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Mr L V Krishnan, a Nuclear Scientist who had worked with the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, gave a presentation on the 'Future of Nuclear Weapons', at an Interaction in the ORF Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 29 December 2007.
Mr L V Krishnan, a Nuclear Scientist who had worked with the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, gave a presentation on the ’Future of Nuclear Weapons’, at an Interaction in the ORF Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 29 December 2007. In doing so, he made particular reference to the Indian context.
Mr Krishnan said that in the present-day world, nuclear weapons have become a necessity for national security. In the next 20-25 years, there are only possibilities of more weapons coming into the picture. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which were aimed at curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons and at the elimination of those weapons were facing a roadblock. The US was not supporting them. The US Government’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty too has made things difficult for any major international agreement on arm’s control, which was aimed at counter-proliferation.
Mr. Krishnan pointed out how nuclear weapons have undergone a change all over the world. From the mega-ton monstrosity of the Cold War era, they have been brought down to sub kilo-ton levels with tactical use. He went on to say that the operative difference between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons was getting diminished by the day. Nuclear weapons were increasingly becoming ’weapons of counter-value’, meant mainly for targeting civilian populations and cities, rather than being a ’weapon of counter-force’, meant for military targets. The nuclear doctrine of countries now allowed both tactical and strategic use of their nuclear arsenal.
In particular, Mr Krishnan went on to talk about the nuclear doctrine of three countries – India, Pakistan and China. He contexualised the Indian position to that in the immediate nuclear weapons neighbourhood. India had a clear-cut nuclear doctrine that specifically foreswore against ’first-use’. India considered nuclear weapon as a deterrent force, and the political authority was in full control of the military and the nuclear arsenal. In Pakistan, as in the US, there was no clear-cut nuclear doctrine. The military establishment was in full control of the nuclear arsenal and army professed a ’first-use’ doctrine. This meant that the nuclear weapons were considered a basic necessity and a vital military weapon. China, on the other hand, believed in a ’peaceful rise’ of the nation with a strong political authority. But the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was a separate entity, which could act on its own without any political interference. The Chinese weapons programme was aimed at countering the might of the US, and the Chinese weapons technology has gone to the outer space.
The issue here for India was to protect itself from the dual-threats from Pakistan and China. To neutralise China, India needed to develop ballistic missile defence systems. It also needed to prospect the outer space in terms of missile defence and for weakening the enemy satellite links. The Damocles’ Sword of Pakistan using a nuclear weapon in times of confrontation was something that India needed to be prepared for.
Points made during the discussion:
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