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Myanmar’s junta ends emergency rule, not to restore democracy, but to rebrand military control ahead of rigged elections and mounting global scrutiny.
Image Source: Pexels
On 31 July 2025, the military junta of Myanmar ended the nationwide state of emergency by revoking Order No. 1/2021- which was initiated to justify the military coup on 1 February 2021- through Order No. 1/2025 signed by Min Aung Hlaing. According to state-run MRTV, Myanmar’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) dissolved the State Administration Council (SAC), forming a new Union government, led by U Nyo Saw as Prime Minister (PM), alongside a newly created State Security and Peace Commission chaired by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The announcement also included the formation of an 11-member commission, overseen by Min Aung Hlaing, further consolidating his control. The junta has simultaneously initiated preparations for a so-called ‘disciplined multiparty election’ scheduled for December 2025 and January 2026, overseen by a military general.
While the end of emergency rule might be a constitutional milestone, it is more likely a tactical manoeuvre. Far from indicating a genuine transition, the move appears to be aimed at reframing military control, securing international legitimacy, and laying the ground for carefully orchestrated elections. Amid a protracted civil war and growing global scrutiny, this recalibration raises a deeper question: Is this the beginning of a political opening, or just the latest façade in the junta’s playbook?
The junta's spokesperson officially claims that the emergency rule has ‘fulfilled its duties’ and that the nation is now set to prepare for a long-promised election. On the surface, this can be interpreted as an attempt to portray a return to constitutional normalcy. It is in rhythm with the 2008 Constitution, which requires the elections to be held within six months after the emergency is lifted.
The goal is twofold: first, to reduce international sanctions and regional pressure and, second, to project a façade of political normalcy and institutional transition to reassure the domestic populace and consolidate internal control.
Nonetheless, this lift seems more strategic than constitutional. The NDSC is constitutionally a civilian-military body; however, it remains dominated by the military, as it includes six military-appointed members out of 11—including the Commander-in-Chief and key security ministers. The security apparatus, thus, remains firmly under Min Aung Hlaing and his commanders' control. Notably, no substantial transfer of power has taken place. Therefore, what has changed is not power but the narrative.
By lifting the emergency rule, the junta is seeking to reorient itself domestically and internationally—not merely as a regime clinging to power through martial law, but as a legitimate actor preparing for electoral democracy. The goal is twofold: first, to reduce international sanctions and regional pressure and, second, to project a façade of political normalcy and institutional transition to reassure the domestic populace and consolidate internal control.
This narrative manoeuvre certainly masks some deeper vulnerabilities. Since Operation 1027 was launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in late 2023, the junta has suffered major territorial and strategic setbacks. It has lost control of key towns and border trade posts across northern Shan, Rakhine, Chin, and Sagaing regions. As of 2024 and 2025, the Arakan Army (AA) has made substantial gains in western Myanmar, while the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied resistance forces continue to challenge the junta's presence in the north and east.
Lifting the emergency can also be viewed as a tactical pause to regroup militarily, without actually relinquishing any administrative control.
The military's workforce is stretched, morale is reportedly low, and desertions have risen. Informal recruitment of militia groups, re-enlistment of retirees, and forced conscriptions all indicate a regime under strain. In this context, lifting the emergency can also be viewed as a tactical pause to regroup militarily, without actually relinquishing any administrative control. The junta's broader aim might be to organise limited, strictly controlled elections in the regions it still governs—creating an illusion of progress while reinforcing its remaining authority. Elections as a Tool, Not a Goal
The announcement of possible elections following the lifting of the emergency should not be taken at face value. The military regime's history indicates that elections are often used more as a political tool than a genuine democratic process. The military-drafted 2008 Constitution grants the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military) 25 percent of parliamentary seats and sufficient veto power over constitutional amendments. Any electoral process under such a framework—especially with major political parties such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) banned, and their leaders jailed or disqualified—is unlikely to yield a fair or inclusive outcome.
Furthermore, even if elections are held in limited pockets, they will likely exclude conflict-affected areas where resistance forces have taken control. Notably, three months of martial law have been imposed on 1 August across much of Kachin, Karenni (Kayah), Karen, Rakhine, Shan, and Chin states, as well as the Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe regions—underscoring the scale of contested territory and instability. This exclusionary approach risks solidifying a de facto two-state reality: junta-controlled enclaves and resistance-administered liberated zones. A bifurcated Myanmar, with duelling sovereignties, would make national reconciliation even more elusive.
The regional bloc—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—has primarily focused on pushing the junta towards meaningful dialogue or a ceasefire through its 5-point consensus, which the junta has largely continued to ignore despite several attempts by member countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The junta's gesture of lifting emergency rule may be partly aimed at appeasing ASEAN critics and securing re-entry into regional forums from which it has been excluded since 2021 and only partially reintegrated in 2024.
China, while maintaining strategic ties with the junta, has also expanded its engagement with Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) to protect its investments and influence in border zones. At the same time, it appears to be currying favour with the military by pressuring EAOs to enter into peace negotiations, aiming to stabilise the conflict landscape and lend support to the likely rigged elections. Though engaging with both sides, India remains cautious. It continues balancing security interests with concern for growing instability along its northeastern border. While the democratic neighbour has, on several occasions, urged the military regime to hold free, fair, and inclusive elections, it has not issued any clear statement regarding the junta’s current electoral plans - reflecting its cautious approach amid complex regional security concerns. Japan has expressed serious concerns over Myanmar’s planned elections, emphasising that they cannot be deemed legitimate amidst ongoing conflict and the exclusion of key stakeholders, many of whom remain in detention. For Western governments, the move will be viewed with scepticism unless accompanied by genuine steps toward an inclusive political process.
Thus, the lifting of the state of emergency by Myanmar's junta may be viewed as neither a harbinger of democratic transition nor a sign of goodwill. It remains a tactical recalibration to reposition the military amid growing domestic pressure and international scrutiny.
For the NUG and resistance groups, the lifting of emergency rule changes little on the ground. The resistance forces have claimed they will boycott the upcoming elections, which they apprehend will essentially bring no meaningful change to their position. Armed struggle and parallel administration in many areas will continue unabated. However, the junta's decision may open space for new diplomatic strategies—pressuring international actors to push harder for a genuinely inclusive dialogue process that includes the NUG, ethnic leaders, and civil society.
Concurrently, the move could embolden resistance forces to view the regime as weakening. If interpreted as a sign of desperation rather than strength, it could accelerate coordination among opposition forces and intensify campaigns to dismantle remaining junta institutions.
Thus, the lifting of the state of emergency by Myanmar's junta may be viewed as neither a harbinger of democratic transition nor a sign of goodwill. It remains a tactical recalibration to reposition the military amid growing domestic pressure and international scrutiny. As the junta prepares for tightly controlled elections in parts of the country, the danger lies in mistaking superficial gestures for substantive reform. The path to genuine peace and democracy in Myanmar must involve not just a change in rules but a transformation in who gets to write them.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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