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Indian diplomacy seems to be drawing a blank when it comes to regional cooperation involving fine diplomacy and seasoned statecraft. The recent events relating to India's attempts towards getting natural gas from Bangladesh and Myanmar and the negative response from Bangladesh suggest that it is unlikely to obtain any gesture of

By broadening the scope of bilateral cooperation from the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to encompass the entire Indo-Pacific region, the India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap, released in July 2023, underscores the importance of moving beyond the traditional self-centred approach to foster a more outward-looking dynamic with key regional partners. The cooperative trilateral mechanisms established by India and France in 2020 (India-France-Australia) and i

Since Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the Indian prime minister and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe, have been instrumental in what has been the most dramatic leap forward in India-Japan bilateral relations. While the two countries have made strides in strengthening cooperation in recent years, there are limitations that need to be overcome. This brief examines the challenges that remain in the relationship, including their sub-par bila

This paper argues that even when the India-Japan-Australia minilateral is inspired by a need to ensure their interests against the current global power transition, it remains limited in its aim: to restrain China from achieving regional hegemony as it may threaten the liberal security order in the region. In the face of China’s rise and the US’ retrenchment, Asia’s regional powers are hedging their bets on a regional security order that is

India's urgent requirements for hydrocarbons seem to be prompting it to look for proverbial strange bedfellows. Shrugging off the ideological baggage of the Cold War era and the Nehruvian idealism, India is all set to pursue a realistic foreign policy.

Ceasefire along LoC has not really solved any of India's problems.There exists a dire need to look beyond the existing CBMs of providing advance warnings for military exercises and ballistic missile tests which are relatively "high level" issues.

The insistent demands today that India adopt an inflexible and hard policy will only undermine the larger strategy. Were an alternative strategy and tactical mix on offer, it would be something worth considering, but the only items on the menu offered by the chicken hawks are jingoistic slogans and war cries.

India’s relations with Russia have made little progress since they got stalled following the end of the Cold War. Today their bilateral ties—officially labelled “special and privileged strategic partnership”—focus heavily on defence cooperation, while the economic partnership remains listless even as the respective relations of the two with other states have grown rapidly. This paper analyses the ebbs and flows of India-Russia relations

India’s growing strategic importance as a balance to China in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as convergence between New Delhi and Washington DC about Beijing’s aggressive stance on emerging technology, have resulted in warming relations between the United States (US) and India. Indeed, in recent years, there has been a spur of cooperative agreements between the two sides on domains such as defence technology, 5G, and semiconductors. This br

India’s ties with the UK are at an interesting crossroads. Regardless of the direction taken, relations seem poised to move in an upward trajectory

On June 14, the British newspaper, Times London, broke the story about issuing of British travel documents, on the recommendation of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in 2014,

Land, over which many battles and even wars have been fought since time immemorial, is once again an issue over which the BJP-led NDA government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the opposition are engaged to change people?s perception so that their votes could be won in coming electoral battles.

The doctrine’s ambitious purpose, in principle, is to help provide a framework for an integrated approach to warfare by all the three branches of the Indian armed forces. However, the JDIAF makes little substantive progress toward force integration among the three services.

Contemporary seabed warfare in Europe should be viewed as a warning for Indian Ocean littoral states, especially sophisticated regional maritime powers such as India and Australia. The Ukraine–Russia conflict has brought seabed warfare to the fore, as seabed critical infrastructure is once again the target of international conflict. This brief surveys European seabed warfare developments since 2021, how various European actors are responding, a

New Delhi requires partners both outside and inside Afghanistan to protect its presence and interests in the war-torn country.

This paper examines India’s role, and stakes, in the so-called ‘Arctic Paradox’: As the Arctic region witnesses an unprecedented rate of ice-melt because of global warming, new routes are being opened, paving the way for untapped hydrocarbon and mineral resources to be exploited. While India has been active in the Arctic for over ten years, it has not fully made use of its Observer status, and it must give new energy to its activities in th

Nuclear cooperation has brought a new dimension to India’s diplomacy in the 21st century. India’s status as a responsible nuclear power is predicated upon the civil relationships in the nuclear domain that it has established with major powers. This, despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and operating outside the ambit of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This brief analyses the impact of key agreements with different count

The November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai the commercial capital of an economically resurgent India?left a deep and indelible impact on the Indian security psyche. The attacks exposed the lackadaisical attitude of the Government, at both the Central and state level, towards coastal security and the sheer illpreparedness of the country to combat such terror threats from the seas.

