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In the summer of 2015, India was at the receiving end of a series of national-security rovocations and, in each case, its response was symmetric and predictable. In response to a Iseasonal uptick in Line of Control (LoC) firings, India responded with its own proportionate firings. Following terrorist attacks in Gurdaspur and Udhampur, India denounced the terrorists and gathered evidence of their Pakistani origin. And then in response to Pakistan’s threat to meet with Kashmiri separatist leaders on the sidelines of National Security Adviser (NSA) level talks, India preempted Pakistan and cancelled the talks altogether.
This familiar cycle of Pakistani provocation and muted Indian response has become the baseline of security relations between the rivals. Occasionally, however, the pattern has been punctuated with the threat of general war. After the 2001 Parliament attack, for example, India mobilised its military for ten months, with the open threat of invading Pakistan along a broad front. Whether the provocation is small or large, India’s response has swung between stark binary choices: either continue diplomatic engagement in good faith, or suspend it; either maintain the peace, or start a general war.
Why does India have so few available options to manage security threats? India has often been praised for its ‘strategic restraint’ in eschewing war, such as after the major attacks of 2001 and 2008, and it undoubtedly displayed some forbearance in those cases. But its response was constrained not only by choice but also because it lacked useable military options. India has few available levers aside from the threat of general war with its neighbouring states. Even in war, India has few operational options aside from attritional conventional war. India has fought six wars since Independence, most of which exacted a high cost simply to maintain the status quo. In both crisis and war, Indian performance has suffered because of a lack of options.
This paper argues that a deeply ingrained preference for what is called the ‘direct approach’ in warfare has limited the tools of statecraft available to India, in the process compromising its war fighting and crisis management. The ‘indirect approach’, which could create more options against a wider array of threats, has generally been missing from India’s strategic repertoire. The arguments in this essay unfold in three parts. First, the paper explains the distinction between the direct and indirect approaches in warfare, and how India’s abiding preference for the direct approach has had adverse effects on how it has tackled its various crises and wars. Second, the essay outlines the reasons for such preference, showing how they are rooted in the structure and culture of India’s national security apparatus. Finally, the Brief closes by arguing that the prospect of India developing new force options is unlikely and carries its own risks for regional security.
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