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It has become apparent that there have been grave failures somewhere — but more likely in multiple places — in the Indian intelligence chain, as i

Canada’s world-class energy resources and national interests in global energy diplomacy must be articulated coherently and to the fullest

China's Blue Book sees the US as a pivot to Asia and strengthening of alliances in the region is viewed by the Chinese analyst as being directed to contain China. The Blue Book also notes that India's defence cooperation with the US, Japan, Vietnam and Australia has strengthened it. India has to act with maturity while dealing with the resurgent China.

Can China be meaningfully engaged on issues like the border or the boundary? The answer is a resounding 'no'. The Chinese leadership structure is in flux. All the meaningful rapprochements and border resolutions were carried out either in the Mao or the Deng era. Since then, China's leaders have been too weak and fearful of internal coups to move forward in a meaningful way.

The Indian Army’s (IA) difficulties with regard to the acquisition of light tanks are as much self-inflicted as they are a product of fiscal constraints. The Army has exerted only half-hearted efforts in developing its light-armoured capabilities—inconsistent with current Army doctrine and in disregard of history. Indeed, the IA has used light armour in high-altitude operations in the past. This paper argues that the IA is hobbled by an infan

Amidst the war of words between China and India and the ongoing economic crisis, Sri Lanka may be forced to make tough choices.

China’s maritime economic initiative, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) that is part of the larger One Belt One Road (OBOR), has been under considerable international focus recently. India, for its part, has remained non-committal despite China’s charmed offensive. However, with the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, both of which exclude the growing economies of I

India's Pakistan policy is now inextricably linked to its China policy.

Growing economic protectionism and recurrent geo-economic and geo-political tensions in recent years are testing the resilience of the global economic order. Erstwhile proponents of globalisation such as the United States and the European Union are themselves recoiling from the global value chains that are over-reliant on China. As the localisation of goods and services has become more critical, it calls to question the viability of a globalised

India as an external power is keen to play the role of a credible stabilising factor in the South China Sea region and cannot afford to be ambivalent. The advantages of taking a stand are many. Such a venture in the South China Sea will give India strategic leverage. Hence joining the fray is not an option but an imperative to safeguard our strategic interests and aspirations.

The Russia-India-China trilateral meet is New Delhi’s attempt to overcome challenges in ties with Moscow and Beijing

The next government must recognise that the Bay of Bengal is no longer a backwater but a strategic hub connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans as well as China and the Bay of Bengal. Delhi must match its rhetoric on trans-border connectivity with much needed political will and administrative competence.

MIRV is a complex technology, and India’s test this week puts it among a small group of countries that have managed to develop it.

India must offer lucrative alternatives that focus on development and ensure early completion of its current projects to maintain its footprint in Mal

India’s plan for naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter China’s military power in the Indian Ocean

Building a set of flexible Asian coalitions that do not include America or China should become a critical element of India's strategy of coping with the historic power shift in Asia and the uncertain evolution of US-China relations.

From offering to mediate on Jammu and Kashmir to expressing willingness to rename the CPEC, is China signalling a softening of its stance?

Maritime power projection, and not sea denial, is the answer to China’s creeping assertiveness in South Asia.

As Maldives faces a complex economic landscape driven by import dependencies and fiscal policy challenges, strategic policymaking is imperative

The recent decision by Maldives to revoke the hydrographic survey agreement with India is indicative of the ebbing of trust between the two

A few incidents in four weeks, and the Maldivian Government is not taking any chances. The illegal import of five double-edged swords and some 'toy guns', shipped from China, and that of a stun-gun and face-mask as

Maldives’ latest India-funded project has stark differences from China-funded ventures

All nations, including India, would be watching for inclinations on how the ‘new Maldives’ intends to avoid a China-induced ‘debt-trap’ of the

Neither Yameen, nor his ministers have explained how getting eternally indebted to China would help in the economic independence of Maldives.

