Once the US successfully built and used nuclear weapons to devastating effect to end the Second World War, other great powers of the time realized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was essential to maintain their status. In 1970, after three decades of hectic developments, America, along with other big powers at that time then formulated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. The NPT divided countries into two groups: those that tested nuclear weapons before 1968, and those that did not. The "nuclear-weapon states" comprised of the US, China, France, Russia (then the Soviet Union) and the United Kingdom. These states were allowed, temporarily, to maintain their nuclear status. Other countries joined the NPT as "non-nuclear-weapon states". In return for committing never to develop or receive nuclear weapons, these countries were given two promises, which included a commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to nuclear disarmament and access to the peaceful nuclear technology. <br /> <br /> To enforce this treaty, American and Western European governments set up entire bureaucracies staffed with international lawyers, career diplomats and arms control specialists. The era of the non-proliferation ayatollah had begun. <br /> <br /> So who exactly is a non-proliferation ayatollah? An NPA is a person, usually in a Western government bureaucracy, who advocates the advancement of American or Western geo-political goals through the prevention of spread of nuclear, missile, space and "dual use" technologies to countries identified as inimical to Western dominance in the aforementioned areas. It is critical to distinguish the non-proliferation ayatollah from a non-proliferation doctrinaire. A non-proliferation doctrinaire is someone who truly believes that nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction are a serious threat to all of mankind and seeks to rid all countries of such dangerous technology, including Western nations. <br /> <br /> <strong>NPAs and South Asia</strong> <br /> <br /> Despite attempts at persuasion, India, Pakistan and Israel refused to be parties to the NPT. India came to the conclusion when it became clear that, instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the NPT only legitimized the continuing possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by the nuclear-weapon states. Indian policymakers saw this as a discriminatory system that is highly prejudicial to India's strategic interests. <br /> <br /> The NPAs saw India's refusal to accede to the NPT and its "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 as dangerous and obstructionist. While they accepted China as a legitimate great power, they did not see any need for India to develop nuclear weapons. The NPAs saw Israel as a special case and were quite sympathetic to Pakistani pleas that it cannot sign the NPT without India doing so as well. In the South Asian context therefore, the NPAs policy had two cornerstones - preservation of the nuclear status quo and a hyphenation of India and Pakistan. The latter soon developed into a mantra for the NPAs. The zero sum game between India and Pakistan also became a useful tool for the NPAs to prod India into submission. <br /> <br /> During the Cold War years, India's ties with the Soviet Union reduced NPAs' direct leverage on India. Therefore, the NPAs saw Pakistan's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons as the only means to convince India not to build nuclear weapons. Even though they prevented Pakistan from acquiring plutonium-reprocessing technology, Western governments glossed over Pakistan's clandestine procurement of Uranium enrichment technology from right under their noses. Despite denials from both parties, Chinese assistance to Pakistan's enrichment and nuclear warhead building projects was also an open secret. It was also well known that many rich Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia and Libya had contributed financially to Pakistan's bomb efforts during that time. <br /> <br /> While it is true that non-proliferation was perhaps forced to play second fiddle to other geo-strategic concerns during the Cold War years, it was hard to avoid noticing the emergence of a clear pattern of the NPAs' cover up of Pakistan's proliferation. Another facet of this era was that the NPAs placed India and Pakistan on the same moral plane. In fact, many accounts indicate that the NPAs were quite sympathetic to Pakistan's position that it was only responding to India's "aggressive" development of nuclear weapons. Even though Pakistan was using extra legal means to acquire technology for its nuclear program in contrast to India's essentially indigenous program, the NPAs still blamed India for "the original sin" of introducing weapons to South Asia. From later accounts, it is discernible that the NPAs might have made a calculation that until they actually tested the devices; it was always possible for them to cap and roll back the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs. But whatever their motivation, the die had been cast in the 1980s and 1990s. <br /> <br /> <strong>NPAs and Pokhran-II</strong> <br /> <br /> After the end of the Cold War, Western non-proliferation policy, especially that of the US NPAs proceeded on autopilot. If anything, the NPAs found more reasons to continue a policy of engagement with Pakistan and more importantly China, which was becoming a global economic force. Even though US-Indian relations started to thaw during this period, the NPAs attached less importance to engaging India, which they still considered as an obstructionist force, than they did to China and Pakistan. <br /> <br /> But the late eighties to mid nineties also saw an order of magnitude change in proliferation. There was clear evidence of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. In 1992, US slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, the sanctions were lifted. Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times reported China#146;s violation of the commitment. The Times' December 4, 1992 article quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had recently delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi. The former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, also admitted to Pakistan#146;s purchase of M-11#146;s from China, but said the missiles were not nuclear capable. <br /> <br /> Shortly after the imposition of sanctions, some NPAs were quoted as saying that despite <em>"...overwhelming intelligence evidence that China in November of 1992 shipped Pakistan key components of its M-11 missile"</em> -- an MTCR Category 1 violation - - Secretary of State Warren Christopher decided China had only committed a Category 2 violation and imposed the mildest form of sanctions possible. Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis defended the decision, saying the U.S. did not have conclusive evidence Pakistan had received complete M-11#146;s. The NPAs also made it clear that the sanctions could be lifted if China signed the MTCR. Eventually, the sanctions were lifted in 1995 after merely another Chinese pledge to stick to MTCR guidelines, despite Chinese refusal to formally sign on to the regime. <br /> <br /> Amidst all this, American NPAs saw no problem with the sale of a Cray supercomputer and advanced American Space Research technology to China. In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical Uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan#146;s Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), American NPAs refused to make a "determination" whether China violated its NPT commitments. Prior to this, the NPAs also ignored evidence that China gave Pakistan the design for a 25-kiloton implosion type A-bomb plus enriched uranium for two nuclear weapons. In addition, just before formally acceding to the in 1992, China signed a $500 million deal to construct a 300 MW nuclear reactor in Chashma, Pakistan. The fact that the NPT forbade its signatories from exporting such technologies to non-NPT signatories made it clear that China was thumbing its nose and the NPAs. Former Pentagon non-proliferation expert Henry Sokolski succinctly captured the NPAs' actions in this timeframe as thus: <br /> <br /> <em>…U.S. officials have taken a more cowardly course, downplaying initial proliferation reports, especially when they involved nations Washington wanted to engage.</em> <br /> <br /> While the NPAs pursued a "see no evil, hear no evil" policy with China, Pakistan also benefited from this kid glove treatment, despite being sanctioned for building nuclear weapons. In 1998, the situation took a turn for the worse when Pakistan "tested" a long-range ballistic missile, which was identical to the North Korean NoDong missile. Titled "Ghauri", this new missile gave Pakistan the means to deliver a nuclear warhead to all corners of India. Apparently, because the US was engaging Pakistan at that time for its role in Afghanistan, the US NPAs were muted again in their criticism of the Pakistani-North Korean proliferation link. Let it not be forgotten that it was this background, when the NPAs were totally blind to the alarming increase in Sino-Pakistani proliferation that the Indian policy makers decided to test its nuclear weapons in 1998. <br /> <br /> <em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.</em>
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