Would enhancing the police powers of BSF improve border security or would it avert BSF’s attention from its core responsibilities?
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), vide a notification dated 11 October 2021, has enhanced the jurisdiction of the Border Security Force (BSF) to carry out search, seizure, and arrest in Punjab, West Bengal, and Assam to a 50-kilometre (km) belt within the international border, from the erstwhile 15 km and reduced it in Gujarat from 80 km to 50 km. The powers remain unaltered in the case of Rajasthan, Jammu & Kashmir, and the Northeastern states. This has ostensibly been done with the purpose of bringing uniformity, besides enhancing security along the borders in view of the changed tactics of trans-border criminals.
Initial delegation of police powers to BSF was done in 1969 under the provisions of Section 139 of the BSF Act 1968. Some modifications were notified in 1973 and, thereafter, seven years ago on 3 July 2014.
These powers were considered essential in view of circumstances like the terrain, population composition, crime pattern besides presence and effectiveness of the police in border areas. The circumstances varying from state to state, the jurisdiction laid down essentially also varied for different areas. Uniformity, therefore, militates against ground reality and is tantamount to having one solution for all problems.
Initial delegation of police powers to BSF was done in 1969 under the provisions of Section 139 of the BSF Act 1968. Some modifications were notified in 1973 and, thereafter, seven years ago on 3 July 2014.
The BSF being the only law enforcing agency present in remote border areas in Gujarat and Rajasthan—which have a low population density and an absence of any population centres up to a large distance from the border, and a limited police presence—necessarily required that police powers delegated to the BSF be larger in these two states. Even the Border Out Posts (BOPs) of BSF were located quite far away from the border (and subsequently moved closer to the border). These powers enabled the BSF to chase and apprehend trans-border criminals who may have managed to escape detection by BSF ambushes. The powers ensured that criminals could not evade apprehension because of police absence or delay in arrival. Population being sparse, it was easier for the BSF to carry out searches in case required.
West Bengal, Assam, and Punjab, being states with much higher population density and a stronger police presence and better infrastructure, the limit of the BSF’s jurisdiction was kept to only 15 kms from the border as an enabling provision. The population density in border areas has gone up by two to three folds in last 50 years. The police presence and, consequently, its effectiveness also has gone up. Enhancement of jurisdiction in these three states to 50-km border belt is, therefore, not warranted and may lead to confusion unless close coordination with the police is not ensured. On many occasions, close coordination may not even be feasible, especially in the case of hot pursuit because of necessity of swiftness and secrecy. Lack of coordination may lead to ugly situations because the concurrent jurisdiction of two forces, controlled by two different governments may lead to turf wars, especially if the ruling parties in the state and centre are different.
Enhancement of jurisdiction in these three states to 50-km border belt is, therefore, not warranted and may lead to confusion unless close coordination with the police is not ensured.
Further, these powers cannot be exercised by the BSF independently as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is not applicable in Punjab and West Bengal. BSF, thus, cannot carry out search and seizure operations without warrant. Uniformity, therefore, is not a rational ground for extending jurisdiction in these three states.
The core function of the BSF will get adversely effected by enhancement of jurisdiction as the troops deployed on Border Out Posts (BOPs) will have to be withdrawn for operations in depth. This thinning out will leave the border vulnerable. One might say that this argument is inconsequential because of a mere increase in jurisdiction. However, BSF has probably never exercised these powers independently in the past except, perhaps, in West Bengal because of lack of resources, wherewithal, definite intelligence, knowledge of terrain of depth area, and police procedures. Instances of troops being attacked during independent intelligence-based operations have been reported in the past in the eastern states.
The evolving methodology of an adversary using tunnels and drones should, instead, have been addressed by augmenting the capabilities of the BSF through induction of technology to detect these at the borders itself. Police will be able to better detect and apprehend the accomplices collecting the payload from a drone landing in depth because of their presence being much closer to the likely spot than the BSF deployed on the border. Similarly, the tunnel openings being very close to the border, the additional police powers are inconsequential.
Strengthening the BSF intelligence wing through induction of technology, and focused tasking to collect information about trans-border criminals will be more effective in enhancing border security instead of extending jurisdiction. Collection of intelligence in an area as large as 50 km from the border in three densely populated states can, perhaps, be better coordinated by the state and central intelligence agencies and acted upon by the local police instead of the BSF being withdrawn from BOPs.
Border guarding is the forte of the BSF. It is not trained to carry out police functions. The need to train BSF for these functions will, in turn, reduce emphasis on training for core functions with adverse consequences. Exercise of extended powers may, thus, end up diluting the abilities of the BSF as a first-class border guarding force and convert it into a third-class police force.
Collection of intelligence in an area as large as 50 km from the border in three densely populated states can, perhaps, be better coordinated by the state and central intelligence agencies and acted upon by the local police instead of the BSF being withdrawn from BOPs.
Significantly, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have extremely sensitive, open borders with Nepal that are repeatedly exploited by Pakistan for fuelling militancy in various parts of India. Enhancement of these powers delegated to Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) deployed along these borders was more vital instead of the BSF in those three states, if at all enhancement of powers was warranted. SSB deployed in West Bengal and Assam should logically have been delegated similar powers as the BSF deployed in these states.
Suffice to say that the implementation of extended powers delegated to BSF has practical difficulties and are unlikely to enhance security. BSF is in no way better than police in search, seizure, and arrest. The government should have, perhaps, focused on empowering the state police and improving the coordination between security agencies.
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Sanjiv Krishan Sood retired as Additional Director General Border Security Forces BSF.
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