A tenuous ceasefire came into effect beginning midnight Damascus time on February 27, 2016. The ceasefire was facilitated by the agreement between Russia and the United States of America, co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group and the unanimous resolution of the United Nations Security Council to support the ceasefire in Syria. All parties to the agreement were called upon to fulfil their commitments to end hostilities. The ceasefire seems to be holding, except for some sporadic violations. Russia has halted air strikes that had hitherto pounded anti-government rebel strongholds and Islamic State assets. Syrian civilians have been under siege for quite some time, and the civil war and the IS's barbarism have taken over 300,000 lives and driven over 11 million Syrians out of their homes to become refugees.
In Syria and Iraq, the combination of State failure, civil war and the rise of the IS has created the most serious crisis in the region. Regional and extra-regional powers have created such a mess that no cohesive approach in dealing with the IS could be developed. External powers funded and supported disparate groups, resulting in the rise of extremist Islamic jihadist militias that now have territory and revenues to expand their depredations in the region and beyond. A political decision in favour of regime change in Syria led to a cul-de-sac and no external power displayed the will to change course, except to let regional players get sucked into the quagmire and wait for the final outcome. The Russian intervention was the first tangible step in getting Syria out of this rut.
Russia's muscular move delivered not only a much needed morale boost to the Syrian government but also assisted the government forces in gaining ground against the rebels and the IS. The tipping point was Russia's vigorous air strikes against rebel strongholds and IS positions and assets, successfully degrading their capabilities. Russia did not give up the diplomatic option and the constant exchanges between Russia, the US and the other P5+1 countries ultimately came to fruition with the unanimous UNSC resolution 2254.
The ceasefire in Syria has one important exception. The IS and the al-Nusra Front (an affiliate of al Qaida) are not part of the ceasefire agreement and will continue to be targeted, along with other assorted outfits that have been declared as terrorist organisations. Doubts persist about the sustainability of the ceasefire as some groups are excluded from it. American efforts to save the al-Nusra Front from further punishment from Russian air strikes did not succeed, again highlighting the irony of the US policy of supporting and protecting an affiliate of al Qaida in Syria. This alliance of convenience, to fight both the Bashar al-Assad government and the IS, has been the bedrock of US policy in Syria. It did not work. Russia, Iran and Syria resolutely opposed the US move and have continued to target the al-Nusra Front and the IS, as mandated by the UNSC resolution 2254 in December, 2015.
The ceasefire went into effect for the first time in many years since the fateful demonstrations in Syria in 2011 — a ripple effect of the Arab uprising that swept across many countries in North Africa and West Asia. Those demonstrations triggered a heavy-handed government crackdown and started the chain of events that has led to the virtual destruction of Syria, thanks to the role of external powers. The US-led regime-change policy, ably supported by its allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and major European powers, is the principle reason for the bloodshed, chaos and the rise of the IS. In pursuit of the goal of regime change, the US and its allies organised, armed and funded motley rebel groups to fight the Assad government.
These interventions have been spuriously justified under the garb of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) promoted by the Western powers to uphold human rights under authoritarian regimes. In fact, the R2P doctrine is another prophylactic for furthering geostrategic objectives. The US-led regime-change brigade failed to dislodge the Assad government, primarily because of the support extended by Iran and Russia. Syrian rebel groups supported by the US-coalition were a mosaic of competing interests with different external masters. The incoherence of this effort has not led to regime change or any solution but only to chaos and humanitarian disaster on a huge scale. There can be no worse example of external intervention in recent times than the Syrian case.
The ceasefire, in spite of doubts about its sustainability, is a prelude to a political process that may still be undermined by Russia and the US-led coalition, both pursuing conflicting objectives. The US coalition still wants to get rid of Assad and, therefore, is likely to sustain the anti-Assad Islamist groups excluded from the UN resolution. In contrast, Russia will continue to target these anti-Assad groups, as it has done since the air strikes began in September, 2015. There are still powerful, diehard cold warriors in the Barack Obama administration, particularly in the Central Intelligence Agency, who oppose diplomatic collaboration with Russia. They are itching to trip up Russia and ever-willing to repeat their historical baggage of intervention in Syria and other Arab countries.
