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UK's Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai, Mr Bharat Joshi, has said that Indian investments in the UK have created over 5000 jobs while UK investments in Chennai alone have generated several thousands.

The deep-seated contradictions among member states on regional security and terrorism, combined with growing Chinese influence, have compelled New Delhi to perform a strategic balancing act.

In the past decade, India has successfully demonstrated the three pillars of effective deterrence—capability, credibility, and communication—in its strategic posture towards China. It has bolstered its defence diplomacy with key partners in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and across the broader Indo-Pacific region, through regular joint military exercises, military officers exchange programmes, frequent high-level diplomatic visits, and the co

Maldivian President Yameen Abdullah Gayoom’s rejection of the Supreme Court’s decision to release the jailed opposition leaders to ensure a free and fair presidential elections later this year has brought to head the country’s brewing estrangement with its traditional ally, India. India faces a dilemma: How must it deal with the situation in Maldives? This report examines India’s options in the context of China’s expanding power in the

India’s interest could be more than economic, spilling over into the domain of strategy.

Speculations are rife about India possibly inviting Australia for the next Malabar naval exercise—which COVID-19 has caused to be moved to 2021.[1] If true, this would represent a break from the past and signal a change in the Asian strategic environment. Over the past few years, India has consistently resisted including Australia in the exercise, despite the latter’s willingness. The only other time that Australia was included in the Malabar

The Indian prime minister’s national security credentials are poised to have benefits at the polls.

India’s Northeast Region (NER) can serve as a pivotal connecting space between India and its neighbours to the east in South Asia, as well as to East and Southeast Asia and beyond, enhancing the country’s diplomatic, infrastructural, and commercial engagements. This paper makes an assessment of NER’s cross-border land connectivity initiatives with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan—all members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative f

The paper examines how the Nuclear Suppliers Group has evolved over the years and the role the Group defines for itself. It also attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of the consequences of India's NSG-membership.

Delhi wants to remain an Eurasian power, swinging between East and West according to its priorities. Its military ties with Moscow. The economic importance of Beijing. America as a strategic counterweight – as long as it works.

As New Delhi and Taipei draw closer together, the map of the Asia-Pacific could change for good.

This paper explains Russian co-option of India into the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) at a high level of participation in September 2019 and the range of agreements involved. It argues that the co-option was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes so far for the Russian Far East of “northeast Asian regional cooperation.” Moscow related this behaviour to skewed priorities of East Asia’s �

On the job creation front, there is need for higher manufacturing growth and the creation of 'decent' jobs and not just menial jobs of security guards and peons as around 10 million people will be enter the job market each year over the next decade.

Given the existing alliance pattern involving the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu and its partnership in the Congress-led UPA coalition at the Centre, people's perception of issues like price rise could become a double-jeopardy for the alliance in any election.

India must learn to quickly indigenise defence production to cut out both dependence on external sources and corruption that is endemic to the system and to provide employment to Indians along with a sense of pride. This will not happen overnight and there will be obstructions by vested interests.

Iran's standoff with neighbouring and Western nations does pose a problem for India which has to balance its relations with Iran against its interest in deepening relations with the US. Collaborating with US initiatives in Afghanistan that exclude Iran might persuade the latter to remove the preferential treatment given to India at Chabahar.

It is likely that Indo-Israel ties will expand in the political, economic and strategic realms. Israel's Ambassador to India, Alon Ushpiz, stressed that the bilateral relationship has surpassed a "buyer-seller relationship," and Israel's long experience of working jointly with Narendra Modi has yielded tangible results.

There is a fundamental transformation in the Japanese assessment of India's role in the shaping of new Asian security architecture. There has been a perceptible change in the nature of the bilateral partnership since the turn of the century. Rather than being centred on economic interactions. Indo-Japanese ties today cover a far wider spectrum of subjects...

Both India and Japan consider the visit of Emperor Akihito as a very significant landmark capable of giving further impetus to the growing partnership. The fact that the Imperial dignitaries make very rare visits overseas nowadays due to their health conditions, further heightens the importance of their forthcoming sojourn.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan visited New Delhi for talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and other Indian leaders in the last week of April,2005. In interviews given before the visit, he did not characterise the emerging relationship between India and Japan as a strategic partnership. However, he spoke of a convergence of strategic interests.

