The Junta's weakening grip on power, coupled with growing internal divisions and external isolation, suggests it may continue to lose ground
Myanmar is undergoing a shift in its political landscape, challenging the Junta's long-standing grip on power. Since 1962, the military has ruled unchallenged, initially through direct control, later shifting to semi-democratic governance post-2012, and a fragile democratic period from 2015 until the 2021 coup. The junta likely believed it could quickly consolidate power and suppress resistance as it had during the 1988 uprising and the 2007 Saffron Revolution. However, this time, the State Administration Council (SAC), or the governing body of the junta, faced an unexpected and powerful opposition—a united front of ethnic armed groups and civilian forces determined to dismantle the military rule.
What initially began as a mass civil disobedience movement has evolved into a broader conflict, showcasing the resilience of the Peoples Defence Forces (PDFs), an armed force of the National Unity Government (NUG), joined at some level by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), demonstrating a united front to hold offensives in the border areas and overthrow military rule.
The junta likely believed it could quickly consolidate power and suppress resistance as it had during the 1988 uprising and the 2007 Saffron Revolution.
According to the figures projected in the SAC-M report between 2021 and April 2024, 86 percent of the country's territory, including 67 percent of Myanmar's 55 million population, is not under stable junta control. Thirty townships were estimated to be under at least 90 percent control by resistant forces, including 14 where the armed groups had secured complete control. According to these estimates, the trajectory of change strongly favours resistance players.
Following Operation 1027, a significant turning point in the conflict, EAOs, and resistance forces have captured over 53 towns across Myanmar. Approximately 23 percent, or 12 towns, are located in districts bordering India, where the military forces lost control of all cities, excluding those in the Naga Self-Administered Districts. In Chin State's Matupi District, the regime forces lost control of three towns.
Around 15 percent, or eight towns, are in Myanmar-Thailand border districts. The Junta lost the most ground in Bawlake District, where it surrendered control of three towns.
The military forces lost control of three towns in the Matupi District and one in the Maungdaw District, which borders Bangladesh.
Source: SAC-M
In Myanmar-China border districts, 32 percent, i.e. 17 towns, were seized by resistance forces. The military forces lost control of cities in six of the nine districts along the China border, with the most significant losses occurring in Shan State's Muse District, where four towns were surrendered.
In the past three years, Myanmar's military forces have significantly diminished to about 130,000 personnel due to desertions, battlefield losses, and declining morale, with an additional 70,000 in police and militia roles. Troop resources are stretched thin, with many soldiers stationed near significant cities like Naypyidaw and Yangon to guard the military heartland from further offensives. Poor support for injured soldiers and distrust in leadership has further weakened unit cohesion. The junta struggles with intelligence leaks and outdated technology, as seen during ‘Operation 1027’ when resistance forces used drone attacks to devastating effect. On 4 April, approximately 30 drones targeted the military headquarters, the residence of Myanmar's ruling general, Min Aung Hlaing, and the airport in Naypyitaw. Though no casualties were caused, the attack was meant to rattle officials, underscoring resistance forces' growing reach and capability to strike at the heart of military power.
Troop resources are stretched thin, with many soldiers stationed near significant cities like Naypyidaw and Yangon to guard the military heartland from further offensives.
Amidst such circumstances, the junta launched three counter-attacks in different phases to regain lost territory, but all have struggled so far. Operation Aung Zeya was the first official offensive launched at a national level in April, overseen by Deputy Chief Soe Win. It was publicised in national and local media, and the offensive focused on quelling the ethnic Karen armed forces from capturing Myawaddy, a vital trade town near the border with Thailand.
The operation involved approximately 3,000 troops equipped with armoured vehicles, airpower, and weaponry to sustain the forces left in Myawaddy after Karen forces captured Infantry Battalion 275. Facing initial gains, however, these support forces were stalled for a few months in the challenging terrains of Dawna Mountain Range, facing continuous attacks from ethnic Karen and other resistance groups. Ultimately, the military forces had to withdraw, dispersing into Mon State and the Tanintharyi Region.
The second operation, Sin Phyu Shin, also known as Operation Lord of the White Elephant, was launched on a quieter note in August to retake northern Shan State. Since June, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3 BHA) grabbed northern Shan's Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Lashio towns. Additionally, the Northeastern Military Command and the townships of Madaya and Mogoke in the Mandalay Region were also seized since China brokered a ceasefire in the area in January between the military and 3 BHA was broken by the Junta as it began airstrikes. However, the operation conducted by the military forces did not achieve much due to its limited strength and size. The TNLA and its allies are continuing their attempt to seize the remaining junta strongholds in Hsipaw and Nawnghkio townships, while the junta retaliates daily with airstrikes on settlements in both areas.
The Northeastern Military Command and the townships of Madaya and Mogoke in the Mandalay Region were also seized since China brokered a ceasefire in the area in January between the military and 3 BHA was broken by the Junta as it began airstrikes.
Operation Yan Naing Min, the latest counter-offensive launched in September, is another attempt by the Junta to reclaim territories lost in Karenni State while bolstering defensive positions in Pinlaung and Naungtayar Townships in southern Shan State, near the Karenni border. Till now, it has seen little success, with the junta relying primarily on airstrikes and holding only a few strongholds around Loikaw. Given the military's reduced strength and morale, regaining complete control of the Karenni State remains challenging.
The current scenario suggests the Junta may lose control over more sections. Even if it tactically pulls out from isolated centres and launches counter-offensives, regaining extensive general or popular backing appears improbable. Moreover, the economic crisis and widespread shortages are becoming harder to conceal, and the humanitarian situation is worsening, especially after Operation 1027, with over four million internally displaced persons (IDPs) since the coup and 12.9 million facing acute food insecurity.
The Myanmar junta's recent call for peace talks with different resistance groups on 26 September marks an age-old tactic. Historically, the military has employed a dual-track strategy, alternating between violent repression and limited political concessions to fragment the Opposition, as seen after the 1988 democracy movement and the 2007 Saffron Revolution. In contrast, the current Junta's rigid reliance on the force during the Spring Revolution and “Operation 1027” has heightened its isolation, with no political outreach or engagement until now.
The military has employed a dual-track strategy, alternating between violent repression and limited political concessions to fragment the Opposition, as seen after the 1988 democracy movement and the 2007 Saffron Revolution.
This recent gesture for dialogue appears to mark the junta's first significant attempt at political outreach. Interestingly emphasising elections as a potential pathway to peace, the junta is hoping to persuade external rather than internal actors that elections could reduce violence despite their inevitable flaws. This could ease international pressure without requiring the military to make meaningful concessions to domestic opposition, where most have been banned from contesting.
The resistance forces, however, have rejected the Junta's peace overtures, emphasising vital demands such as eliminating the military from politics, adopting a federal constitution, and holding the military accountable for wrongdoings. While there is little sign the Junta will concede to democratic demands, growing dissatisfaction among officials suggests the possibility of an internal collapse in leadership. A “coup within the coup,” similar to what occurred in 2004, could happen again.
While the conflict's outcome remains uncertain, the overall trajectory has tipped the scale in favour of resistance gains against junta losses. Given the Junta's sway within the capital, an outright defeat of the Junta is neither imminent nor guaranteed but also not contested. On the other hand, resistance to the Junta continues to grow steadily with no signs of abating. The Junta's weakening grip on power, coupled with growing internal divisions and external isolation, suggests it may continue to lose ground. Whether the resistance forces can maintain their momentum and capitalise on the fractures within the regime will be pivotal in determining the future trajectory of Myanmar's struggle for democracy.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
Read More +
PREV
