Continuity rather than change may well be the mark of the second Bush administration's foreign policy.
It was billed as `the liberty speech.' George W. Bush, beginning his second term as President, said: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." Enemies of freedom the world over were put on notice and American resolve asserted in words that bore the imprint of John Kennedy, perhaps even of Rousseau. The President also revealed his intent and limitations by being repetitive, and by ignoring subjects demanding attention - freedom from want, human security, freedom of choice, respect for law, and regard for international community. So will U.S. policy and conduct be different in the next four years?
Observers like Professor John Gaddis and others had hoped that the second term would provide for midcourse corrections. The speech gives no clue of it. A hand is held out to allies but without diluting the prescriptive intent. The new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has stressed the need for diplomacy but refrained from defining the contents of a possible new approach. Continuity rather than change may therefore well be the new order.
If so, what insiders like Deputy Secretary for Defence Paul Wolfowitz say needs to be noted. "Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq," he wrote in a Memorandum on May 20, 2004, "are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of his own country"; hence the need for "effective intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the years preceding hostilities."
The Memorandum appointed a special Task Force on `Transition to and from Hostilities.' Answers to specific questions were sought: "Are there techniques and technologies which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the post-hostilities period? Can something be done in the pre-hostility phase which will minimise or even eliminate post-hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems? How can our capabilities in shaping, language, and cultural understanding be enhanced by technology?"
The assessment that forays into foreign lands will not be greeted with bouquets is evident. The Task Force found widespread animosity towards the U.S. and its policies the world over and cited as evidence a State Department survey of editorials and op-eds in 72 countries; 82.5 per cent of these were negative. It found fault with America's public diplomacy, stressed the need for strengthening U.S. ability "to understand global public opinion," and said a global strategy of communicating ideas was essential if "the global battle for ideas" was to be won. It recommended steps that "will greatly improve the ability of the United States to communicate with and thereby influence worldwide audiences."
While the bulk of the Report is focussed on the use of informational and cultural means to further the strategic objectives in a new situation, Chapter 2 offers an interesting analysis of the perceptions in the "Arab-Muslim world," beginning with the assertion that in a war of ideas for hearts and minds, delivering a message to an audience should be preceded by listening to it to ascertain the "language, symbols, and images that resonate with the target audience." The Task Force does so unambiguously: "American direct intervention in the Muslim world has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies."
The Report also points to the deficit of political legitimacy in many countries; as a result the weight of numbers is in favour of those who oppose the regimes that, in turn, are supportive of the U.S. "Thus it is incumbent on the U.S. strategic information campaign to first find a way to address this near unanimity of Muslim opinion hostile to the U.S." and instead of preaching Western values to the Muslim world, the effort should be to reassure them that America does not require submission to "the American Way."
The operational parts of the Report draw upon private sector marketing and political campaigning techniques to differentiate between individual preferences and group impulses and to "target those who support, or are likely to support, our views based on their own culture, traditions and aspirations about such things as personal control, choice and change, personal mobility, meritocracy, individual rights (and, particularly, women's rights)." America, in a word, "must adopt the strategies and tactics of the insurgent, not the incumbent: waging a proactive, bold and effective U.S. strategic communication effort." This would include promotion of "a more robust dialogue within Islam" since "driving a wedge between moderates and extremists
is a top strategic priority." The Report altogether is candid and clinical in its diagnosis, simplistic in its preoccupation with marketing techniques, noteworthy in its myopia on the cure for anti-Americanism.
"We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation" - and make reforms the test of relationship - said the President. Such an agenda can lead to turmoil. Is this the American intent? Does America have the capacity to contain it? Is the agenda altogether altruistic?
< The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.> * Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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