In recent weeks, Maldives passed a legislation allowing foreign entities to own land in that country, provided these entities invest at least a billion dollars. Another stipulation is that 70% of total land area to be owned by any foreign entity is supposed to be reclaimed land. It is apparent that the only country capable of fulfilling these obligations is China, given its economic might and pace of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.
India was apprehended with the prospects of China constructing strategic assets on the reclaimed land in Maldives, close to the international sea lines of communication. Such installations would permit China to maximise its maritime domain awareness capabilities in the Indian Ocean including monitoring activities of the Indian Navy. There are also concerns that China could go ahead and establish a naval base on the reclaimed land. A naval base would allow China to forward position its naval ships and submarines, possibly permanently, at some stage in the future. These naval assets predeployed in the Indian Ocean would be critical for deterring plans, if that fails, for easing pressure on Chinese vessels at the Strait of Malacca. In addition, China could threaten to interdict Indian merchant vessels and energy containers in the Arabian Sea or along the eight/nine degree channels.
Maldives responded to these strategic concerns promising it would ensure the Indian Ocean remain demilitarised. It also pointed to commercial installations built on reclaimed land in Dubai and Saudi Arabia to make clear of its intentions in passing the legislation. Indeed, land is a precious resource for Maldives, a country facing acute danger from rising sea level propelled by climate change. If the recent Rohingya crisis is any indication of the policy of Indian Ocean littoral in accepting refugees, Maldivians are in clear danger since a consensus has yet to be established as to who constitutes a 'climate change' refugee. The scarcity of land also means disinterest from the investors to move their assets. Slowdown in economic growth would only add to jeopardizing the grip of the current Maldivian president.
On the other hand, China is desperate to fast track its construction activities in the Indian Ocean to make its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative a reality. This project was initiated to solve China's Malacca Dilemma. It first started working with Myanmar, a country kept in isolation by the international community due to military rule. India was not only concerned about the infrastructure projects that would sway its neighbour Myanmar into China's fold but also of reports claiming erection of Chinese surveillance stations and other naval facilities on the Coco islands. The Coco islands are part of the Andaman Islands and are in close proximity to India's jurisdiction of Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the mouth of Strait of Malacca, a strategic maritime choke point. However, Myanmar allowed India to verify these claims which turned out to be mere allegations. Better yet, India might have pre-empted any such moves by China.
Swiftly, China's attention turned towards Sri Lanka proposing construction and upgradation of Sri Lankan ports, power and transportation capacity. It designed Colombo Port City Project to be constructed on reclaimed land from the sea. Sri Lanka's then president Rajapaksa showed enough enthusiasm towards China's initiatives that India began to be concerned again. The history of India-Sri Lankan relations and domestic pressure on the then Indian government did not allow for a swift response. However, anchoring of Chinese submarines and their auxiliary ships in the Colombo port demanded a strategic response from India.
It is not just the mere presence of Chinese submarines in a Sri Lankan port but the significance of Colombo port for India's maritime commerce and energy imports that unnerved India. Owing to the lack of infrastructure and depth at the Indian ports that could handle heavy cargo vessels, such shipments are broken down at the Colombo port and then shipped to India, and vice-versa. Therefore, India cannot perceive the presence of Chinese submarines at this critical port as mere symbolism but as the 'String of Pearls' taking concrete shape.
Now, it is the turn of Maldives playing host for allegations about the possibility of China establishing a naval base there. "Alarm bells are ringing" is the news from India. They might keep ringing as China aggressively pursues its MSR initiative in the Indian Ocean backed by its economic power and construction technologies. From China's perspective, its naval patrols in the Indian Ocean are necessary to safeguard its investments and people in Asia and Africa as well as defend its sea commerce from traditional and non-traditional threats. Therefore, the strategy of seeking forward bases and extending naval power by China along its trade arteries in the Indian Ocean is in compliance with the teachings of Alfred T. Mahan Besides, a major power like China that possesses the largest fleet amongst Asian navies cannot afford to depend on India's promise to emerge as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean. China shall 'self-help' itself.
However, the probability of China establishing for itself a naval base in Maldives after its experiences in Myanmar and Sri Lanka should be assessed. After witnessing the work of India's political clout in the latter countries as well as acknowledging its deployment of armed forces to roll back the 1988 Maldivian coup d'état, China would certainly seek to construct its naval base in a country that would not be perturbed by India i.e., Pakistan. Likewise China's designs in Myanmar, its investments in Pakistan would transport hydrocarbons to China directly from the Arabian Sea. It would also help alleviate China's underdeveloped provinces.
Pakistan would in turn receive political, diplomatic and financial support from China to tackle many of its internal and external problems. China would be able to better monitor the ports and naval bases located on India's west coast where aircraft carriers and other advanced naval vessels are home-ported as well as developments at the Chabahar port. India will also be forced to re-examine the feasibility and threat perception towards its proposed pipelines from West and Central Asia. Moreover, the presence of a Chinese naval base in Pakistan seriously affects Indian decision-making process if it were to blockade sea access or replay the 1971 Karachi port attacks in a future escalation scenario. Over at Maldives, replenishment dockings of naval vessels would happen if China were to build a port on the reclaimed land.
Although neither India nor China envisions participating in decisive naval battles given the interdependent nature of the world order, naval suasion continues in the Indian Ocean. The underlying strength for control of the Indian Ocean, however, is not geopolitical but economic power. The Indian Ocean littoral requires billions of dollars of investment just for raising basic infrastructure and China is the undisputed economic power in this region. Even India requested Chinese financial and technological investments into its infrastructure projects. Maldives is no exception.
The counter from India, therefore, should be parallel. India should successfully take advantage of present market crisis in China and bolster its 'Make in India' initiative to prosper. Since the Indian Ocean countries are more oriented towards India due to historical and cultural linkages as well as economic grants as opposed to Chinese self interests and loans, the Mausam and Spice Route initiatives shall block geopolitical ambitions of the latter in the Indian Ocean.
(The writer is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
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