While China may aid West Asian countries to hedge their interests against the US, the lack of Chinese diplomacy on ground shows that there is still a gap between ambition and reality
China’s official response to the attack on Israel by terror group Hamas earlier this month was to weigh in on the “two-state solution”, and call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also put forth the proposal of convening an international peace conference to arrive at a wide-ranging consensus on the issue of Palestine. China has excoriated Israel’s campaign against Hamas in Gaza as being beyond the pale of self-defence. None of Beijing’s remarks on the ongoing crisis have ostracised Hamas. The objectives of China’s approach are to show public solidarity with Arab interests and insert itself as a peacemaker in a region widely seen as being in the US sphere of influence. The former positioning is a continuation of Chinese policy from the Cold War era moulded for a new era of great power politics.
China must align itself in and around positions that benefit its partners such as Russia and Iran.
Beijing’s view on the West Asia (the Middle East) crisis is an amalgamation of its historical and contemporary geopolitics. Right now, China must align itself in and around positions that benefit its partners such as Russia and Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has criticised Israel for its expansion of settlements, linking Israeli domestic politics to the ongoing crisis. Beyond the regional dynamics, China is also maintaining a similar balance that it did between Russia and Ukraine, balancing between criticising Western policies of the past while stressing respect for territorial integrity.
Academic Song Zhongping singles out America’s moral support as a provocation for Israel’s belligerence and the cause of its nonchalance towards the international outrage over the military offensive in Gaza. Additionally, Song highlights fallacies in Israel’s Gaza campaign, stating that it has the potential to cause a disproportionate number of civilian deaths. There is a prognosis in Chinese media that the current conflagration has the potential to turn into a wider conflict, with outlets like Global Times likening it to a “6th war” in West Asia. In line with this doomsday scenario for the wider region, Li Shaoxian, an expert on West Asia at Ningxia University, cautions that groups like Hezbollah could increase their involvement further exacerbating the crisis.
Song highlights fallacies in Israel’s Gaza campaign, stating that it has the potential to cause a disproportionate number of civilian deaths.
As far as future scenarios are concerned, there is a view voiced by scholar She Gangzheng from Tsinghua University that to wipe out Hamas, the Israeli forces will have to annihilate its military wing and to meet these objectives, the Israeli Defence Force will have to occupy Gaza. Zou Zhiqiang from Fudan University and Li Shaoxian argue that controlling Gaza would pose a great burden on the Israeli state.
The discussion in the Sinosphere has also focused on America and its diplomatic approach to West Asia. Wu Sike, China’s former envoy to West Asia, focuses on different factors at play in West Asia. Wu states that while the clout of the “Jewish lobby” in politics has ensured Israel’s primacy for American foreign policy, at the same an escalation in West Asia distracts it from its priorities in Asia-Pacific. Wu assesses these pressures will push the United States to favour deterrence—presumably a reference to Israel’s Gaza campaign—to avert other nations in the regions from getting involved militarily. There is also an assessment that America’s standing in the region has declined due to it leading to several wars in West Asia and the rise of the economic clout of other nations. Wu foresees that despite American military presence in the region, a “feeling of autonomy” in diplomatic engagement is growing among Arab states on account of the new balance of power—given China’s rise. In this entire evaluation, there is an attempt to portray Iran as a victim of the American diplomatic approach to the region. Wu paints a picture that America does not want a rapprochement between powers in the region and has sought to create a NATO-like anti-Iranian bloc in the region.
Wu assesses these pressures will push the United States to favour deterrence—presumably a reference to Israel’s Gaza campaign—to avert other nations in the regions from getting involved militarily.
China’s strategy in West Asia is an attempt to blame the festering of the West Asia crisis on the US foreign policy. Two, China seeks to draw focus to Israel’s treatment of its Palestinian minority and thereby, resolve it by the “two-state solution”, which is ironical given its own “One China” principle that is used to deny Taiwanese nationhood. Lastly, there has been an incident where a staffer of the Israeli embassy in Beijing has been attacked, China must remember that pandering to the Palestine cause and glossing over terrorism by Hamas may be a trigger to revive the dormant Uighur struggle in Xinjiang.
The above would translate well for Beijing’s objectives. The exit from Afghanistan was often equated to a requirement for Washington D.C. to redirect resources to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A second ‘front’ in the Middle East means that the US would be further distracted from theatres such as the Indo-Pacific. This also feeds into a strategic narrative of the US's capacity to run multiple large theatres of conflict. In the post-9/11 era, both Afghanistan and Iraq and US tactical failures in these countries were attributed to mismanagement of one for the other. Meaning, the Iraq war was seen as a distraction that ultimately also led to the eventual downfall of the American campaign in Afghanistan.
The exit from Afghanistan was often equated to a requirement for Washington D.C. to redirect resources to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Finally, Beijing’s aspirational position is also one of a mediator of conflicts. In March this year, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced the resumption of diplomatic ties, a deal brokered by China and announced in Beijing. A month later, in April, Beijing reiterated a long-standing proposition to mediate between Israel and Palestine. Realities, however, are different. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s extensive shuttle diplomacy followed by US President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel has shown that Arab and Israeli interests still look towards Washington D.C. as the prevalent external power. While China may be available for regional states to hedge their interests against the US, the lack of Chinese diplomacy on the ground in the Middle East at this moment shows that there is still a gap between ambition and reality
Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme and is based out of ORFs Delhi centre. His research focusses on China specifically looking ...
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Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
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