Li Keqiang's India visit has given rise to two sets of extreme emotions with very little middle ground to straddle. The pessimists point to China's 'congenital aggression', as former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it, while the optimists point to that other Americanism, "It's the economy, stupid!" The pessimism here needs some tempering but the optimism much more so.
The pessimists forward two issues - Chinese nuclear and missile proliferation on one hand, and the unsettled border on the other, which was brought into sharp focus these last few weeks. The reality is that the Chinese missile programme and nuclear proliferation are only likely to continue as the strategic rationale for them cannot be done away with. China does not like allies. Allies bring assets, but they also bring liabilities, which China has no intention of shouldering. Consequently, Beijing prefers relatively independent rogues like Pakistan and North Korea that destabilise the region, but have complete strategic autonomy that nuclear weapons confer. This gives China the ability to look others straight in the face and claim - very honestly - that they had nothing to do with any serious provocation.
The problem, however, is that China scores several self-goals in the process. It is this exact preference for rogue actors, which explains for India and much of the South China sea gravitating into the US orbit. As a result, China is cyclically forced to use its Security Council vetoes to prevent its autonomous 'associates' from being sanctioned, and in the process severely erode China's plausible deniability. For example, China has repeatedly shielded North Korea from harsher sanctions, and has routinely prevented several Pakistan-based terror groups from being branded terrorists.
On the border issue, far too much has been said this week to be repeated. But the core problem here seems to be China's inability/unwillingness to discuss hard issues. To say this is a cultural thing is borderline racist - yet the reality is that in negotiation after negotiation, no single country has been able to get China to agree to facts on the ground or meaningfully discuss matters. Much of this has to do with the skeletons in Beijing's closet which, if admitted to, will cost it significantly at the negotiating table. For example, if China admits to Pakistan being a staging-post of terror attacks on India and the most likely place where
jihadis will first get their hands on nuclear weapons, they in effect sell out Pakistan, and lose leverage in Islamabad.
The argument of insulating the border dispute from the economic or cultural relationship is a very dangerous one. This is a Nehruvian formula, that Sardar Patel had repeatedly warned against. In the end - as usual - Patel was proven right and Jawaharlal Nehru wrong. It's amazing, therefore, that such solutions still do the rounds and find precious print space.
The question then is: Can China be meaningfully engaged on issues like the border or the boundary? The answer is a resounding 'no'. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the Chinese leadership structure is in flux. All the meaningful rapprochements and border resolutions were carried out either in the Mao or the Deng era. Since then, China's leaders have been too weak and fearful of internal coups to move forward in a meaningful way.
But here we also need to introspect. For years, India has allowed China to go ahead with infrastructure projects in Tibet - that have a powerful economic rationale - without reciprocal constructions on our side of the border. In fact, for the last 67 years, due to antiquated and discredited notions of economics we hold dear, we have deliberately impoverished our border regions and destroyed livelihoods. Consequently, when in the last few years, major projects were announced, they have always had a military, not economic, rationale. Adding a further two mountain divisions aimed at China has only reinforced the military message. We can hardly feign surprise or innocence when China reacts the way it does.
The optimists point to the massive increase in trade between the two countries. The current nature of trade is however colonial - exploitative in nature; China removes raw materials from India and sells back to India processed goods. This is very similar to the nature of trade British India enjoyed with Britain. Far from being a lubricator, this kind of trade actually makes war more likely. Invariably a supplier nation will feel the necessity to take over its main supplier of raw materials for a variety of complex reasons. This was true 4,000 years ago, when Egypt felt the need to take over Nubia; 2,000 years ago when Rome felt the need to take over Gaul; and 300 years ago when Britain felt the need to take over India. America, because it moved to pure capitalism from mercantilism, has achieved this through other more enlightened means.
What is needed, therefore, is a shift to a more American approach on the part of China, where, instead of mere extraction and supply, China integrates India into its global supply chain, making it an indispensible partner. But this is impossible. Much of the Chinese economy is in fact state-run. State demand accounts for 70 per cent of China's national demand. Only 14 of the major state conglomerates are profitable; the rest are in deep loss and, due to opacity, no one knows the exact rate of indebtedness or loan defaults. It is the profit of the 14 that keeps the other loss-making enterprises afloat. Exacerbating this is the nature of Chinese manufacture. Due to a variety of complex reasons they have been unable to climb up the value chain. Consequently, China will in the foreseeable future always be linked to a mercantilist view of foreign affairs, and will be unable to integrate allies into its supply chains.
It is, therefore, one thing to demand that China be meaningful and accept India as a partner, integrate it into supply chains and move ahead. Ground reality dictates that this simply will not happen.
What are we likely to see is a slew of recommendatory Op-eds: China should do a b c, India should do x y z. There will be lots of toasting, back- clapping and obsequious platitudes. Statements will be made of promise and hope. In the end though, everything will go back to what it has been because, as Julius Caesar would say, "The Die has been cast". But it was cast long back, and the results are obvious for all to see - if only they would bother to look.
(The writer is a Programme Coordinator with Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
Courtesy : The Pioneer, May 21, 2013
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