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The India-Japan engagement has been enhanced both on the bilateral front as well as in minilateral formats such as the Quad in recent years.

India and South America have barely managed to maintain minimal bilateral ties for the last several decades. Absent strong ties in geography, what India and South America have instead is a shared post-colonial history. Colonised by European powers for several centuries, both began their journey as independent countries under conditions of underdevelopment and having inexperienced polities with a limited foreign policy agenda. Today, it is not onl

The 4th India-Arab Partnership Conference, organised late last month as part of the Modi government's efforts to elevate the level of engagement between the two sides, echoed the new government's agenda of economic reforms and deeper economic engagement globally and regionally.

riangular cooperation is a growing trend in India’s global engagement. The term refers to development cooperation in which traditional aid donors work together with Southern partners to address challenges in developing countries. Largely absent from this type of cooperation in the past, India has gradually become a more visible partner. The current government’s endorsement of triangular cooperation in joint statements with key partners, as we

This paper explores how India has been able to achieve cooperation in the sphere of international development, but has been unable to replicate such success on issues of international security. It maps out India’s engagement on these two issues through four case studies and places them in the context of multilateral theory and international cooperation theory. It further considers factors within the game theoretic models of cooperation, includi

What explains New Delhi’s greater engagement with the country’s military government?

India’s engagement in the Arctic has evolved from a primarily scientific focus to one increasingly shaped by geopolitical and strategic considerations. However, this shift highlights an inconsistency in India’s strategic decision-making: while New Delhi seeks to help shape a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by working with like-minded democracies, its Arctic strategy remains largely anchored in cooperation with Russia, whose actions in U

India should try to make its development cooperation more effective and make sure that instruments lines of credit deepen India’s economic engagements with partner countries like Vietnam.

Considering India's vast energy needs and demand for natural gas, India should push to frame the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as a trilateral project once more. The thaw in the Iran-US relations could possibly encourage India to increase its engagement with Iran. Also, India has shown signs in recent months of being open, once again, to engaging with Pakistan.

India may have a geopolitical interest in the South China Sea area, but it is driven by an economic need. India must make its presence felt and pursue its engagements in the area. This in turn will involve a continued effort to cooperate and collaborate with the Southeast Asian nations.

In June 2015 the Modi government launched the Smart Cities Mission, a major urban development initiative designed to improve living conditions and achieve higher economic growth in 100 cities across the country. The Mission offers the State and city governments yet another opportunity to think creatively and work towards the betterment of their cities. Will India succeed in this venture, and would the future 'smart cities' be equitable and sustai

India has a stake in Bangladesh not only for the security of its eastern borders but also for other strategic advantages. Therefore, it cannot afford to let go of the recently achieved opportunity to break away from the past trajectory and establish new contours of engagement with Bangladesh. In many ways, this is a rare opportunity for both the countries to talk with each other and resolve differences.

India's deepening engagement with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Israel could also moderate New Delhi's diplomatic ties with Tehran. India-Iran relations were at their peak during then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Tehran in 2001 and then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's visit to India in 2003.

Displaying a shift from the previous administration, the Narendra Modi government has initiated high-level political engagement with Israel. Modi met with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in New York, sent his Home Minister to Tel Aviv, and received former President Shimon Peres in Delhi recently.

Since Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the Indian prime minister and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe, have been instrumental in what has been the most dramatic leap forward in India-Japan bilateral relations. While the two countries have made strides in strengthening cooperation in recent years, there are limitations that need to be overcome. This brief examines the challenges that remain in the relationship, including their sub-par bila

Military engagements between India and Japan have been on a steady growth path that mirrors the shared political and strategic goals of Delhi and Tokyo.

