omission and commission by the non-proliferation ayatollahs thatled to the 1998 nuclear weapons testing of India, followed byPakistan. However, the stark reality of the consequences of thedubious policies adopted by the NPAs towards Pakistani and Chineseproliferation came to light recently in the exposé of thePakistan's "nuclear father" Dr.A.Q.Khan and his nuclear smugglingring. <br /><br />Khan and his cohorts stood accused of transferring Uraniumenrichment technology, designs for an implosion device and evensome enriched Uranium to Libya, Iran and North Korea. With Libyavirtually handing over its nuclear program to the US and the UK,the evidence of Pakistani involvement was irrefutable. Iran alsoadmitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that itobtained its nuclear wares from Pakistan. In early February, Khanmade a televised confession in English taking full responsibilityfor the nuclear sales and absolved the Pakistani government. AfterKhan's plea for mercy, Pakistani leader Gen.Musharraf promptlypardoned him. There was only a muted response to this high farcefrom Washington and other Western capitals. <br /><br />Firstly, the idea that the Pakistani government was not involved inthe proliferation acts of A.Q.Khan must be debunked. FormerPakistan army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for nuclearties with Iran in the early 1990s when the nuclear transferssupposedly began. Libya has had long standing ties with thePakistani nuclear program starting with the funding of the thennascent Pakistani nuclear program by Col. Gaddafi when Z.A.Bhuttowas the Pakistani leader in the 1970s. Surely the wily Libyanleader was not doing this out of the solidarity with a fellowIslamic nation. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear relationship was asimple nukes for missiles barter deal by which Pakistan was able toacquire North Korean NoDong ballistic missile by paying for it withnuclear technology, at a time when Pakistan was facing a financialcrisis. The fact that Pakistan Air Force planes were involved intransferring this technology clearly shows state involvement innuclear proliferation.<br /><br /><strong>NPAs after the A.Q.Khan scandal</strong><br /><br />In this context, the reactions of the NPAs to the Khan saga areboth predictable and alarming. The official NPA view of how topursue the Pakistan led nuclear ring and shut it down is bestillustrated by a recent speech by Robert Einhorn, thenon-proliferation Czar in the second Clinton administration. Aftershocking the audience with his admission that successive USadministrations have had <em>"a very tough time facing up to Pakistan's proliferationproblem,"</em>Mr. Einhorn proceeded to blame India for its "original sin" inintroducing nukes to South Asia. Never mind that South Asia wasimmediately bordered by a freely proliferating nuclear power,China. The best course with Pakistan, opined Mr. Einhorn, was to <em>"forget the past and look to the future"</em>. Really? <br /><br />The sheer logical fallacy of this opinion is staggering. Firstly,despite the behind the scenes pressure on it, Pakistan hascompelling reasons to keep the nuclear underworld alive, albeitmore discreet. Because of its weak indigenous scientific capacity,Pakistan has long relied on Western sources for sophisticatednuclear components. Even as the A.Q.Khan saga was unfolding, USFederal prosecutors were looking at the case of a South Africabased middleman who was caught in a sting operation sending nuclearbomb triggers to a man a person with ties to Pakistaniintelligence. Clearly, for Gen.Musharraf to cooperate indismantling the nuclear network would see Pakistan lose is nuclearcomponent supply chain, bringing its nuclear weapons program to agrinding halt. Now why would Gen. Musharraf or any other Pakistanileader do that? Alternatively, if the NPAs believe that they canconvince Pakistan to take actions that could not but shut itsnuclear program down, then why not apply multilateral pressure toopen up Pakistan's nuclear program directly?<br /><br />The other "brilliant" argument used by the NPAs is to point outthat the Pakistani army is the best keeper of Pakistan's bomb andtherefore must be engaged and not isolated. Now, this one is ahoot. Firstly, it is the Pakistani army that has so recklesslyindulged in nuclear profligacy for all these years. Should the USrely on the very same institution again by forgiving past sins, themost logical consequence would be the emboldening of futureGenerals to keep the nuclear sales option open because they nowknow they have been able to get away with it before. The "nightmarescenario" of Islamic Radicals taking over Pakistan shouldGen.Musharraf fall is simply not likely. America has beenconstantly cultivating the Generals immediately junior toGen.Musharraf and should Musharraf be deposed, it is extremelylikely that another pro-Western General would replace him.<br /><br /><strong>China and India - Double Standards?</strong><br /><br />If the NPAs' reaction to Pakistan's role in proliferation ispredictably absurd, their reaction to the role of China can bedescribed as shamelessly craven. The Washington Post reported thatthe items surrendered by Libya included "step-by-step instructionsfor assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb" and "technicalinstructions for manufacturing components for the device." Thesource of all this material was China, even though the Khan networkdistributed it. This revelation was unimpeachable evidence ofChinese role in nuclear proliferation. This was also the worst kindof nuclear proliferation, because should a terrorist group getaccess to nuclear fuel, this design gives them the ability to builda nuclear bomb that could fit on the rear of a pick up truck andtherefore giving them the ability to inflict a carnage immenselyworse than the 9/11 atrocities.