The Middle East is in a situation of instability and transition. In the post-Cold-War era, the great powers have focused on their individual national interests, as the global struggle of the Cold War receded as the central arena of contestation between the two blocs. The end of the Cold War left the US in a position of unparalleled influence and power, giving it unprecedented freedom to act, as it did to reverse Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It also enabled the US to station its military forces in the Arabian Peninsula and provided the impetus to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestine issue in the Camp David Accords. The Nato-led assault on Libya, popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt — the so called Arab Spring movements — political rumblings in other Arab states, and the disastrous and unwarranted second American invasion of Iraq in 2003 were cataclysmic events that hastened the pace of geopolitical changes in the old Middle East.
The sectarian genie came out of the bottle in Iraq and has now caused one of the main cleavages in the region. American self-sufficiency in oil and gas, brought about by new fracking technologies that have unlocked the potential of shale oil and gas, has led to the waning of American oil-related strategic interests in the Middle East, which is today afflicted by State failure, civil war and political transformations induced by the home-grown Arab Spring. Although primarily directed at authoritarian governments, the political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt are also protests against external powers that have intervened, occupied, ruled and manipulated Middle East politics for over a thousand years after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate.
The US will continue to exercise the dominant external influence in the Middle East but at a less visible level, both by choice and constraints of exercising power in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The Iranian nuclear deal is a classic example of a choice made by the US with the backing of other P5 powers and Germany. The US pivot towards Iran will bring about fundamental changes in the power equations in the Middle East, as Iran will emerge as a powerful country, given its potential and influence in Iraq and Syria and over Hezbollah, Hamas and the Shia crescent.
This outcome has worried Israel considerably as is evident from the utterances of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel's unique status as a nuclear weapon power with a powerful conventional military force will not be eroded, but Israel will be challenged by Iran. The peace process is unlikely to make any progress as the sectarian conflict, Iran, Yemen and the continuing confrontation with the IS divert attention of Sunni Arab countries away from the Palestinian issue. Indeed, the civil war in Yemen and the bombing of the country by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Arab countries has shown that the latter may be willing to depend less and less on the American security cover they have enjoyed for many decades. Arab countries will make their own pivot towards Russia, China, India and Japan as this process unfolds.
Russia has tried to restore its influence in the Middle East where its principal interests are political and economic, as well as in fighting terrorism. Russia senses a threat from thejihadis in the Russian Caucasian areas where Muslims live. In the two Chechen wars in 1994 and 1999, jihadi fighters from the Middle East and South Asia fought the Russian army. Islamic movements have established roots in Russian Tatarstan and Central Asian states. Like the other great powers, Russia, too, has to tread a thin line managing competing goals. The Russia-Iran relationship is a classic example, wherein Russian concerns of revolutionary Islamic penetration have been balanced with Russian assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme, although Russia has never supported Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Russia has built a complex web of relationships with Arab and other countries, like Turkey, a Nato member and a historical rival. Russia-Turkey commercial and energy ties have soared to around $35 billion in value. Russia has also developed impressive commercial relations with Iran and Egypt.
With other Arab countries like Algeria and Syria, Russia has had a durable arms supply relationship. Russia spearheaded the deal to remove chemical weapons from Syria in 2013, boosting its position with its Arab allies. Russia, therefore, has positioned itself as a key external power whose cooperation is vital for any resolution of the region's outstanding problems. The Iran nuclear agreement is the most recent example of Russian collaboration. Yet, Russia did not back away from announcing that it will lift the ban on delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missiles after the first framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear deal in April, 2015. In November, 2014, Russia announced a deal to build two nuclear reactors for Iran (with an option of six more), two weeks before the deadline for the Iranian nuclear talks.
Russian concern about low oil prices has conditioned its moves in the Middle East and its interest will surely lie in pushing up oil prices. Russia is critically dependent on oil revenues and finding ways of reducing supply must engage Russian policymakers. The Iranian nuclear deal is not good news for higher oil prices. But, if Russia is hoping for some way to push up oil prices, its ambition will be tempered by China, which has emerged as another external power with the capacity to influence developments in the Middle East, particularly against oil-price shocks.