In the past decade, India has successfully demonstrated the three pillars of effective deterrence—capability, credibility, and communication—in its strategic posture towards China. It has bolstered its defence diplomacy with key partners in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and across the broader Indo-Pacific region, through regular joint military exercises, military officers exchange programmes, frequent high-level diplomatic visits, and the co

The United States (US)-China trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic fundamentally altered global trade patterns, revealing critical supply chain vulnerabilities. US tariffs pushed companies to shift manufacturing to more favourable locations, accelerating “friendshoring” to countries like India and Vietnam. The “China plus one” strategy has bolstered domestic manufacturing and attracted foreign investment through Production Linked Incentive

India’s attempts at strengthening its intelligence infrastructure and capabilities have historically been reactive and incremental, rather than holistic and sustainable. This was seen, for instance, in the aftermath of the Kargil War, and following the terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. India has rarely undertaken proactive reforms and done little to implement corrective measures subsequent to these crises. This brief offers recommendat

Energy transitions in developing economies like India are complex processes involving substantial financial and technological resources as well as appropriate innovation. These transitions are central to the climate debate, where emphasis is placed on increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change. This paper examines the historical attributes of energy transition and finds various critical

The Sino-India bilateral relationship has been premised on an understanding that the two nations can move forward on other areas of engagement as the border remains “hot” with military activity. Chinese actions are producing the opposite effect of what was intended, and India is now willing to adopt policies with a strong anti-China orientation.

The Integrated Defence Staff released the first-ever public joint doctrine for the Indian armed forces (JDIAF-2017) in April 2017. Absent a publicly articulated national security strategy, the joint doctrine presents important clues about what that strategy might be. This paper examines JDIAF-2017 in conjunction with other Indian military doctrines, public writings of leading Indian strategists, as well as foreign military doctrines and strategie

This report is part of the Observer Research Foundation’s “Financing Green Transitions” series which aims to find potential linkages between private capital, in all its forms, and climate action projects. The series will primarily examine domestic and international barriers to private capital entry for mitigation oriented climate projects, while also examining potential avenues for private capital flow entry towards adaptation and resilienc

The Western Indian Ocean Region (WIOR) is linked to India in several ways, yet it remains conspicuous in its absence from India’s foreign policy discourse. This lack of attention is now beginning to reverse as external players stake their geopolitical claims in the region. India has responded by reorienting its own nautical outlook towards WIOR and building friendly relationships with African countries that straddle the region. This bri

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 changed the strategic dynamics in the region. For India, the new regime and its attendant risks—especially the threat of terrorism—quickly put it in an unenviable position. This brief assesses India’s policy towards Afghanistan since August 2021. It will cover how India has articulated its Afghan policy, domestically and in multilateral organisations, and its incremental

The security dimension of Chabahar is based on a preferential approach towards Indian interests rather than one based on exclusivity by Iran

Nine months after the surgical strikes, what is the verdict on the efficacy to deter Pakistan from its sub-conventional warfare?

In the Trump 2.0 era, India’s pivot toward bilateral trade deals with trusted Western economies has become a necessity rather than a choice.

From elections in India to Trump running the Presidential show on his terms, to Brexit — here is a wrap of what to look forward to in 2019.

Why does India have so few available options to manage security threats? In crisis management, Indian policy-makers have faced all-or-nothing choices, either passively absorbing provocations, or overreacting with massive mobilisations and threats of general war. In wartime, with the notable exception of the 1971 war, India has generally fought to degrade enemy military capabilities rather than to achieve decisive operational effects. This paper a

As a precursor to the wider project of energy cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia, India and Pakistan must take baby steps towards energy trading as part of their ongoing trade liberalisation. Petro-products delivered by Indian refineries in the north and west to Punjab and Sindh regions would save Pakistan at least $14 per barrel of oil.