<br /><br />But the NPA circles did not waste time after this news to come toChina's defense. Former Clinton Administration special policyadvisor on non-proliferation at the Department of Energy, JonWolfsthal, said that Chinese views on proliferation has changed <em>"dramatically since the 1980s"</em>and that of late the Chinese <em>"generally cooperate"</em>with the US in preventing nuclear technology leakage. This claimflies in the face of the facts that came to light when Mr.Wolfsthal was in the government, such as the Chinese sale of ringmagnets to Pakistan and continuing missile technology assistance toPakistan and Iran. The NPAs also conveniently ignore the otherwiseinescapable conclusion that Pakistan could not have used C-130cargo planes to ferry nuclear technology and missiles to and fromNorth Korea without refueling in Chinese territory.<br /><br />While the NPAs see no problem with continuing US hi-techco-operation with China despite its apparent desire to proliferateto anti-American regimes, the NPA reaction to similar co-operationwith India, even at a lower level, has been downright hostile. OnJanuary 12, President Bush released a statement outlining Americandesire to pursue the "Glide Path" or hi-tech co-operation withIndia, including in the areas of Space and civilian nuclear arenas.But within hours of the announcement, a State Department NPAhurriedly convened a briefing and poured cold water over theannouncement. The official, who spoke "on the background", made itclear that this co-operation would take years and is contingent onIndia "tightening its export laws" amongst other things. Never mindthat unlike China or even the Western European nations, whichallowed private companies to supply Khan with nuclear componentsfor decades while sitting comfortably under a NATO nuclearumbrella, India has never even come close to transferring dangeroustechnology to other states. As if this was not enough, the officialwent out of the way to make it clear that the US would like tooffer the same deal to Pakistan - at the time of the A.Q.Khanscandal! <br /><br /><strong>Dangers of Groupthink</strong><br /><br />A previous article by this author pointed out the prevalence ofGroupthink in US strategic circles when it comes to South Asia. Asone can see, nowhere is Groupthink more prevalent than in thenon-proliferation bureaucracy. The NPAs dislike democratic Indiabecause the Indian leadership wouldn't "play ball" with them whilethey find it easy to deal with the authoritarian Pakistani andChinese ruling elites who show a ready acceptance of Western norms.What they don't realize is that while Pakistani Generals andChinese Communist leaders may display a liking to Westerndiplomacy, it only serves as a veneer to mask their deep rootedcontempt for core Western values like democracy, individualliberties and transparent rule of law. Indeed the Chinese andPakistani rulers see the NPAs as weak-kneed when they forgive anynumber of broken promises made by them in bad faith on the basis ofproclaimed strategic or economic interests and yet feel humiliatedand swear revenge in the rare occasions the West manages to drawthe line. <br /><br />The NPAs' Groupthink also makes them oblivious to the pattern ofPakistani and Chinese proliferation, which clearly belies theirdesire to keep challenging the status quo - not just ofgeopolitics, but also of values. In some aspects they#146;re out toprove not just that West has no values when it comes to foreignpolicy and that liberal values are unnecessary for a nation tobecome a great power. Indeed they seek to demonstrate to the Westthat "freedom and democracy" are one great lie conjured up andpromoted by the West to maintain its hegemony over the rest of theworld. Therefore, for the NPAs to continue to push forproliferation policy with China and Pakistan that has long movedwell South of the line separating engagement and appeasement isdownright reckless and irresponsible. <br /><br />A clear example of the emboldening of Chinese and Pakistani nucleargoals by the free pass that they received from the US came in theform of this month's revelation that Pakistani nuclear officialssecretly visited Beijing recently to conclude the technicalagreement for the second 300 MW Chinese reactor to be built atChashma, Pakistan. In addition, reports say that Pakistan and Chinaare already talking about a huge 600 MW Chinese reactor in Karachi.Yet there's not even a whimper of protest from the American NPAs tothese acts of chutzpah.<br /><br />In the ultimate analysis, the policy decisions formulated by theAmerican non-proliferation ayatollahs over the years have clearlyfailed to achieve their stated goals of preventing dangerous massdestruction weapons from being acquired by states with dubiousrecords. Even granting that many of non-proliferation goals had toplay second fiddle to other pressing geo-strategic concerns, theNPAs' various acts of selectively targeting acts of proliferationhas reduced their credibility to a state beyond repair. More thanthat, by their serial acts of cover-up of proliferation, especiallyby China and Pakistan, the NPAs have perhaps provided fillip tosome in the latter state especially, to continue their dangeroustrade to rogue nations and more dangerously to terrorist groups.While the NPAs have perhaps failed to prevent nuclearproliferation, they did succeed in preventing the proliferation ofone thing - new ideas. That may turn out to be their mostdeleterious contribution in the long run.<br /><br /><input type="image"src="/cms/export/orfonline/images/sq_bullet.gif" /> <u> <font color="#800080">The reign of the Non-proliferation Ayatollahs - 1</font></u><br /><br />Concluded.<br /><br /><em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author anddo not necessarily reflect those of Observer ResearchFoundation.</em>
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