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Being a pragmatist, Iranian President Rouhani simply accepted the reality and made a deal, that ensured Iran's respect and dignity and gave relief to his people. His next 100 days will be equally crucial and that may bring about tectonic changes in the region.
A significant thaw is happening in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Once Saudi Arabia decides to mend its ties with Iran, the US should hardly have any reason to go on punishing Iran. In this scenario, it seems the resolution of Iran's nuclear negotiations is not far off.
The SCO has so far not been a major factor in discussions about Afghanistan's stabilization. But there is a good possibility that Afghanistan will obtain observer status in the SCO. Given the differing agendas of the SCO and the US/NATO, Afghanistan's embrace of the SCO could greatly complicate reconstruction efforts.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently investigating Iran's nuclear program, especially the possibility that Pakistan helped it with substantial transfers of technology and materials in the past. There has been no conclusive evidence so far, except for a piece of evidence that Pakistan
Need to put the Iranian nuclear programme in perspective
I read with great interest your article titled "THE COMING WARS: What the Pentagon can now do in secret" carried by the "New Yorker" in its issue dated January 24, 2005, which is already on sale. The article is about US preparations for a possible covert operation against Iran's suspected military nuclear installations set up with Pakistani complicity.
In a prescient view, when the region and the world were still sizing up the Iranian President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a Xinhua despatch from Teheran featured by People's Daily in early August reported: "The successful play of the class card and religion card at a critical juncture has brought an unknown mayor to the office of the president.
Modalities of statecraft have abiding relevance. In a celebrated letter to Moghul Emperor Akbar, Shah Abbas the Great commented on a predecessor's misrule and said that "internal diversity of opinions made the foreigner covetous and caused anarchy in the country."
There is no doubt that Iranian security policy is now bent on laying out on the table and publicising its entire gamut of strategic and tactical playing cards for all to see
Now, a lot depends on how the fourth Vienna meeting between Iran and the P5+1 goes and whether or not Iran is able to complete the set of actions it has agreed to under the Framework for Cooperation with the IAEA by the May 15 deadline.
The recently concluded fourth Vienna meeting, between Iran and P5+1, has revealed that Iran and the international community will have to cross the major hurdles for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear deal.
The unexpected good showing of the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former Mayor of Tehran, in the first round of the Iranian Presidental elections held on June 17, 2005, and his emergence in the No.2 position with 19.5 per cent of the valid votes polled as against 21 per cent for the favourite Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani throws open the possibility that in the second
In voting for a moderate President, Iranians have demonstrated their desire to overcome continued political isolation, marked by significant economic deterioration and disappearing democratic accountability. Can Mr. Rouhani overcome challenges and deliver?
Heightened rhetoric about a Western plot, quack remedies and blind faith added to the problem in a nation where senior clerics and politicians have died in the pandemic
The general public discourse around such events in Iran usually pendulums between the ill-informed and the critically ill-informed.
Iranian civilisation is heresy-prone. Heresy is indicative of a questioning mind. Throughout history, individuals and movements have emerged in Iran to invoke the moral imperative and disrupt the status quo. The most recent events sustain this characteristic of the Iranian personality. Paradoxes abound in the vote in the June presidential election: it was anti-establishment, not anti-regime, anti-clerical but affirmative of the principles of the
Saudi Arabia recently extended an invitation to Iranian Foreign Minister, indicating towards a possible thaw in relations. Is this shift in Riyadh's stand because of a change in US-Iran relations and the positive reception of Iran's overtures by the other GCC States?
Much has already been written about both the drawdown of US troops from the region, and the recent Iranian nuclear deal and the possible impact it could have on Iran-US relations.
Afghan refugees in Iran are experiencing increasing hostility as State policies become explicitly discriminatory. The recent persecution of these displaced persons has brought this fact to light.
If Iran becomes a nuclear state down the road, it will be in the first place due to Iran's intransigence; but it will also be the result of over a decade of poor negotiating by the international community.
There is the possibility, albeit remote, of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Riyadh has always been unambiguous in its stance of acquiring a nuclear weapon if Iran does and the Kingdom's longstanding support for Pakistan's nuclear program alludes to this possibility.
Probably the most common response to the criticism that has been leveled at the P5+1-Iran negotiations over the past year is: "but what's the alternative?"
The deal with Iran should boost efforts to do an Iran with North Korea's nuclear programme as well. This would be more difficult given the authoritarian nature of the regime in North Korea but is still an idea worth pursuing. The major powers should carry forward the momentum and energy to solve other issues in the Middle East.
Iran represents a complex policy challenge that needs to be carefully weighed. Any assessment will need to look not only at the benefits but also the costs of not changing course on Iran. But fence-sitting and procrastination might be an unsustainable and expensive choice.
A common enemy does often become a powerful uniting force, but the fact that the US has so many friends and not a single ally to fight the Islamic State speaks volumes about its foreign and defence policies in Wes Asia.
Trump Tantrum: US sanctions on Iran threaten to hit India’s strategic interests in West Asia
When Dr. Hassan Rouhani takes charge as the new President of the Iranian republic on 4th August 2013, there are two most important challenges before him -- the mismanaged economy and the intractable nuclear negotiations that seem to have hit a road block.
Iran's cancellation of $500 million funding to Pakistan for the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline indicates Iran's clout in regional energy affairs. It is unclear why Iran took this sudden step. Is President Rouhani merely fine-tuning some of the policies of his predecessor? But there is certainly more to this than meets the eye.
If Richard Nixon sought a breakthrough in China after failure in Vietnam, George Bush had a breakthrough with India after failure in Iraq, Barack Obama could work on a legacy that is a breakthrough with Iran after failure in Afghanistan.
During the 2017 winter session of parliament, PM Modi stated that India’s foreign policy stood on its own independent merit, and if it wanted to purchase oil from Iran, it would do so.
New Delhi's bid to counter the One Belt One Road by creating transportation linkages through the Iranian ports, is at stake.
New Delhi must work with the Rouhani government to ensure that bilateral irritants in fostering economic ties between the two nations are resolved soon.
As New Delhi welcomes Rouhani, the two sides will be hoping to assuage each other’s concerns even as they will try to build partnership, which has often struggled to match the rhetoric surrounding it.
India's thinking about the Middle East, whether from the UPA or NDA, has tended to be ideological and rooted in their domestic political considerations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi needs to break from this tradition and develop a strategy towards the Middle East that is firmly anchored in realpolitik.
The political tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be better understood through the lens of ‘regimes.’
After over a decade of declared intentions, India has finally decided to put money on the strategically important Chabahar project. It's a sad story of how bold intentions of leaders were stalled by the different perspectives in different ministries of the Government itself.
Dr P R Kumaraswamy, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, initiated a discussion on ¿India, Iran and the US: The Problematic Triangle¿ at the ORF Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 22 December 2007.
India's deepening engagement with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Israel could also moderate New Delhi's diplomatic ties with Tehran. India-Iran relations were at their peak during then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Tehran in 2001 and then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's visit to India in 2003.
India's ties with Iran have clearly been strained by the latter's tumultuous relationship with the United States, with the Iran factor equally imposing constraints on India-US relations. India has had to walk a diplomatic tightrope in balancing its relationships with these countries.