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Both India and China seem to be fixated on a "status quo plus" option, in that each side wants something more than the current LAC. Clearly, much more work needs to be done. For the moment, incremental progress is better than no progress at all.
The Communist Party of India (Maoist), which came into existence on September 21,2004, through the merger of the Maoist Communist Centre of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist--People's War ) ,
China has a somewhat limited aim to keep India as a neutral in their real battle that for pre-eminence in East Asia, where they are pitted against the Japan-US combine. India has no real stakes in the conflict, and it is not as if Japan supports the Indian position on our borders with China or Jammu & Kashmir. Yet, New Delhi needs to handle the issue with a great deal of care.
They can keep trying to match each other’s capabilities but that will only increase chances of war.
Despite mounting domestic concerns, the focus of the electoral campaigns has continued to be on external players such as China and India.
Africa has emerged as a favoured investment destination on account of the high rate of growth experienced by many African countries and discovery of oil.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, India established official ties with the five former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; so did China. In recent years, both India and China have come up with different strategies to strengthen their respective ties with these resource-rich economies, collectively called the Central Asian Republics (CARs). China’s strategy is the ambitious Belt and Roa
As two great civilizations and influential Asian powers, India and China share common responsibilities to ensure peace and stability in the region and the world at large.
Britain's former Chief Scientific Advisor and Head of the Government Office of Science, Sir David King, has said that both India and China should take a leadership role at the global platform for Climate Change.
The Doklam crisis of 2017 illustrates the increasing tension in India and China’s nuclear relationship. There are elements of stability and instability in such relationship, and this brief examines them. Stability, on one hand, is derived from a history of military and political restraint, ongoing institutionalised negotiations, and growing economic relations. However, the continuing border dispute and disagreement on a non-demarcated Line of A
The structure of the international system and balance of power tend to limit the foreign policy choices of smaller states. But we are now living in a
It must be recognised that the India-China dialogue needs both a foundation and a breakthrough.
India’s nuclear weapons programme has been developed in response to the diabolic Sino-Pak nuclear axis. Yet, India has advanced its nuclear programm
Proactively taking advantage of China’s involvement in the Taiwan Strait to fight China in multiple theatres is something Indian military planners should think about.
India has emerged as the focal point of global attention as the search for a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific gathers steam.
India has historically taken a neutral position in the disputes along the South China Sea involving China and countries of Southeast Asia, even as the tensions have threatened the security in the region. In more recent times, however, there has been a noticeable change in India’s stance. This brief ponders this shift: the rationale behind India’s responses vis-à-vis the disputes, and their implications on the country’s ‘Act East’ and
India and Japan have had a long relationship, which was never really a factor in their relationship with China.
Reform of the Central Military Commission underscores Xi’s absolute dominance in the army, which helped put the Communist Party of China (CCP) in power. No other CCP leader, including Mao, has controlled the military to the same extent as Xi does today.
Plans for the ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative should emphasize multilateral cooperation — or risk opposition.
Various estimates show that RCEP’s share in the world GDP may touch 50 per cent by 2050. The fear that India may be left out if it decides not to join the group is real. But given the economic clout of China and other economies, India may find it very difficult to grab a significant share of the this RCEP cake.
The New Year of 2022 has come with intriguing messages from China, not in the least for India.
For New Delhi, the pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away — and leading it to deepen its security partnerships.
Since India submitted its formal membership application to the NSG in May 2016, Beijing publicly expressed its objection to it.
The Navy needs a strategy of distant power projection. By employing a plan for sustained presence in the Western Pacific, New Delhi can show its resolve to Beijing.
As the Indo-Pacific construct gains momentum, India is augmenting its role in the region in the post-COVID period through enhanced interaction with ne
If Xi does not mend fences, Delhi will continue to frame policies assuming the worst about Beijing’s intentions
Unless India accelerates the pace of the physical border infrastructure build-up, New Delhi will face serious difficulties in any future confrontation with China.
India must quickly come to terms with the fact that Vietnam’s concerns on the looming security crisis in the South China Sea will lead Hanoi to search for new partners.
India's best course is the one that Prime Minister Modi is setting. This seeks to position India as a "swing state". On one hand, India has joined the New Development Bank, the AIIB and resisted American-led efforts to condemn Russia over Ukraine. On the other, it is actively wooing the US and its allies, Japan and Australia, in the Asia Pacific region.
A pragmatic problem solving approach to the India-US trade spat is likely to yield New Delhi much greater dividends than an openly confrontational one
In Modi’s second term, India needs to be pragmatic and clear-eyed about the challenge that Beijing poses for its interests.
We need a foreign policy approach that thinks beyond event management.
A comprehensive strategy vis-á-vis China is instrumental for India to act as a bridge between the democratic camp and the Global South
For formulating an effective China policy, India needs scholars well versed in Chinese language and culture who should be able to understand and appreciate the Chinese style of diplomacy to foster better synergy and cooperation between the two countries.
In order to get an accurate picture of trade in India’s neighbourhood, one has to look beyond Free Trade Agreements.
