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AUKUS fits into a growing network of minilaterials crisscrossing the Indo-Pacific and rooted in shared strategic interests.

Historical differences can threaten the optimism raised at APEC and East Asian Summit.

This brief examines the historical dimension of the tensions between Japan and South Korea and its implications on the current breakdown in their bilateral relationship. It argues that the battle over historical memory has led to lasting animosity between the two countries, contributing to serious problems in their defence ties and creating space for China to expand its influence in the region. The brief explores why efforts to overcome the histo

A four-day maritime conference on "Maritime Geo-Politics in the Indo-pacific" was organised in Chennai, Kochi and New Delhi recently. The conference saw speakers deliver perspectives from India, China, Japan, US, Australia and Indonesia.

This brief examines the efficacy of the inclusion of private capital in development finance, using the cases of certain countries that have met with success in utilising such a strategy. It underlines the experiences of institutions like the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the United States International Development Finance Corporation (US-IDFC) that use innovative financial tools to support international financial institution

The United States, Japan, India, Australia – may emerge as guarantors of free trade and defense cooperation to check China

China’s approach to trade has stood impervious to change. It is time for a new geoeconomic approach to counter China. Like-minded nations can fashion rapid arrangements to grow the supply chains that matter most, such as for electric vehicles (EV). The US and India, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Britain, Taiwan, Korea, and Mexico can form an EV supply chain compact to create a level playing field within the group and incentivise their

It would be worth France, India, and Japan beginning an institutionalised and wide-ranging dialogue to ensure that the three of them can better coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific — not necessarily to counter China, but to encourage it to cooperate.

India pulled out of the planned Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2018 after entering negotiations in 2013. India has a trade deficit with 11 out of the 15 RCEP countries and some analysts have theorised that India decided to opt out of the agreement because of such adverse trade balance.  Indeed, India has a trade deficit with most of its trade partners in past free trade agreements (FTAs). It is in this context that this br

Although Modi could not make Japan his first foreign destination as PM, he has kept the essence of his promise that he would attach special significance to ties with Tokyo. His trip to Japan is his first bilateral diplomatic engagement outside the subcontinent.

The Liberal Democratic Party defied expectations and managed to sweep 261 seats with Fumio Kishida at the helm.

The G20 has gradually transformed itself from a forum for economic crisis management — through international cooperation and discussion on specific

Can China slow down without imploding? No, says Mr. Osamu Tanaka, the Executive Vice President of the Policy Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance, Japan. He predicts that 2017/8 will be the beginning of a Chinese financial meltdown.

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government headed by Mr. A. B. Vajpayee had made India increasingly invisible in its neighbourhood. It was content to play second fiddle to the US in Nepal and Sri Lanka, let Norway, the European Union and Japan play a more active role in Sri Lanka, maintained a silence on the growing confrontation between President Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives and the pro-democracy activists

The two countries are moving closer in the security domain.

There is a strong sense in Japan today that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and India's new Prime Minister Narendra Modi would take India-Japan relations to a new height, say senior officials and scholars in japan.

Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

As the security situation in Sudan worsens, the importance of having a military base at Djibouti has been further underscored

China has a somewhat limited aim to keep India as a neutral in their real battle that for pre-eminence in East Asia, where they are pitted against the Japan-US combine. India has no real stakes in the conflict, and it is not as if Japan supports the Indian position on our borders with China or Jammu & Kashmir. Yet, New Delhi needs to handle the issue with a great deal of care.

India should join hands with Japan, South Korea, and Australia to collaborate on shared geopolitical and security interests so that it can counterbala

Delhi sides with the U.S. and Japan vis a vis China in this strategic strait. But it needs substantial improvements.

Narendra Modi has emphatically indicated that good and close relations with the US will form the core of his global policy. In the short time he has been in power, Modi has met Obama thrice. An indication of his thrust are the close ties that the Modi government is building with Japan and Australia.

There is mounting interest in reviving the US-India-Australia-Japan Quad strategic dialogue.

India and Japan have had a long relationship, which was never really a factor in their relationship with China.

There is a significant difference between the texture of the relationship that the US enjoys with other democracies like UK, Germany, France and Japan, and the one it has with India. And neither are we able to cash in on it to the extent the Chinese and the Pakistanis managed.

