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Behind the scenes of war, China’s alliance with Russia has flourished—but the shifting US policy could expose the cracks in this silent partnership
Image Source: Getty
A few weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood beside the Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and declared a ‘no limits’ partnership. However, after the tanks rolled in, the phrase quietly vanished from official rhetoric as its continued use could have signalled unambiguous Chinese backing of Russia’s war footing. Yet the eventual rupture with the West only deepened their ties. Isolated and increasingly aligned, Moscow and Beijing forged a silent alliance in which Xi, with quiet calculation, steadily gained the upper hand over Putin.
China is cautiously observing these developments unfold, as the reduced United States (US)-Russia contestation could potentially lead to the relative weakening of the Moscow-Beijing partnership.
However, the political turnover in Washington in 2025 was marked by a deliberate shift away from European entanglements, toward both a strategic reset with Moscow and intensified efforts to contain China in the Indo-Pacific. This has signalled a potential paradigmatic realignment in China-Russia relations. China is cautiously observing these developments unfold, as the reduced United States (US)-Russia contestation could potentially lead to the relative weakening of the Moscow-Beijing partnership. As discourse around the war in Ukraine tilts toward the possibility of a ceasefire, a reassessment of how these shifting dynamics affect China’s strategic interests is both timely and necessary.
The Russia-Ukraine War considerably impacted Beijing’s interests, as China is a major trading partner for several countries in the region. The majority of Chinese inland trade to Europe went through Russia, but with sanctions imposed on Moscow, this trade route faced disruptions. To circumvent, China even attempted to position itself as an honest broker in bringing peace to the conflict by rolling out a twelve-point peace plan, but the efforts proved futile because the agreement did not stipulate the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory.
However, as the war progressed, the China-Russia partnership continued to improve since China stopped short of condemning Russia, instead urging respect for national sovereignty and ending hostilities. Furthermore, Beijing did not join the sanctions regime against Russia, leading to increased trade between the two nations. Bilateral trade grew from US$ 147 billion in 2021 to US$ 240 billion in 2023. In fact, from 2022 to early 2024, the Russian economy underwent Yuan-isation, i.e., it increasingly became dependent on the yuan to settle international payments.
The majority of Chinese inland trade to Europe went through Russia, but with sanctions imposed on Moscow, this trade route faced disruptions.
Moreover, Russia’s energy and mineral exports meant for the European market were re-routed to China, and in exchange, Russia imported substantial amounts of high technology goods, manufactured products, and consumer items (see Fig. 1.1 and 1.2). Beijing not only became the biggest supplier of commercial goods to Moscow but also exported dual-use items, covered by Western export controls. These items included microelectronics, telecommunication equipment, radars, optical devices, machine tools, sensors, and other high-priority components used to manufacture tanks, drones, and missiles.
Figure 1.1: Russia’s exports to China in 2022 and 2023
Source: Chinese Customs data
Figure 1.2: Chinese exports to Russia 2022 and 2023
Source: Chinese customs data
During this period, the Russian-Chinese political ties also witnessed improvements, reflected through frequent bilateral exchanges between all levels of their governments and their close collaboration in regional, multilateral and plurilateral organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Further, both countries prioritised harmonising connectivity projects in Eurasia, reflected in the linkage of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Moreover, the geoeconomic interlinkages have reflected in the geopolitical realms as well. China’s improved relations with Russia have helped it expand and solidify its footprint in the Arctic region. Beijing’s stake in the Northern Sea Route has increased, connecting the Russian ports in the west to China’s northeastern ports, reducing shipping time by a few weeks, compared to the route via the Suez Canal. To buttress, China has invested in port development projects in the Arctic, for example, China's state-owned Poly Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to develop the Arkhangelsk region to build a deep-water port. China is also developing a nuclear-powered icebreaker in cooperation with Russia’s Rosatom. Their naval cooperation was evident last year as Russian and Chinese navies participated in a 35-day-long patrol in the North Pacific Ocean, touring the Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea, and the Arctic Ocean.
