Event ReportsPublished on May 27, 2008
Pakistan Army is in the throes of a dramatic transformation both in its profile and approach but is no where near relinquishing its stranglehold over the political and corporate landscape of Pakistan. The office-cadre is much more conservative but not radical,
Pak Army to retain its power base

Pakistan Army is in the throes of a dramatic transformation both in its profile and approach but is no where near relinquishing its stranglehold over the political and corporate landscape of Pakistan.

The office-cadre is much more conservative but not radical, and yet the influence of religious fundamentalism introduced by President Zia-ul Haq into the armed forces during the early 80s will be felt within the Army for sometime.

These observations were made by Mr Shuja Nawaz, author of a brilliant analysis of Pakistan Army and its role in shaping Pakistan’s past and future, Crossed Swords: Pakistan –its Army, and its Wars Within, during a presentation at Observer Research Foundation on May 27.

Mr Nawaz, younger brother of a former Pakistan Army Chief, General Asif Nawaz, and a former Pakistan Television journalist, has had access not only to some of the top ranking serving and retired officers in the Army but also, more significantly, to official records, data and archives from the General Headquarters, Rawalpindi.

Some of his assessments, made on the basis of the data he had accessed during his research in Pakistan, the US and UK, are as follow:

  • The composition of the officer-cadre in the Army is increasingly reflecting the society more than at any time in its history. The recruitment base, for instance, is moving beyond the traditional recruitment ground in the Potohar region of north Punjab to bigger towns and cities in central and south Punjab. In 2005, central Punjab witnessed recruitment of 7500 men as compared to the traditional north Punjab totaling 5000. Southern Punjab provided 1800 recruits. Similarly, recruits from Sindh, North West Frontier Province and FATA saw a sharp rise. In Sindh, for instance, the recruitment rose from 8.85 per cent to 23.03 per cent with rural Sindh accounting for a majority-2500 out of 5095.

  • Similar changes are visible in the officer cadre.  Even though Punjab retained its supremacy—66.93 per cent, there were notable changes in the home districts of the officers.  Most of them came from the more populous and emerging urban centres of central and southern Punjab. Significantly, these bigger cities and towns are also the traditional strongholds of the growing Islamist parties and conservatism. 

  • The present officer-cadre is more conservative and ritualistic but not radical.

  • Army is confronted with a new operational challenge—its traditional ethos and training have shaped it into a conventional fighting force which is finding difficult to cope up with fighting well-trained and armed insurgents within Pakistan.

  • The Army has a deep and abiding relationship with the US Department of Defence but is extremely wary of its policies. Pakistan Army works in its own interest, and even when it is seen to be following the directives of the US, it is doing so out of self interest.

  • The Army’s corporate interests are deep and strong and there is no likelihood of it giving up these business interests even for broader national interests. Likewise, it is not likely to give up its hold on the civilian bureaucracy in the near future even though General Ashfaq Kayani has ordered a pull-out from civilian posts. There is substantial vested interest within the force to delay, if not subvert, such a process.

  • There is a marked change in the Kayani’s tenure; he appears willing to cede decision making to the elected politicians and to return to its professional roots. But changing the expectations and habits of the senior military brass will take time and therefore the Army, for sometime to come, will retain its key position on the political scene primarily because of the inherent weakness in structure and character of present day political parties.

Mr Nawaz said one of the ways of containing the Army’s political supremacy would be to create regional commands to be headed by four-star generals to be selected by the same process as the Chief of Army Staff. This would drastically reduce the power of the Army Chief and make Pakistan coup-safe. He has also suggested restructuring of the Joint Chairman of the Staff Committee (JCSC) which is at present largely ceremonial. Mr Nawaz would like the JCSC to be truly `joint`, with members selected from among the retired senior commanders.


The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.