China as an external power has built strong relations with the Arab countries, Iran and Israel. With Turkey, China's relations have come under strain because of the treatment of the Uighurs in China's western Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Chinese investments have brought with it an increasing clout in the region. Israel is China's third largest trading partner and the second most important source of defence technologies. China's desire to play a larger role in the Middle East will be tempered by its dependence on oil. Around 3.1 million barrels of the 6.2 million barrels that China imported in 2014 were sourced from the Middle East, making it the largest importer of oil from this region.
For the oil exporters in the region, China, Japan and India have emerged as the principal buyers of oil at a time when the US has become self-sufficient in oil and gas. This relationship is likely to strengthen, with China and India still growing and consuming larger amounts of oil. Chinese ties with the Middle East will grow stronger with the overland Silk Route and the Maritime Silk Route initiatives. China is currently debating how to extend and integrate the Silk Route initiatives with its ties to countries in the Middle East. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already drawn in several Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, and the bank's investment will strengthen China's economic and commercial role with the region.
China is not burdened with any colonial historical baggage and has not become entangled in the region's disputes by avoiding taking sides. It has navigated a more neutral position on the Palestinian issue, the salience of which has taken a downward turn. While China has gradually upped its role as security provider by sending naval ships for anti-piracy operations, and Chinese nationals were evacuated from conflict-torn Yemen by Chinese navy ships, Beijing still remains wary of stepping into intra-regional conflicts. President Xi Jinping cancelled his visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in April, 2015, after the Saudi-led air strikes on Yemen.
China's role in the region can be seen more as a potential in the future rather than an immediate overhang. China is still unwilling to expend blood, sweat and money on intra-regional political conflicts because it is loath to take sides. It is therefore still marginal in terms of relative influence, though it does care about the Middle East because of growing energy dependency and Islamist elements inspiring and training Muslim insurgency in western China. China has consequently increased its engagement with the region in terms of ministerial visits, closer ties with the Arab League, showing the flag on visits by naval ships and bringing in several countries of the region into the AIIB project. China's dilemma will be to balance its ties with Tehran, its largest trading partner, and Riyadh, its major oil supplier.
Asian powers like China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea are still marginal players in the Middle East. All are dependent on energy supplies from the region and deeply concerned about stability of supply. India enjoys good relations with Arab countries across the board and has also moved into a privileged relationship with Israel. India's navy has shown the flag in the region's waters and assisted in anti-piracy operations. But, the main security provider is the US, ensuring the flow of oil to the rest of the world. The US will remain the primary security guarantor in the future with its naval presence and military bases in the region. It will also remain the main interlocutor in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, though it is tempting to visualize a multilateral approach as seen in the P5+1 talks with Iran that have brought about the nuclear deal. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has largely been the domain of the US and European powers. No other extra-regional power has been able to play a significant role in this conflict. But there are growing signs of Chinese-Russian convergence and coordination in the Middle East with regard to Syria.
The Middle East is in the throes of another major power shift as regional and extra-regional powers seek to interfere, intervene and influence developments in the region, marked by State failure, civil war, terrorism and the rise of the IS, which seeks to establish a new caliphate. In this geopolitical landscape, the ongoing turmoil will induce fundamental changes that will have an impact on the regional and global geostrategic balances of power. The final outcome is still unclear, but whatever it is will affect its global standing and influence.
The Middle East will remain the happy hunting ground of regional and extra-regional powers. There are very few points of convergence in great power politics and policies in the Middle East, in this era marked by huge uncertainties, shifting loyalties, new political boundaries and the persistence of Islamic jihadist ideology. On the surface, every power wants terrorism defeated but at the same time, regional and extra-regional powers do not hesitate to exploit extremist groups to further their individual geopolitical goals. The Middle East is poised to become anew a laboratory of great power politics and balance-of-power manoeuvres. The first few rounds of this new "Great Game" is being played out. There is more to come in the decades ahead. But for Syria, the Russia-US collaboration holds the key to a political solution and to peace, the price for which may well be redrawing of old borders and partition.
This commentary originally appeared in The Telegraph.
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Pinak Chakravarty is a Visiting Fellow with ORF's Regional Studies Initiative where he oversees the West Asia Initiative Bangladesh and selected ASEAN-related issues. He joined ...
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