On 29 June 2023, a draft of the new Patriotic Education Bill was submitted to the National People’s Congress of China for consideration; the bill
will most likely pass.
Article 1 of the bill claims that the new regulations aim to “promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”—which Xi Jinping described as the “
greatest dream of the Chinese nation since modern times”.
Patriotic education includes history, culture, deeds of heroes and role models, national symbols, the beauty of the motherland, and other comprehensive areas.
The law identifies practically all social institutions and organisations as responsible for the promotion of patriotic education, including “parents and legal guardians of children,” who are to “include love of the motherland in family education,” as well as cooperate with patriotic educational activities conducted by schools or the state (Article 16). Other accountable entities include federations of literary and art circles, associations of science and technology, associations of industry and commerce, and labour unions (Article 12). According to the state media outlet,
Xinhua News Agency, patriotic education includes history, culture, deeds of heroes and role models, national symbols, the beauty of the motherland, and other comprehensive areas. This education will adhere to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Marxism-Leninism, Deng Xiaoping Thought, and Mao Zedong Thought. Internet service providers will also be required to promote the dissemination of patriotic content, and will be required to develop new technologies and products to “vividly carry out patriotic activities”.
Potential offences under the new law include insulting the national flag, questioning official histories and deeds of martyrs and national heroes, among other anti-national activities. The state media outlet,
The Global Times, used
this analogy to defend the law: “If China passes an anti-drug law, the only people concerned would be drug dealers. Hence, the only people concerned about China’s patriotism law would be those who are unpatriotic.”
Potential offences under the new law include insulting the national flag, questioning official histories and deeds of martyrs and national heroes, among other anti-national activities.
This is by no means the first patriotic education bill to be passed in China—in fact, the bill recalls the patriotic education movements of the 1990s and 2000s, which were
widely regarded as highly successful in fostering support of the the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) among younger generations of Chinese people. The Patriotic Education Bill will likely have little effect on the status quo in educational facilities, as nationalist education is already mandated in most schools starting from kindergarten. Even in Hong Kong, the 2020 National Security Law mandated that patriotic education should be used to
“raise awareness,” and in 2021, the pro-democracy Hong Kong Professional Teachers Union was disbanded and replaced by the pro-Beijing Federation of Education Workers. Though the law codifies nationalism in education, most of these practices were already in place, both in the mainland and in Hong Kong. However, it is likely to tighten restrictions on internet service providers and social media companies to crack down on anti-patriotic content more comprehensively than ever.
Furthermore, the extra-territorial nature of the law may have consequences for overseas Chinese, particularly those who live in countries that are not allied with China. At a time when Chinese citizens abroad are viewed with increasing concern and suspicion for potential involvement in intelligence activities, the law could exacerbate anti-Chinese sentiment and provoke fears of spying. This would be detrimental to the “rights and interests” of these overseas Chinese, which the law is aiming to protect and promote. Throughout its history, China’s elite has had a unique relationship with its people living overseas, who have been an important force for change. For example,
Sun Yat-sen was part of a global band of revolutionaries that played a role in overthrowing the Imperial Qing dynasty and establishing modern China in the early 20th century. Thus, Beijing may try to leverage Chinese settled abroad to counterbalance the Taiwanese who have pro-independence leanings as cross-strait tensions intensify.
At a time when Chinese citizens abroad are viewed with increasing concern and suspicion for potential involvement in intelligence activities, the law could exacerbate anti-Chinese sentiment and provoke fears of spying.
The law is part of a larger trend towards what Xi Jinping calls “
yifa zhiguo,” or the rule of law. The past year has seen a series of laws that strengthen CCP authority over various aspects of civil life, including the Foreign Relations Law of July 2023. However, this is the first bill to specifically target residents of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and overseas Chinese to help them “enhance their sense of national identity”.
Taiwan is grappling with a growing military threat from China, which sees the island as a breakaway province that must be brought back to the fold, by force if necessary. Given that China exercises little sovereign control over Taiwanese education systems at present, it is unclear how these educational measures will reach Taiwanese citizens and students, however, the law itself is an indication of ever-increasing will towards reunification. Taiwan’s continued conflict with the mainland is considered by some nationalists to be a
continuation of the “Century of Humiliation,” which will, in these claims, end when Taiwan is reunified with the People’s Republic of China.
To conclude, the legislation is being put into the statute books at a time when there has been economic ferment and unprecedented political dissent in China. Last year, Chinese home buyers across nearly 100 cities stopped payments on their mortgages in an act of civil disobedience. The slow simmering came to a boil when students demonstrated against the obstructive COVID-19 restrictions in many cities and provinces. In conflating national symbols with the CCP, the party is trying to shore up its legitimacy. The outreach to social institutions and organisations is possibly an attempt to garner widespread support for its policies in uncertain times, from both inside and outside the country.
Maya Prakash is an intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
