Originally Published 2005-04-30 11:16:02 Published on Apr 30, 2005
The view from Dhaka was summed up in a journal thus: ¿The cumulative case against a dependable relationship between India and Bangladesh is a very strong one¿ since Bangladesh suffers from ¿a serious lack of bargaining power¿ and hence needs ¿a viable strategy of alliances with China, Burma, Nepal and Pakistan¿. Adventurism is its logical outcome.
Tackling Terror: Calibrated restraint, incremental pressure needed
The view from Dhaka was summed up in a journal thus: "The cumulative case against a dependable relationship between India and Bangladesh is a very strong one" since Bangladesh suffers from "a serious lack of bargaining power" and hence needs "a viable strategy of alliances with China, Burma, Nepal and Pakistan". Adventurism is its logical outcome. 

Differing narratives of the post-'71 period, and specific problems that have festered over time, have aggravated matters. The incident of April 16, vicious and premeditated, is indicative of the extent to which some elements in Bangladesh can go. The same approach is reflected in the training and sanctuary provided to insurgent groups from our adjoining Indian states. What then should India do? 

Several options - punitive, persuasive or constraining - can be explored. The first set includes hot pursuit, permissible in international law but under prescribed conditions; pre-emption, sanctified by the US for itself (but not by the UN); economic sanctions imposed unilaterally. 

The second set focuses on diplomatic efforts aimed at making the other state weigh for itself the immediate or longer-term consequences of such practices on overall relations. The third set involves tighter border patrolling, border fencing, joint or coordinated patrolling, and agreed procedures for handling local crises. Each of these has implications. Given the terrain, hot pursuit may not be feasible on most occasions. Pre-emption may not meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter and would bring in the Security Council. 

Terrorist training camps can be moved or replicated with ease and thus negate the impact of cross-border action. Economic sanctions would hit the state indirectly or belatedly and different segments of Bangladeshi public directly. The impact of sanctions on Indian interests would complicate matters further. A rational and cooperative approach, combining calibrated restraint and incremental pressure incorporating third-set of measures, would produce better results. New areas of bilateral cooperation would assist the process.

Courtesy: Economic Times, New Delhi, April 27, 2005.

The author is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations and former Vice Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University. He is presently Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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