Has India’s free trade agreement with the 10-member Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) spurred India Inc.’s globalising drive eastwards? This region, after all, has recently emerged as a major destination for investments from Japan – which is widening its options due to its conflicts with China – and the US, with its so-called ‘pivot to Asia’. India’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, which kicked off in January 20

India's best course is the one that Prime Minister Modi is setting. This seeks to position India as a "swing state". On one hand, India has joined the New Development Bank, the AIIB and resisted American-led efforts to condemn Russia over Ukraine. On the other, it is actively wooing the US and its allies, Japan and Australia, in the Asia Pacific region.

Never before has India story looked more credible than it does today with the world in turmoil and India standing out as a beacon of hope.

The Quad's real problem is the absence of a plan to counter China's smart-strategy in South Asia that combines economic activity with benign naval presence.

Experts at a seminar in Chennai felt that 'rogue Sates' like North Korea could alter the security architecture as well as the geo-strategic approach in Asia. And, in light of this uncertainty, evolving ties between nations like India, Japan, South Korea and Australia gain significance. It also stressed the need for Australia-India ties to be treated as a stand-alone development.

India and China do differ radically on the kind of Asian layout for the future. India work at an inclusive approach as opposed to China's exclusivist approach which appears directed against India, US and Japan.

India has held such dialogues with the U.S. and Japan in the past.

India's Look East policy, launched in 1991, has made steady progress in widening its economic and strategic reach to Japan and South Korea. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to South Korea should be seen in the expanding context of India's Look East Policy.

Speculations are rife about India possibly inviting Australia for the next Malabar naval exercise—which COVID-19 has caused to be moved to 2021.[1] If true, this would represent a break from the past and signal a change in the Asian strategic environment. Over the past few years, India has consistently resisted including Australia in the exercise, despite the latter’s willingness. The only other time that Australia was included in the Malabar

The Indo-Pacific construct is now at the centre of strategic jockeying in the region and the three nations — Japan, America and India — have been trying to define the exact scope of their engagement.

India’s back-to-back moves to boost relations with Japan and Russia, particularly in security matters, appear to indicate it wants a bigger naval role in the contested South China Sea to counter a rising China. The reality is far different

This paper explains Russian co-option of India into the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) at a high level of participation in September 2019 and the range of agreements involved. It argues that the co-option was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes so far for the Russian Far East of “northeast Asian regional cooperation.” Moscow related this behaviour to skewed priorities of East Asia’s �

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, within eight months of coming to power, has gone about strengthening India's relations with Japan, Australia and the US, in what seems to be a well laid out plan with a clear agenda.

Trump’s “toned down” stance on the South China Sea issue, his emphasis on “America first” policy and his soft attitude towards China have made many Japanese leaders suspect that the US is retreating from Asia.

China's Blue Book sees the US as a pivot to Asia and strengthening of alliances in the region is viewed by the Chinese analyst as being directed to contain China. The Blue Book also notes that India's defence cooperation with the US, Japan, Vietnam and Australia has strengthened it. India has to act with maturity while dealing with the resurgent China.

The key challenge PM Modi would face in China is to completely debunk the hypothesis, which some people suspect, that a key objective of Modi's 'Act East' policy is to contain China, in covert or overt support with the U.S., Japan and other affected nations. This task is not surely going to be easy.

Exercise Malabar and the trilateral dialogue have assumed significance in the backdrop of the US' rebalance to Asia and India's Act East Policy. The growing convergence of interests among the US, Japan and India on issues such as the Indian Ocean, maritime security, respect for international law and a stable Asian security order has driven the trilateral dialogue.

From all reports, it is quite clear that the Japanese PM's Delhi visit would mainly be devoted to consolidate the partnership and draw up a fresh road map for future developments. The much anticipated agreement on civil nuclear cooperation is not likely to happen during the current visit.

Growing maritime competition in the Indian ocean has compelled India to engage in maritime diplomacy with the Quad countries to upkeep its commitment

In today’s world, the role of major and middle powers is more critical than ever in ensuring that wider developmental concerns are addressed

Ties between India and Japan are historical and enduring. In the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), the leaders of the two countries have married their respective countries’ “Act East” Policy and “Free and Open Indo Pacific” aspirations. The AAGC is envisioned to provide a renewed opportunity for partnership where both regions can complement each other’s development and growth.  The AAGC will bring out the economic gains for Afr

Other than neighbouring countries, any future Indian government's principal focus will be on the vast swathe that begins in Sri Lanka and ends in Sydney, and can be described under a variety of rubrics: Look East, Indian Ocean Region, the Indo-Pacific. Countries such as Japan, Indonesia and Singapore present India big windows as it strives to become an economic and maritime power.