaches, a stable economic recovery, and the aid of partners are needed.

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is to be complimented for her candour. Her press conference in Moscow with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov unavoidably focussed on Iran's nuclear plans and Mr. Lavrov said Iran had the right under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to the nuclear fuel cycle. Dr. Rice said, "this is not a question of rights but whether or not the fuel cycle can be trusted in Iran."

New Delhi’s decision to import oil from Moscow has disappointed the US and UK, but urging us not to do so as that would help the Russian economy is blatant hypocrisy.

2014 by far has been the most chaotic year in international politics, since the end of the Cold War. The Islamic State terrorists in the Middle East threaten to upturn borders settled for close to a century. Europe is in the throes of an unexpected tussle with Moscow. In the South and East China seas, China's aggressiveness is too clear now to be ignored.

After the United States and its allies left Afghanistan in 2021, analysts expected Russia to fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal. As far as Moscow itself is concerned, it would like to establish full diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime while it urges Western countries to take accountability and fulfil their responsibilities towards the Afghan people. Indeed, Russia’s desire for security and regional hegemony compels it to selectively e

The tide of the war has turned against Moscow. But the Russian president and his close advisers do not acknowledge that reality and have resorted to nuclear sabre rattling

Adaptation remains critical in wars as seen throughout history and the current conflicts between Moscow and Kyiv and between Hamas and Israel are no d

Observer Research Foundation and the Experimental Creativity Centre (ECC), Moscow, completed the second leg of their collaborative research project on the theme "Understanding the Emerging Contours of Power and Hegemony - Contemporary Geo-political Narratives" in New Delhi on March 15-16, 2010.

But New Delhi's decision to send a contingent of the Indian Army for the September 1-7 Vostok 2022 military drill in Russia's far east has raised eyebrows, particularly in the West that is trying to isolate Moscow after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is a major exercise involving more than 50,000 troops and 5,000 weapons units, including 140 aircraft and 60 warships, with the participation of troops from China, India, Laos, Mongolia, Nicar

Backing Moscow beyond a point is likely to hurt Beijing’s economic plans and long-term interests

A closer look at what relations between Washington and Moscow mean for New Delhi.

इराण-इस्रायल यांच्यातील निराकरण न केलेले आणि संबोधित न केलेले गतिमान संबंध इतर कोणत्याही प्रादेशिक सामान्यीकरणास धोका असल्याचे जाणवत आहे.

इस्रायल आणि हमास यांच्यातील सध्याच्या संघर्षाची गुंताग

आंतरराष्ट्रीय पातळीवरचे एकटेपण सोडण्यासाठी आणि नवीन दे

पन्नास वर्षापूर्वी भारत आणि सोविएत रशिया यांच्यात झालेल्या सहकार्य कराराने दक्षिण आशियाच्या राजकारण आणि भूगोलावर मोठा प्रभाव पाडला.