Sanctions are in news again, this time in context of North Korea. Responding to North Korea's third round of nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2094 on March 7, which imposed new economic sanctions against the country. Although announced within hours of North Korea threatening US with a "pre-emptive" strike, the decision was taken after extensive discussions between the US and China. While the
regional dynamics of the test were being explored, North Korea reacted aggressively to the new sanctions. Besides threats to retaliate with "crushing strikes", it declared the cancellation of non-aggression pact with South Korea and terminated a hotline between Pyongyang and Seoul. Meanwhile, asserting that this round of sanctions will be effective, Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, proclaimed, "these sanctions will bite, and bite hard." However, Resolution 2094 has sparked a debate, not only about the efficacy of this relatively new tool of statecraft, popularly termed sanctions, but also of North Korea as a defiant regime.
Sanctions and North Korea
It was in 2006 that the United Nations first sanctioned North Korea, soon after its first round of nuclear tests. The sanctions, imposed under Resolution 1718, were both punitive as well as defensive, prohibiting countries from transferring dual use items, luxury goods and heavy military equipment to North Korea. Nevertheless, six-party talks, initiated in 2003, resumed after the test and resulted in easing of tensions and some positive developments. However, the detente was short lived, as tensions spurred up again in 2009. This time, North Korea's attempt to launch a satellite using ballistic missile technology became the reason for international condemnation. Miffed, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks. The same year, North Korea tested another nuclear device, which compelled the United Nations to adopt Resolution 1874, tightening trade restrictions and enforcing financial sanctions on one of the world's most isolated economies. The resolution also called on countries to check North Korean vessels at their ports and high seas for cargo prohibited by the United Nations resolutions.
Estimating the exact impact of sanctions on North Korea is hard, especially because it does not share its economic data. However, it is evident that the sanctions have not been able to change the behaviour and policies of North Korea. One of the key reasons for the failure of sanctions is believed to be China's disregard for them. China, a key actor in the region, is known to help North Korea, especially in the fields of banking and trans-shipping. It has also never published the list of luxury goods banned for export to North Korea. Interestingly, export of luxury goods is believed to have risen over the
years. However, China's active cooperation in punishing North Korea this time around is a positive contribution. If China abides by Resolution 2094, North Korea's proliferation activities can be checked, even if not entirely stopped.
US sanctions and non-proliferation regime
Presently, the main norms and practices of the non-proliferation regime are found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, rules and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various United Nations resolutions. Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, is by far the most important multilateral nuclear arms control agreement. With non-proliferation as one of the significant foreign policy objectives, the US has led the non-proliferation regime. Over the years, economic coercion has become a significant ingredient of the broader US non-proliferation strategy. The sanctions law enacted in 1974, as a reaction to India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" was the first non-proliferation sanction law implemented by the US. Currently, it has in place a number of domestic laws to support the global non-proliferation regime. The Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) is the most frequently used law to impose penalties on entities and individuals for transfer to, or acquisition of equipment and technology controlled under multilateral control lists. China, a major critic of sanctions, especially unilateral economic sanctions, has often opposed the resulting restrictions. Before North Korea's February 12 nuclear test, China vehemently criticised US for enforcing
sanctions on Chinese firms under the provisions of the INKSNA.
Especially since 2006, Iran and North Korea's nuclear related activities have been considered detrimental to the non-proliferation regime. With North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the great powers have become concerned about the resulting weakness of the non-proliferation regime. Resorting to a three-pronged approach consisting of diplomacy, threat of use of military force and sanctions, much has been done to invigorate the fast dissipating regime. However, the results have not been encouraging.
Preoccupied with enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, United Nations Security Council members have often chosen to avoid a discussion on North Korea's regime type. Nevertheless, some economists and international relations theorists have thrown significant light on North Korea's defiant regime that has refused to bow down to sanctions. Termed as an "inward looking regime", North Korea has seldom shown regard for international approval or the "taboo" associated with nuclear acquisition. The US threats and its troop presence in South Korea are alleged to have contributed to North Korean insecurity, but its drive to develop more nuclear weaponry cannot be understood without taking into account domestic dynamics. To bring about a genuine change in North Korea's behaviour, its internal dynamics will have to be considered. Merely making the sanctions "bite" may not suffice.
(The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
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