Nepal's outgoing Ambassador in India, HE Mr Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, gave an impassioned call to all countries in the South Asian region to cooperate in curbing, if not eliminating, the culture of violence and fighting insurrectionists. 'Weapons do not respect sovereign borders'

The process of rapprochement between India and Pakistan began during the SAARC summit at Islamabad in January 2004. The two estranged neighbors set aside the bitterness of the recent past and decided to work together for peace and stability. That such a beginning could be made is itself a major achievement.

Analyses and discussions in matters relating to Indo-Pakistan economic relations continue to be marked by considerable wishful-thinking, superficial analysis and illusions. This article, in the form of questions and answers, tries to project the problem in its proper perspective.

Since January, 2004, there has been a wind of change in Indo-Pak relations for which credit has to be equally shared by Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, the former Prime Minister, and Dr.Manmohan Singh, the present. Rhetoric has given place to seeming reason and confrontation to conviviality.

As part of the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue process, the two countries will hold official-level talks in nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) on June 19-20, 2004. This is a welcome development since the last round of such discussions was held at the ill-fated Lahore summit in February 1999, even though the CBMs agreed upon were rather general in nature and, at least in spirit, the Pakistan army was not a willing party to them.

The pressures to change in Pakistan are real. It is not inconceivable that over a period of time, Islamabad will recognise that there are alternatives for Pakistan to exercise regional influence.

There is very little doubt that there would be a change of Government in Delhi from June, 2014. It is also most likely that the new Government will be that of the National Democratic Alliance. The BJP is the largest single party among the NDA constituents who will present the new Prime Minister.

As a precursor to the wider project of energy cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia, India and Pakistan must take baby steps towards energy trading as part of their ongoing trade liberalisation. Petro-products delivered by Indian refineries in the north and west to Punjab and Sindh regions would save Pakistan at least $14 per barrel of oil.

A desire to find a solution to the conflict that plagues both India and Pakistan was the common thread that run through the discussion at ORF on the bilateral relations and the way forward between Indian experts and retired military officials from Pakistan.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's vision of making borders with Pakistan irrelevant seems to have made a measured beginning on the ground.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's initiatives at Sharm-el-Sheikh (Egypt), Thimpu and Chandigarh to improve relations with Pakistan, viewed with much skepticism at the time, were far-sighted. It is time now for even bolder steps.

In a scenario, where there is virtually no interaction between dispassionate sections of the populace who have no vested interested in conflict and acrimony, it is not very tough to up the ante and exacerbate tensions on an issue that should actually encourage cooperation.

Though domestic politics will continue to pose challenges to Dr Manmohan Singh's image, his firm commitment to Indo-Pak engagement has put both countries on course for at least a manageable relationship, if not a cordial one, based on mutual interests rather than vicissitudes and emotions.

The Observer Research Foundation hosted at round-table discussion on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal of July 18, 2005 to look at the hurdles that are being faced in its implementation. Since the agreement was signed, it has been the subject of intense debate and varied interpretation by interested groups in both the countries.

Despite unhappiness and disappointments in India over the repeated US failure since 1981 to call Pakistan to account for its sponsorship of terrorism against India in an attempt to achieve its strategic objectives, a consensus has developed since the terrorist strikes of 9/11 that the Indo-US Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism as developed since 1981 should be kept sustained and further developed.

Much like the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, Indo-U.S. cyber engagement appears to have plateaued and could benefit from a tailored reset. Adopting various measures to ensure trust in defence hardware is essential to both India and the United States, and should therefore be explored as a mechanism for deeper cooperation.

Though domestic politics have not always promoted closer US-India defence cooperation, changed geopolitical context, regional and global advances now pull India and America together, says the US co-chair of the DTTI, Frank Kendall. Even perceptions of security challenges of both the countries are increasingly converging.

On 25th February, the US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said, ¿We would expect those negotiations will continue by phone, document and the like, probably up through the President¿s visit.¿ The Indo US nuclear deal is not over: it has entered the last few hours of hard bargaining.

Despite a few hiccups in the initial years of the Obama administration, relationship now stands at a comfortable juncture of increased confidence and a substantially high level of cooperation across a host of issues including Afghanistan where the US, despite some initial apprehensions, now increasingly see India's role as positive in nature and pivotal for the economic resurgence of the Afghan people.

Observer Research Foundation in collaboration with RAND organized a two-day Indo-US Strategic Dialogue at ORF Campus, New Delhi, on December 10 and 11, 2003.