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Economic ties between India and Russia have remained the weakest link in their bilateral relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both countries have set out to correct this in the past two years, making efforts to diversify their relationship beyond the defence and energy sectors as they navigate a changing world order. This brief analyses the developments in India-Russia relations since the May 2018 Sochi informal summit and the 201
The Indo-Pacific region has become a crucial area of the India-United States (US) partnership. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the two countries have increased their alignment on the Indo-Pacific, with both sides giving greater priority to the region and acknowledging sharper shared concerns about China. The US and India are also increasing cooperation via the Quad and engaging in other platforms such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (I
The dilemma facing ASEAN countries - economic benefits vs strategic balancing as they engage China - is nothing unique. This provides the context for India and the US to channel their efforts in establishing a firm partnership for enabling a stable Asian order.
Vietnam is an important player in India’s Act East policy and also its Indo-Pacific vision
With China a shared concern, India and Vietnam continue to deepen their relationship.
Given that the China threat looms large for both Vietnam and India, the bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Hanoi is likely to gain even greater traction.
Whatever comes after India’s election, the role of China will loom large in Indian foreign policy.
While China currently enjoys enormous power in the Indo-Pacific region, a more assertive India could potentially challenge this status quo.
New Delhi is trying to deepen ties to confront common threats but in-group differences pose hurdles
Given the geopolitical and security interests, India cannot afford to ignore or isolate Myanmar.
New Delhi’s strategic recalibration recognises the South China Sea’s critical importance to regional security and the global maritime order
New Delhi finds a prominent place in the strategy’s focus on Washington’s network of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.
India’s silence on developments in the South China Sea is highly unlikely to win it a lasting friendship with China but has the potential to do it some lasting damage.
Since the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, Indonesia has endeavoured to play a leading role in shaping Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture; this continues to be true amidst the more recent shifts taking place in the global geopolitical landscape. Accordingly, the nature of Jakarta’s contributions towards Southeast Asian security reflects the dynamics of its national foreign policy dec
Imposition of wider restrictions on technology exports to the other
Increasingly, many countries that have traditionally maintained a defensive and pacifist posture, like Japan, are having to reconsider their options.
At this juncture of weak economic performance, India has done well not to sign the treaty. It can still join if its main complaint about rapid tariff reduction by 80 to 90 per cent on imports from China is resolved. Also, its concerns about services have to be dealt with, especially regarding the movement of service workers within the region. India could not at this point have opened its huge market to ASEAN and China unconditionally.
By transferring Rs 1.76 lakh crore from the RBI’s surplus funds, the government is determined to meet its fiscal deficit target of 3.3 per cent of the GDP because doing that seems to be its top priority, rather than spending more on infrastructure, welfare programmes and centrally sponsored development schemes.
New Delhi’s approach to Southeast Asia within the wider Indo-Pacific region is strategically sound but has limits.
No one expects the MoD's current leadership - both political and bureaucratic - to take bold new initiatives towards ASEAN. What surprises southeast Asia is the passive incoherence of the MoD's participation in the various defence forums of ASEAN - neither ready to lead nor willing to respond.
In 2018, significant developments could take place in Southeast Asia, beginning with the Indo-ASEAN commemorative summit on January, followed by New Delhi hosting all the ASEAN leaders collectively as chief guests at the Republic Day function.
Until the country can address its own economic problems, agreements like the RCEP may do more harm than good.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Vietnam later this week will mark the first visit by an Indian prime minister in the last 15 years.
How can Asia’s democracies bring the Indo-Pacific to life?
Our 20 most–read commentaries this year.
Myanmar hosted US President Barack Obama this week in Nay Pyi Taw for the ASEAN and East Asia Summit. Obama, who visited the former 'paraiah State' for the second time in three years, said that the reforms in Myanmar were real but incomplete.
The tragedy of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar has got much attention from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation and a leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has sought to promote a constructive engagement between the OIC and Myanmar, which is a member of the ASEAN, on the Rohingya problem.
Since being initiated by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formally in 2016, Tokyo’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision has become the preferred framework for diplomatic engagement among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. This paper undertakes an assessment of FOIP. The motivation is threefold: first, it creates an understanding of Tokyo’s vision of maintaining a stable global order; second, because FOIP has become inclusive—it
Given the ground realities - where China's power exceeds ours by orders of magnitude - we need allies. That is where relationships with the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia come in.
The Chinese say that their interests in the East China Sea are what bother them the most because of their proximity to the Chinese heartland. The South China Sea, they insist, is not a problem area of the same dimension. Beijing's unambiguous goal is to isolate Japan, divide the ASEAN and befuddle the United States.
Public health is the worst spot in India’s economic path despite a recent rise in GDP growth. Without a healthy population and labour force, India cannot hope to compete with countries in the West or the ASEAN.
Though there are lingering differences within the group, the need to counter China’s challenge is an area of converging interest.
India has to weigh carefully the gains to be had from signing the treaty, which may mean making itself vulnerable to having its markets inundated with Chinese goods.
The ASEAN’s intent to be in the driving seat is clear as it seeks to manage the emerging regional order with policy moves
The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Second Thomas Shoal is the new flashpoint in the South China Sea. Solving it is vital for the region. The ASEAN definitely has the potential to facilitate dialogue with China. It must seize this opportunity or risk living with the consequences of failing to do so.
Many of the phenomena go back to the financial crisis of 2008, the biggest shock to the global economic system since the 1929. Nine years after 1929, a nervous, pessimistic and Hobbesian world was plunged into war. 2017 is nine years after 2008.
Singapore’s centrality in India’s Southeast Asia outreach is reflected in the two countries’ cooperation in multilateral forums
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy, released in December 2022, highlights the country’s willingness to engage with the Indo-Pacific concept, shedding the ambiguity of the earlier stance under President Yoon Suk Yeol’s predecessor. This policy step up recognises emerging geopolitical trends that require South Korea to engage with new territories previously overlooked in its strategic radar, such as the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This brief