While there is greater cohesion in the government’s response to India-centric development agreements, it is also seeking to keep the China relations

The balanced approach adopted by Maldives highlights how the Maldivian foreign policy has evolved under the Solih presidency

Tensions in Asia are rising over unresolved territorial disputes and sovereignty issues. In contrast to the immediate post-Cold War period, recent tensions are characterised by the evident proclivity of some, if not all, parties towards the threat or use of limited force.

The fact that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has so far avoided giving any direct official comment on the Manmohan Singh-Bush Joint Statement, needs to be weighed carefully for its significance.

Muizzu’s foreign policy seems to have three objectives: reduce dependence on India, increase cooperation with China, and diversify relations with ot

The US has provided financial and military support to Ukraine since 2014, when Russia took control of Crimea, and more firmly since February 2022, when the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war began. Indeed, US military, political, and strategic support to Ukraine is crucial to Kyiv as the conflict continues. For the Biden administration, aid to Ukraine is a vital principle on which his party politics hinges; it is a critical pathway to rebuild transatlant

Growing maritime competition in the Indian ocean has compelled India to engage in maritime diplomacy with the Quad countries to upkeep its commitment

India’s geography lends itself favourably to the cultivation and expansion of maritime ties. Yet, for much of the country’s contemporary history, the country has overlooked these opportunities. As the world reengages with its vast ocean spaces, India too, has become more willing and capable of participating in the maritime domain. This paper outlines the evolution of the country’s maritime outlook as it shifts its largely continental-orient

In recent years, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the South-West Indian Ocean (SWIO) region have emerged as vital security and developmental partners in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—thereby gaining prominence in India’s foreign policy priorities. This paper examines India’s bilateral and multilateral engagement with the SIDS of the SWIO region, and argues that India should consider the concerns of the

This paper examines security collaboration in the Bay of Bengal. It argues that despite increased cooperation in the maritime domain, the security perceptions of Bay states differ significantly, arising primarily from disagreements associated with China’s presence in the region. Crucially, the Bay states are wary of being seen as siding with India to counterbalance China. Even in nontraditional security areas where cooperation is readily possib

During a lecture on 'Japan's foreign policy: Strategy and practice', Japan's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Akitaka Saiki reiterated the Japanese position that the security issues in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and East China Sea cannot be treated separately.

At this juncture of weak economic performance, India has done well not to sign the treaty. It can still join if its main complaint about rapid tariff reduction by 80 to 90 per cent on imports from China is resolved. Also, its concerns about services have to be dealt with, especially regarding the movement of service workers within the region. India could not at this point have opened its huge market to ASEAN and China unconditionally.

The inclusion of soft power initiatives under the BRI shows the urgency on the Chinese side to project the wheels of BRI as moving in Nepal

At the current rate of urbanisation, India would have taken two and a half centuries to urbanise to the current US levels, as against two centuries fo

With Maldives veering towards China, Mauritius is emerging as a decisive factor in ensuring India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean Region

After years of facing a global pushback against its revisionist agenda, Beijing has become aware of the need to project a softer image

If efforts to dilute tensions between the West and Russia fail, Delhi will have to intensify its engagement with Moscow to develop the relationship as leverage against what is perceived to be India's primary strategic challenge - the rise of China. India and Russia will have to creatively use various forums to circumscribe Chinese power.

In today’s world, the role of major and middle powers is more critical than ever in ensuring that wider developmental concerns are addressed

Amid the ongoing fundamental changes in the international order, such as the growing bipolar competition between the US and China and the promotion of multipolarity, middle powers may take more ownership of conflict points such as Afghanistan. To comprehend this possibility, it is important to trace the evolution of middle powers in the Persian Gulf. This paper looks at the complexities of the Gulf middle power states, with Afghanistan as the the

At a time when India flaunts its 'arms card' to woo global arms suppliers, its attitude towards strengthening its R&D base has been pathetic. Indian spending on R&D (less than $2 bn) is one-fiftieth of that of the US ($96 bn) and one-fifteenth that of China ($32 bn).