The current China-Russia Coast Guard exercises in the Russian Far East and their Arctic patrol are part of shared strategies to protect their interests in the region
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On 16 September 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels and the Russian Federal Security Service’s Border Service ships conducted joint naval exercises named ‘Pacific Patrol 2024’ in the Peter the Great Gulf near the Russian Far East. After five days of exercises, both flotillas extended their mission with a 35-day patrol of the Northern Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, and the Arctic Ocean. Earlier, a similar instance of cooperation occurred in July 2024, when four Chinese and Russian strategic bombers patrolled near Alaska, triggering interception by US aircraft.
While Russia and China have often held joint military exercises in the Pacific or adjacent seas, these recent patrols in the Arctic signal a distinct shift in focus.
While Russia and China have often held joint military exercises in the Pacific or adjacent seas, these recent patrols in the Arctic signal a distinct shift in focus. The Arctic is a strategic priority for Russia whereas China’s primary interest remains in the Pacific, with only a secondary focus on the Arctic. Therefore, this paper explores China’s evolving relations with Russia and consequent Chinese compulsions for deploying coast guard ships in the Arctic.
The Arctic has remained deeply embedded in Russian national consciousness since the Czars period and became a strategic battleground between superpowers during the Cold War. However, once the Cold War ended, both superpowers lost interest. In recent years, melting seas, the opening of new trade routes, the region’s rich natural bounty of oil, gas and minerals and its potential for tourism and shipping have rekindled global interest in the Arctic, including from China and other non-Arctic states.
In 2007, to underline its ambition, Russia sent a nuclear icebreaker and two mini-submarines and planted a titanium Russian flag on the Arctic seabed at Lomonosov Ridge to mark its 1.2 million square kilometres of maritime territory after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rejected its claim. Russia has, thereafter, remained focused on developing its Arctic Zone and opening the Northern Sea Route to assert sovereignty over the region, protect its economic interests, and reinforce its status as a great power.
The revamped Joint Strategic Command North controls Russia’s Arctic forces including polar tanks, Borei-class nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, guided missile warships, and nuclear deterrence forces.
Russia has, moreover, substantially bolstered its naval, military, and commercial presence in the Arctic since 2007. The revamped Joint Strategic Command North controls Russia’s Arctic forces including polar tanks, Borei-class nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, guided missile warships, and nuclear deterrence forces. Russia also has the largest icebreaker fleet in the world, especially the Arktika-class ships. This military capability is supported by numerous air bases including 545 military facilities, floating nuclear power plants, gas rigs, energy terminals and two crucial shipping routes: the Northern Sea Route which shortens the distance between Asia and Europe compared to the Suez Canal (13,000 km vs 20,000 km) and the Northwest Passage, although navigation on both routes remains a challenge. Russia’s first-mover advantage and its geographical proximity have helped it to achieve near-dominance in the Arctic, a position Western powers are actively striving to contest.
Although Russia’s Arctic flag planting raised concerns in the West, internal dissensions, particularly from Canada and Iceland, delayed a joint response formation. However, over the years, NATO, led by the US, has adopted a more proactive approach. In 2022 and again in 2024, the US government updated its Arctic Strategy to better safeguard its interests while encouraging its allies to strengthen their military presence in the region. The US has revamped its five military bases in Alaska and one in Greenland, deployed advanced fighters and aviation assets, and reoriented its 11th Airborne Division. Additionally, the US Congress passed the Arctic Security Initiative Bill and established a budget for enhancing US defence capabilities in the north.
The US has revamped its five military bases in Alaska and one in Greenland, deployed advanced fighters and aviation assets, and reoriented its 11th Airborne Division.
Other NATO members have actively contributed to this endeavour. The UK has implemented multiple Arctic Policy Frameworks and raised commando troops, while France’s Polar Strategy for 2030 has led to its submarines and ships visiting the Arctic. Nordic countries have ramped up their naval and military capabilities, aiming to strengthen their strategic position in the Arctic.
In collaboration, NATO members have conducted multiple joint military exercises in the Arctic, including Cold Response 2022, Immediate Response 2024, Arctic Edge 2024, Ice Camp 2024, and Nordic Response 2024. Russia and China view these developments as strategic moves by NATO to strengthen its credibility and military presence in the region.
After the Russia-Ukraine War began in February 2022, the seven members of the Arctic Council excluding Russia, issued a joint statement condemning the Russian invasion and rejecting Russia’s Chairmanship of the Council. Russia, in response, withdrew from the Northern Dimension and the Barents Sea Euro-Arctic Council, effectively making all avenues of joint management of the Arctic dysfunctional. Trade, economic cooperation, investments in regional projects, shipping routes, scientific research, and safety and emergency response cooperation, have uniformly suffered.
Trade, economic cooperation, investments in regional projects, shipping routes, scientific research, and safety and emergency response cooperation, have uniformly suffered.
The dysfunction in Arctic governance has, in turn, propelled the region’s militarisation, with both Russia and the Western powers vying for dominance. The entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively, upstaged the balance among the three main blocks in the Arctic: the US block, the Russian block, and the neutral Nordic block. The merger of the US and Nordic block has bolstered NATO’s dominance in the Arctic, posing a major threat to Russia, which is now aligning with China to reinstate the balance in the region. In addition, discussions for establishing a ‘Nordic+’ model, excluding Russia from Arctic governance, are pushing Russia towards China to create an alternative management model and disrupt Western objectives.
China became an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 and considers itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, even though it is 900 miles away from the region. It further expresses ambitions to participate in the Arctic’s governance, and maintain a peaceful and stable regional order and oppose its militarisation.
However, China faces four crucial contradictions in its Arctic strategy. First, it must navigate to establish itself as a legitimate Arctic power. Second, it must find a way to balance its relations with Russia and other Arctic countries. Third, China’s over-aggression in Arctic affairs will create conflict with the US. Finally, China’s close partnership with Russia could increase US-China tensions. These contradictions present complex challenges to China which it is keen to manage skilfully which explains its caution in the region.
The Arctic is valuable for China as investing and securing energy imports from there would be faster, and cheaper and alleviate its Malacca Dilemma.
Nevertheless, the Arctic is valuable for China as investing and securing energy imports from there would be faster, and cheaper and alleviate its Malacca Dilemma. In addition, developing Arctic shipping routes requires substantial investment. As expected, Russia has increasingly welcomed Chinese investments and collaboration in opening and maintaining the route. China has consequently incorporated them into its Belt and Road Initiative under the banner of the ‘Ice Silk Road’.
Chinese development efforts in the Arctic have been substantial, including projects like the Zarubino Port, the Arkhangelsk Deep-water Port, and probably a railway connecting Arkhangelsk to the Siberian railway. To protect its investments, energy resources, and shipping routes, China has steadily increased its military cooperation with Russia over the years. The Vostok 2018 exercise marked the first large-scale Chinese participation in a Russian-led operation and since then, joint military exercises have taken place across different environments and domains.
The current China-Russia Coast Guard exercises in the Russian Far East and their Arctic patrol were also a part of this exercise series where both countries have collaborated and shared strategies to protect their interests in the region. Nevertheless, China has deliberately downplayed its interest in the Arctic’s militarisation, choosing instead to keep a lower profile presence through law enforcement patrols by its coast guard. For Russia, China serves as a financially affluent but non-threatening junior partner in the Arctic, that helps to advance key projects without challenging its primacy and dominance. Their joint military exercises and strategic bomber patrols, therefore, benefit and serve their current mutual interests.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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