The Kartarpur corridor, inaugurated in November 2019, is regarded as an important peacemaking measure between India and Pakistan. Various international organisations have welcomed the corridor, including the United Nations. Drawing from history, this brief argues that opening a pilgrimage corridor or renovating a place of worship, and other such attempts to bridge India and Pakistan using religious sentiment inevitably fail to address the deep-ro

The India-Russia military technical relationship has withstood the test of time. Despite strains since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship has remained highly critical both in terms of the level of trust between the two states and the imperatives of sustaining a military-technical relationship to counter the growth of Chinese power. A more synergistic military-technical is possible, and Moscow and New Delhi must explore ways to con

Much of PP&R's engagement with civil society remains limited to event-oriented modes. There is a fundamental problem in the extant approach.

This article makes a case for increased engagement of India’s scholars of international relations (IR), especially of the theoretical variety, with the global IR community. While India has increasingly been integrating itself in global economic and political orders, its IR scholarship is yet to become truly global. This article outlines the structural and domestic-level causes for the relative absence of theoretical IR works in India while argu

Nuclear cooperation has brought a new dimension to India’s diplomacy in the 21st century. India’s status as a responsible nuclear power is predicated upon the civil relationships in the nuclear domain that it has established with major powers. This, despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and operating outside the ambit of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This brief analyses the impact of key agreements with different count

India has a role to play in global climate diplomacy, with its large population, fast-growing economy, and vulnerabilities to the consequences of climate change. Utilising a review of existing literature, this brief evaluates the country’s involvement in international climate forums in the past decade, its negotiation strategies and policy coherence, and their effectiveness. It finds that India’s strategy for climate diplomacy has aimed for a

New Delhi is trying to deepen ties to confront common threats but in-group differences pose hurdles

The Sino-India bilateral relationship has been premised on an understanding that the two nations can move forward on other areas of engagement as the border remains “hot” with military activity. Chinese actions are producing the opposite effect of what was intended, and India is now willing to adopt policies with a strong anti-China orientation.

The Indo-Pacific construct is now at the centre of strategic jockeying in the region and the three nations — Japan, America and India — have been trying to define the exact scope of their engagement.

The Western Indian Ocean Region (WIOR) is linked to India in several ways, yet it remains conspicuous in its absence from India’s foreign policy discourse. This lack of attention is now beginning to reverse as external players stake their geopolitical claims in the region. India has responded by reorienting its own nautical outlook towards WIOR and building friendly relationships with African countries that straddle the region. This bri

India’s Northeast Region (NER) can serve as a pivotal connecting space between India and its neighbours to the east in South Asia, as well as to East and Southeast Asia and beyond, enhancing the country’s diplomatic, infrastructural, and commercial engagements. This paper makes an assessment of NER’s cross-border land connectivity initiatives with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bhutan—all members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative f

The pace of growth in the Australia-India strategic relationship is quite impressive, but New Delhi’s hesitance on hard security issues may hamper further developments.

New Delhi is increasingly positioning itself as a significant player in African peace, security and development. Examining the question of how India responds to state fragility in Africa, this brief finds that India’s engagement is mostly transactional: working around, rather than on, sources of political fragility. Development and security interventions tend to operate in silos, but might change if Indian commercial investments are threatened

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 changed the strategic dynamics in the region. For India, the new regime and its attendant risks—especially the threat of terrorism—quickly put it in an unenviable position. This brief assesses India’s policy towards Afghanistan since August 2021. It will cover how India has articulated its Afghan policy, domestically and in multilateral organisations, and its incremental

Greater engagement with the Taliban will create new possibilities for India as other regional players such as China, Russia and Iran look for ways to step up their engagement

This paper explains Russian co-option of India into the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) at a high level of participation in September 2019 and the range of agreements involved. It argues that the co-option was the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dissatisfaction with the economic outcomes so far for the Russian Far East of “northeast Asian regional cooperation.” Moscow related this behaviour to skewed priorities of East Asia’s �

Though domestic politics will continue to pose challenges to Dr Manmohan Singh's image, his firm commitment to Indo-Pak engagement has put both countries on course for at least a manageable relationship, if not a cordial one, based on mutual interests rather than vicissitudes and emotions.

