Originally Published 2003-10-13 09:25:22 Published on Oct 13, 2003
THE politician's lust for power is a significant factor that has allowed the People's War Group (PWG) Naxalites to grow and gain in strength. Routinely, several political leaders at various levels have sought the rebels' support to win elections. In April 2003, a local legislator in Warangal district went to pay "homage" to a PWG leader killed in a police encounter, Polam Sudarshan Reddy "Ramakrishna",
Nexus with politicians helping the PWG
THE politician's lust for power is a significant factor that has allowed the People's War Group (PWG) Naxalites to grow and gain in strength. Routinely, several political leaders at various levels have sought the rebels' support to win elections. In April 2003, a local legislator in Warangal district went to pay "homage" to a PWG leader killed in a police encounter, Polam Sudarshan Reddy "Ramakrishna", an accused in 1042 criminal offences and the then member of the North Telengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC)-the PWG's flagship guerrilla zone. In another incident a few days ago, on September 18, the police arrested a local-level people's representative, Nanam Raja Reddy, for helping the Naxalites. There were other similar cases in the past, too. In late 2001, some local-level leaders in the same district were held for helping in a Naxalite plot to blow up a "model" extremist police station in Kataram, designed specially to withstand an armed attack.
 
Testifying before the Advocate's Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh, many political leaders admitted that there exists an "active" politician-Naxalite nexus. A lack of political will and expediency has led to successive governments being lenient towards the PWG. In the meantime, the rebels had their sight firmly fixed on their goals even as they struck alliances of convenience or have diluted their ideological and organisational rigour. They seem to be following the classic dictum Mao Zedong had laid in his "On Contradictions" - of co-opting, working with and abandoning the various classes of society in the interest of the revolution. The PWG's highest leadership is moulded in strong ideological commitment and is clear-minded while the lower rung is no better than any riff-raff. Being a bottom-down organisation, the PWG has thus been able to survive despite the numerous losses it had incurred over the past several years. The most prominent loss has been that of the killing of three of its central committee members in a controversial encounter in 1999.

The rebels promise to free society of all forms of exploitation. Therefore, they are able to connect with the people in their pockets of influence. They had eliminated in cold-blood local feudal landlords like Maddunur Rajeswara Rao and Rejpalli Venkata Reddy. Since then their executions have evoked fear and deference. The Naxalites behave like modern-day Robin Hoods and are viewed as selfless fighters, committed to a cause and volunteering to face a harsh underground life and willing to die at the hands of the "enemy" - the police.

The misdemeanours of the Naxalites are either brushed aside as negligible aberrations or are suppressed. The rebels ill-treat women cadres and exploit them. One arrested Naxalite told this author in 2002 that his colleague was asked to apologise for misbehaving with a young female relative of their hostess. Another women cadre was bold enough to question the immoral deeds of her district committee secretary and was, therefore, made to quit the PWG. She was attracted towards the PWG by an inspiring song a visiting guerrilla squad sang in her village. Not only this, the rebels field child combatants in their ranks, both boys and girls.

In fact, the PWG's chief military strategist, Nambala Kesava Rao, said in December 2002 that the rebels hoped to recruit 3000 fresh cadres by May 2003. There is, however, no information on the extent of the success of the plan.

While the rebels have been gaining in strength, the government vacillates between intense security force operations in some parts of the state and laxity in some others, even as it encourages surrenders and rehabilitation, or holding talks -like the failed "talks about talks" earlier in 2002.

Furthermore, the surrender and rehabilitation policy has been grossly misused by some of those who had surrendered. After surrendering each person is given a handsome amount - Rs 5 lakh - for rehabilitation, besides a "modest" sum of Rs 5,000 at the time of the surrender to cover immediate expenses. Some of the surrendered Naxalites have turned into a gang of criminals leading the land mafia and extortion rackets, especially in Hyderabad. Kattula Sammaih was a forerunner to such persons before he died mysteriously in Colombo in a freak fire accident. Thereafter, there emerged on the scene notorious persons like Naeemuddin, Eedanna, Jadala Nagarju and Sammi Reddy. They had linked up with powerful real estate dealers in Hyderabad, earned vast amounts, struck and broke deals, abducted and killed one another and had maintained illicit relationships. They cleverly flaunted their "utility" to the police and, meanwhile, indulged in criminal activities. The "unlucky" ones had to wait for months at end to "receive" the cash that has been promised because of bureaucratic red-tape. Meanwhile, a few of them returned to the Naxalite fold.

In order that the Naxalite menace is successfully tackled, a well-defined, coordinated and coherent policy, and not expedient political alliances, is necessary. In its absence the Naxalites will march ahead emboldened by their "successful and spectacular" acts of terror to occupy power in Hyderabad by 2020 and in Delhi by 2050, as they claim.

The writer is a Research Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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