Ukraine was, therefore, an easier destination for China to acquire Soviet high-technology defence goods and their know-how, bypassing Russia, for local production in China.
Nonetheless, China’s improving relations with Russia come at a cost. Before the war, Ukraine was a key arms exporter to Beijing and its third-largest source of military equipment. China had purchased an icebreaker and even a half-finished aircraft carrier, Varyag, from Ukraine. China also bought the naval fighter Sukhoi-33 from Ukraine after the Russian refusal, and reverse-engineered it to produce its J-15 naval fighter jet. Most of China’s naval gas-turbine engines in its warships are produced in collaboration with Ukrainian manufacturers. The Chinese heavy strategic airlifter Y-20 is an improved copy of the Ukrainian design.
In 2016, Chinese investors had purchased the majority (56 percent) shareholding in Motor Sich, an aviation engine company that makes engines for aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones. The purchase aimed at resolving China’s Achilles heel, i.e., its lack of aviation engine production capability. Ukraine was, therefore, an easier destination for China to acquire Soviet high-technology defence goods and their know-how, bypassing Russia, for local production in China. The high level of corruption in Ukraine played an enabling role in these surreptitious technological deals before the war.
The growing Russia-China cooperation and China-West contestation further tightened screws against the Chinese access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex.
However, Xi Jinping’s proximity with Russia and his unwillingness to condemn Russia’s Crimean takeover gradually closed this technology acquisition route. The growing Russia-China cooperation and China-West contestation further tightened screws against the Chinese access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. In 2021, despite Beijing's vehement condemnation, Ukraine nationalised the Motor Sich company and effectively shut down the tech-transfer possibility. The war played a further role in constraining spare part supply for Ukraine-supplied defence goods to China. In addition, the Russian bombardment of Ukraine’s military industry has worsened these supply disruptions.
Nevertheless, China-Ukraine bilateral trade is regaining momentum. Before the war, China was Ukraine’s largest trade partner, and in 2021, bilateral trade stood at US$ 19.3 billion. However, the initial shocks of the war in 2022 sharply disrupted this trajectory, reducing trade to approximately US$ 8 billion. Since 2024, bilateral trade has rebounded significantly, reaching US$ 17 billion. This increase can be attributed to Chinese exports of electrical components, machines, boilers, furniture, metals, chemicals, and non-ferrous metals to Ukraine, and its imports of wood, wood products, ash and slag, and cereals from Kyiv. The bonhomie of the pre-war era between China and Ukraine, however, remains missing.
Russia has long craved recognition as a European power, and historically, its relationship with China has deepened only when the West has shut its doors. Despite bilateral official overtures, mutual distrust lingers beneath the surface, especially among Russians wary of Chinese ambitions in the Far East. Therefore, any thaw in US-Russia relations would slow Moscow’s drift toward Beijing. Should sanctions ease and Russia reenter the global financial system, China’s leverage will begin to diminish. For India, this recalibration offers a strategic relief, as a less indebted Russia means stronger bilateral ties with New Delhi, unburdened by Western scrutiny or Chinese pressure.
Russia has long craved recognition as a European power, and historically, its relationship with China has deepened only when the West has shut its doors.
In Ukraine, the expanding US footprint, cemented by a new critical minerals agreement and a joint reconstruction fund, threatens to box out China. Beijing has long eyed postwar rebuilding contracts financed by Western capital, but those ambitions may falter if US-China tensions escalate.
Therefore, Xi’s visit to Moscow in May 2025 to attend the Russian Victory Day Parade is a calculated move to arrest the drift in Sino-Russian relations while closely monitoring the evolving dynamics of the war in Ukraine. The Moscow-Beijing silent partnership, a product of a decade’s alignment, won’t unravel overnight. China will continue to exploit Russian territory to advance the BRI, expand links to Europe, and grow its Arctic presence. However, President Trump’s approach to ending the Russia-Ukraine War appears to be a lose-lose possibility for China.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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