Much like the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, Indo-U.S. cyber engagement appears to have plateaued and could benefit from a tailored reset. Adopting various measures to ensure trust in defence hardware is essential to both India and the United States, and should therefore be explored as a mechanism for deeper cooperation.

Viewed through the prism of recent difficulties in India-US engagement, the focus of PM Modi?s US visit was in the nature of the leadership of the two nations getting to know each other, as well as aimed at building trust and fostering commitment between them, says former Secretary in the MEA, Mr. M. Ganapathi.

This brief probes the role of the current 116th US Congress in strengthening India-US relations in the realm of defence trade and technology transfers. The analysis is done in the context of the Trump administration’s relaxation of arms export policies, as well as a rise in conservative nationalism which abhors arming partner nations that prolong US conflicts overseas. Furthermore, as the Democrat-majority House of Representatives appropriates

The Arctic region, with its vast reserves of natural gas, minerals, oil, and hydrocarbons, presents energy and economic opportunities for countries, including India. India’s Arctic Policy, released in 2022, signalled the country’s intent to expand its engagements in the region beyond its historical focus on scientific research and climate studies. While the policy acknowledges the region’s growing economic potential, however, it does not ad

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to America will show if there is any political energy left in the UPA government for purposeful international engagement. If the answer is in the negative, the rest of the world will simply wait for stronger leadership to re-emerge in Delhi. India might pay a price for the wasted moments, but the ruling party may not much care, having grown rather comfortable with a do-nothing foreign policy.

Japan's engagement with SE Asia focuses through expanding economic ties, cooperation on maritime issues and building close diplomatic relations through Abe's travel diplomacy. This is Japan's 'pivot' to SE Asia and it is here to stay given its strategic rivalry with China.

The expanding engagement with the Japanese navy, one of the strongest in the world, should give a boost to India's maritime diplomacy in Asia. If New Delhi's interests in the Pacific are growing, Tokyo's naval profile in the Indian Ocean has begun to expand.

As the Biden administration would take time to settle down, the first half of 2021 will be crucial for Beijing to lay down new terms of engagement. It is shaping the battleground before Biden can come up with his own strategic response.

The apparent role of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba in the terrorist attack in Srinagar on June 24, killing 8 jawans, has raised several questions which may sour the tone and tenor of New Delhi's renewed engagement with Islamabad.

It is now clear that the heft of the Prime Minister’s persona alone or the goodwill he enjoys cannot drive India’s external engagement.

The successive torture and slaying of individual Americans in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf region has a new message for the civilized world. Whatever be the rationale behind the decision-making at the governmental-level, the average American is ready for a long engagement with terrorism and terrorists.

India has moved away from the idealism of the past in its engagement with the global multilateral order

How have nuclear weapons affected Indian foreign policy? Has India been able to leverage its status as a nuclear weapons state to further its foreign policy objectives? This issue brief examines these questions by first analysing how India’s foreign policy objectives have been affected by its possession of nuclear weapons. It then posits two strategies that India can pursue to leverage its status as a nuclear weapons state. The first strategy d

China’s failure to condemn the Ukraine war raised concerns on the future of the rules-based international order not only in the European Union (EU), but also in India and Taiwan. While their respective relationships with China and Russia are characterised by different complexities, the EU, India, and Taiwan are all vulnerable to authoritarian threats. All three recognise that China’s continued rise will have strategic implications for

As Washington and Beijing circle each other in Asia, Delhi needs to step up engagement with both. The question is not about picking sides, but about relentlessly pursuing India's own interests.

India’s geography lends itself favourably to the cultivation and expansion of maritime ties. Yet, for much of the country’s contemporary history, the country has overlooked these opportunities. As the world reengages with its vast ocean spaces, India too, has become more willing and capable of participating in the maritime domain. This paper outlines the evolution of the country’s maritime outlook as it shifts its largely continental-orient