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Despite promises of peace following a devastating earthquake, Myanmar's junta has intensified its military campaign, targeting civilians and deepening the country’s humanitarian and political crisis
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Image Source: Getty
Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis continues to worsen, exacerbated by relentless airstrikes and natural disasters such as the recent earthquake that struck the Mandalay-Sagaing region at the end of March 2025. Despite public statements from both the military junta and various armed ethnic groups expressing support for a temporary ceasefire to facilitate relief efforts, these calls have not translated into a halt in violence. On the contrary, the breach of ceasefire mechanisms has only deepened the existing instability. The junta's desperation to regain control over lost territories increasingly defines the country’s security landscape, particularly as its grip on key regions loosens.
The 28 March Mandalay-Sagaing earthquake, which claimed more than 3,735 lives, injured 5,108 individuals, and left 120 people unaccounted for, has inflicted a significant toll on everyday life. The State Administration Council (SAC) announced a temporary ceasefire on 2 April, initially scheduled to last until 22 April and later extended through the end of May; however, in practice, aerial assaults have only intensified. Over 741 air attacks by the SAC have targeted civilian areas—including schools, homes, and religious institutions, resulting in at least 113 civilian casualties, many of them children (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Airstrikes by the Junta following the Earthquake (28 March – 13 May 2025)
Source: ISP-Myanmar
One of the most harrowing incidents occurred on 12 May, when a school in Otein Twin village, Tabayin Township in Sagaing Region, was bombed during an unscheduled class session. The attack killed 23 people—21 schoolchildren and two teachers—and wounded around 100 others. The school was among many in the Anyar (Dry Zone) region that had been discreetly operating to evade detection and air raids. Just a day later, on 13 May, an airstrike hit Htun Ya Wai village in Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State, killing at least 13 civilians, including one child. Although the SAC denied responsibility, eyewitnesses identified the aircraft as junta fighter jets. These incidents are not isolated occurrences; similar attacks occurred in 2022 in Depayin Township, when another school was hit, killing 11 children.
There appears to be a systematic campaign to pressure anti-junta forces by targeting civilians, thereby undermining popular support for Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and pro-democracy groups. The junta understands that these groups cannot sustain their operations without civilian backing.
The junta’s air campaign has expanded beyond traditional conflict zones, increasingly targeting residential wards, hospitals, and religious buildings in non-conflict areas. These actions reflect not only military aggression but also a deliberate strategy to terrorise communities and assert control over regions beyond the junta's direct influence. There appears to be a systematic campaign to pressure anti-junta forces by targeting civilians, thereby undermining popular support for Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and pro-democracy groups that currently control large parts of the country. The junta understands that these groups cannot sustain their operations without civilian backing.
The military seeks to consolidate power through elections in this uneven and volatile landscape. Under Myanmar's 2008 Constitution, elections must be held within six months of the end of a state of emergency. Since the 2021 coup, the military has repeatedly extended emergency rule, with the latest extension set to expire in July 2025. Power is constitutionally mandated to return to the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), dominated by military appointees. However, in July 2024, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing replaced Vice President Myint Swe as the chair of the NDSC, enabling him to manipulate constitutional provisions and extend military control indefinitely.
On 8 March 2025, the junta reaffirmed its commitment to hold multi-party elections soon. On 26 March, the junta laid out detailed plans to conduct the polls in four phases: during the third and fourth weeks of December 2025 and the first and second weeks of January 2026. By 9 May, 77 political parties had registered with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission, including those aligned with the military, such as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), as well as several smaller ethnic and regional parties. However, key pro-democracy parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), have been forcibly dissolved.
Elections held under the present conditions—marked by a lack of inclusivity, transparency, and security—are unlikely to be free or fair, and instead risk entrenching authoritarian rule under the guise of legitimacy.
Since annulling the results of the 2020 election, the regime has wielded the promise of future elections as a political smokescreen to placate neighbouring countries and international actors, while simultaneously intensifying crackdowns on political opposition and civil society. Elections held under the present conditions—marked by a lack of inclusivity, transparency, and security—are unlikely to be free or fair, and instead risk entrenching authoritarian rule under the guise of legitimacy.
Meanwhile, the junta continues to strengthen its international ties with like-minded authoritarian regimes. Its recent diplomatic overtures, including high-level visits to Moscow on May 9 and meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time since the 2021 coup, signal a clear intention to reinforce its strategic alliances with Russia and China. Xi pledged China's support for Myanmar's post-earthquake reconstruction efforts and reaffirmed backing for the junta's planned elections. Min Aung Hlaing, in turn, assured the protection of Chinese interests and projects within Myanmar.
Between 2019–2023, Russia and China were Myanmar's two largest arms suppliers, accounting for 38 percent and 26 percent of its major arms imports, respectively. Under a 2018 contract worth US$ 400 million, Myanmar received six Su-30SME multirole fighter jets from Russia, the final two of which were delivered in December 2024. That same month, the junta commissioned six Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters, another K-8W fighter jet, and a Y-8 support aircraft. In addition, the Myanmar Air Force operates MiG-29s and Yak-130s, which, although acquired before the 2021 coup, have been heavily deployed in recent operations. In August 2024, Myanmar also took delivery of six FTC-2000G fighter jets from China, which have been used extensively across multiple theatres.
The junta has significantly expanded its drone arsenal, acquiring Chinese-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Russian-made Orlan-10 E and Orion-2 (Helios) drones in 2024, which enhance its nighttime operational capacity. While anti-junta forces lack sophisticated weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles, they have managed to shoot down low-flying military aircraft using heavy machine guns, such as .50 calibre weapons. Moreover, resistance groups have adapted commercial drones and 3D printing technology —allegedly of Chinese origin—for both surveillance and offensive operations. In April 2024, for example, approximately 30 drones were used in a coordinated attack on key installations in Naypyidaw. Despite the growing deployment of drones by both sides, the military retains the technological edge given its steady accumulation of advanced weaponry from key partners and sustained funding.
On 18 May 2025, military personnel abandoned a key off-take station on the Chinese oil and gas pipeline in Mandalay following multiple coordinated resistance attacks. Since October 2024, Beijing has advocated establishing a joint China-Myanmar security company to address such threats. In February 2025, the junta legalised foreign private security companies (PSCs), allowing them to be armed and embedded within Myanmar’s security framework, primarily to protect Chinese interests.
Furthermore, since 2022, China has supported the regime's digital surveillance efforts by employing facial recognition systems and internet monitoring technologies. While avoiding direct involvement in combat, China’s provision of surveillance technology and infrastructure security raises concerns about Myanmar’s sovereignty and Beijing’s indirect role in sustaining the junta.
More decisive action from key partners—such as India, Japan, and the European Union (EU)— is crucial to facilitate dialogue with all stakeholders. The international community, with ASEAN’s backing, must also push for a comprehensive arms embargo to curb the junta’s violence.
As Myanmar’s crisis worsens, its regional fallout—from refugee flows to security threats—demands urgent attention. While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus provides a foundation, more decisive action from key partners—such as India, Japan, and the European Union (EU)— is crucial to facilitate dialogue with all stakeholders.
The international community, with ASEAN’s backing, must also push for a comprehensive arms embargo to curb the junta’s violence. While China and Russia may resist such efforts, support from the US, UK, EU, Canada, and South Korea underscores a growing consensus. A coordinated embargo could significantly weaken the military’s capabilities and reduce the intensity of the conflict. Whether a united and sustained international response can arrest Myanmar’s descent into chaos and uphold its people's aspirations for a just and democratic future remains a critical question.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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