Search

The elimination of nuclear weapons is a pre-condition for peace in the 21st century. This was the key message delivered by the Hon'ble Senator Douglas Roche, renowned campaigner for nuclear disarmament in his address to Indian experts at the ORF campus in New Delhi.

India and Pakistan could demonstrate their responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons by launching a bilateral initiative on HINW.

In February 2004, President George Bush outlined his new nuclear non-proliferation approach, in his ¿seven points¿ speech at the National Defense University. It include the setting up of proliferation security initiative which will control and monitor not only shipments and nuclear transfer of material/technology but also will be empowered to take direct action against the violators of the law.

This research provides an empirical analysis of India’s limited, but transformative position in the global nuclear order. By examining India’s bid for a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership, this paper makes three major arguments. First, India’s attempt to acquire veto power status through the NSG challenges classical revisionism in international relations theory. Second, India’s rise through the NSG is based on selective coalition-bu

With a number of African countries reworking their energy basket, Beijing could emerge as the partner country of choice

Nuclear states are clearly planning for the long-term future of their nuclear capabilities.

Exercise Sanghe Shakti, held over one week in Punjab in May 2006, was designed to test the Indian Army¿s new concept for offensive operations in the plains. This was the most recent in a series of annual exercises that have included Poorna Vijay (2001), Vijay Chakra, Divya Astra, Vajra Shakti (May 2005) and Desert Strike (November 2005), all of which were all aimed at concentrating and coordinating firepower and fine-tuning

Whichever way the conflict ends, one outcome is clear: Nuclear weapons are here to stay and any prospects for nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament have receded further.

Russia and China have been concerned about the US’s growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision-strike capabilities.

Securing Bangladesh's energy supply in the face of its growing needs has been the primary motivation for the country to sign the recent agreement with Russia for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

For India, the key implications come in the form of the direction China is headed on nuclear.

There is the possibility, albeit remote, of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Riyadh has always been unambiguous in its stance of acquiring a nuclear weapon if Iran does and the Kingdom's longstanding support for Pakistan's nuclear program alludes to this possibility.

There are two streams of debate on India’s current nuclear doctrine: one on its current interpretation and deducing its form and what such form means for India’s overall nuclear strategy; and another, more internal to India, on what should be the Indian nuclear doctrine with respect to the evolving nature of threats. The two debates are not mutually exclusive. However, neither of them have contended with all conventional contingencies, in par

Despite New Delhi’s continued hopes and some encouraging signs, significant challenges remain.

China's existing stand of moving ahead with its aggressive stance on nuclear policy clearly stems from Indo-US nuclear deal, which according to China, seriously damages the integrity and effectiveness of non-proliferation thereby setting dangerous precedence for other countries.

The successful tests of Chinese nuclear device WU-14 has brought the emphasis back on deploying effective ballistic missile defences. The Chinese test is also definitely going to speed up the US' quest for enhancing both its offensive and defensive technological capabilities.

Ahead of the anticipated Biden-Xi meeting, officials from both sides met in Washington for arms control and nonproliferation talks.

China’s evolving security dynamics with the United States have compelled it to rethink its nuclear strategy to achieve effective deterrence. It is aiming to modernise its nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through conventional-nuclear entanglement. Ambiguity will increase the risks of mischaracterisation and can have a destabilising impact on the Indo-Pacific region. This paper highlights two areas where India ought to be most c

China’s nuclear weapons arsenal has grown and modernised over the recent years, and current estimates say the country has 350 operational warheads ready for delivery, over 248 land-based ballistic missiles, and 72 sea-based ballistic missiles. China also has 20 nuclear gravity bombs and additional warheads intended to be armed on land- and sea-based missiles. This brief outlines a history of China’s nuclear weapons programme, scrutini

China’s nuclear expansion could lead to a spiraling arms race.

At a conference on "Civil Society and Nuclear Weapons Policy", organised by ORF and Chatham House in Bangkok, there was a general consensus among participants that the emphasis should be given on raising awareness on the various hazardous impacts of the nuclear weapons explosion, especially in the nuclear weapons states.

India should recognise that no country has a completely fool-proof mechanism and it should not get excessively defensive about its nuclear security policies and practices.

If massive retaliation is retained in the nuclear doctrine, it will be not because of its efficacy as a strategy of deterrence.

The nature of nuclear threat that India faces is not "binary" as India's concerns related with Pakistan and China are intertwined. The history behind China-Pakistan nuclear collusion makes it important to look into the "interlink".

Development and production of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan has increased the level of tensions in South Asia, though it has, in an attempt to ease global concerns over its development of TNWs, has assured that its top leadership will continue to have complete control over its TNWs if deployed.

China's decision to sell two additional nuclear power reactors to Pakistan has dimensions that need to be better understood. China is persisting with its internationally destabilizing proliferation activity.

No one believes that India would wipe out Lahore, if Pakistan used a low yield nuclear weapon against an Indian military formation, and that, too, in Pakistan.

Cyber security should take centrestage in nuclear-policymaking. This brief evaluates the current state of cyber security in India’s civilian and military nuclear systems, as gleaned from both incidents of breach on-ground and analyses in the public discourse. It outlines the level of threats faced in this domain, and makes a case for the development of policy measures for an integrated cyber-nuclear security strategy.

The Iran nuclear issue is touching yet another point of criticality. The build-up was evident to the naked eye, the crescendo almost predictable. It was six weeks ago that Secretary of Iran¿s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, expressed Teheran's frustration that EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) was stonewalling in the negotiations, meandering into blind alleys, lost in thoughts.

'Nuclear Security in India' Report, launched recently by former PM Envoy on Non-Proliferation Rakesh Sood, sets out a list of policy recommendations which essentially seeks to address the gaps that still remain in the overall architecture of nuclear security in the country.

Mr L V Krishnan, a Nuclear Scientist who had worked with the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, gave a presentation on the 'Future of Nuclear Weapons', at an Interaction in the ORF Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 29 December 2007.

The Power sector reforms in the country have presented the next strategic challenge that could redefine global interest in India. The country has set an ambitious target of producing 20,000 MW of Nuclear power by 2020 i.e. around 1000 MW of additional nuclear capacity per year for the next 17 years.

As the debate on restarting two nuclear reactors in Oi is hotting up in Japan, the Noda government needs to both give the newly announced nuclear regulatory body time to create the promised new regulations while also ensuring the people and industry do not suffer due to power shortage.

Intelligence agencies are prone to exaggerate an adversary’s capabilities. Indian intelligence in the mid-1970s, meanwhile, severely underestimated Pakistan’s nuclear cunning. For a crucial part of those years, India could not identify AQ Khan’s clandestine nuclear activities to acquire Uranium enrichment technology. This brief names three reasons: hubris, biases, and overlearning from one’s experiences. For New Delhi, this is as much a p

In the conventional escalation along the LAC, India cannot afford to ignore China’s expanding nuclear arsenal

The Doklam crisis of 2017 illustrates the increasing tension in India and China’s nuclear relationship. There are elements of stability and instability in such relationship, and this brief examines them. Stability, on one hand, is derived from a history of military and political restraint, ongoing institutionalised negotiations, and growing economic relations. However, the continuing border dispute and disagreement on a non-demarcated Line of A

Around the world, nuclear energy has taken a back seat because of the risks that reactors bring with them.

India's diluted version of the 'No First Use' nuclear doctrine makes an already dangerous security situation in South Asia more dangerous still. Everyone would be better off if the government did away with it.The problem is that no political group currently has the wherewithal to try to fix these ambiguities.