Since the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, Indonesia has endeavoured to play a leading role in shaping Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture; this continues to be true amidst the more recent shifts taking place in the global geopolitical landscape. Accordingly, the nature of Jakarta’s contributions towards Southeast Asian security reflects the dynamics of its national foreign policy dec

Its future will be defined by how it responds to the crisis in Ukraine, and in the shadow of growing Russia-China ties

A Brahmaputra-class guided missile warship, the Betwa was in the process of undocking when the unfortunate incident occurred, killing two sailors and injuring another fifteen.

That there is massive change in the mindset of Pakistanis towards India is an impression that this writer got during a visit to Pakistan last August. This impression has got further strengthened during a recently concluded visit. The desire for peace with India is no longer limited to the usual suspects; rather it is to be found even in the quintessential establishment types who have traditionally thrived on India-baiting.

That there is massive change in the mindset of Pakistanis towards India is an impression that this writer got during a visit to Pakistan last August. This impression has got further strengthened during a recently concluded visit. The desire for peace with India is no longer limited to the usual suspects; rather it is to be found even in the quintessential establishment types who have traditionally thrived on India-baiting.

Today's intelligence agencies operate in highly complex environments. Cold War definitions and understanding of threats have long become redundant. Threats are multiple, layered, networked, diffused and transcend social and spatial boundaries.

Intelligence and the world of espionage are as old as history. Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of R, used to say that his friend, Comte Alexandre de Marenches, the French chief of intelligence during the Seventies, described this world as the best. Marenches used to say that espionage was an unscrupulous game played by gentlemen.

The public attribution of a cyber incident—undertaken coherently and underscored by robust decision-making—can be a useful tool for national security. India, thus far, has not publicly attributed any international cyber incident to a specific private perpetrator or nation-state. Studying the models framed by scholars based in other jurisdictions, this brief offers suggestions on how India can approach the issue of public attribution of cybera

Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) in India is enshrined in the Constitution and mandated under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act 2009. Yet, its implementation remains tentative for many reasons, primary of which is the absence of a clear government guideline regarding which Ministry is tasked with policymaking and implementation. This brief attempts to offer an answer for the government. It examines

Does India have any intention of assisting the US in invading and occupying Pakistan? And should India be part of such an adventure? What are the likely implications on India's security of such an action? These are questions that would normally fall in the realm of scenario building and war gaming.

On 6 November 2003, US President George W. Bush made an 'excellent¿ and ¿noble¿1 speech (much acclaimed by analysts and the media) at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, whereby he launched a new ¿forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East'.

I read with great interest your article titled "THE COMING WARS: What the Pentagon can now do in secret" carried by the "New Yorker" in its issue dated January 24, 2005, which is already on sale. The article is about US preparations for a possible covert operation against Iran's suspected military nuclear installations set up with Pakistani complicity.

Last week the curtains came down on the 21st century's first unjust war - the US involvement in Iraq. But worse may follow after the American pullout. The implications for India of further turmoil in the Persian Gulf, particularly Iraq are enormous.

Police and Army are perceived to be low . The mercenaries of the Iraqi members of the governing council such as Ahmed Chalabi are better paid. The staff of the Iraqi Police and Army were till recently not entitled to the war hazard allowance. A proposal to grant that allowance even to them was under consideration.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq in March-April 2003 by a 'Coalition of the Willing' led by the United States was the second part of the response to the outrage conducted by a non-state actor on September 11, 2001. This was perceived in Washington as a gift from history, an opportunity to reshape a region of crucial relevance to the politics and economics of the western world. The impulse for drastic action was greater because notwithstanding

The Mumbai blasts were an act of war against the Indian state; it would be naïve to term it as anything else. It was an act of terror to kill as many Indians as possible. It was an act enabled, to a large measure, by a growing perception among the terrorist groups, especially those operating from Pakistan, that the Indian state was soft and indolent.