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It is widely recognized that China and Iran have maintained enduring and productive military ties, with the former significantly contributing weapon platforms and critical military and dual-use technologies to the Islamic Republic. However, their bilateral military relationship has encountered challenges over time. This article examines the arms sales over the past five decades, identifies broad patterns indicative of future trends, and evaluates whether the prima facie impression of China’s predominant role in augmenting Iran’s military capability is accurate and credible.
China and Iran are two Asian civilizations with a long history of commercial, diplomatic, and cultural relations (Garver, 2006, pp. 3–7). Despite this, they found themselves on opposite sides during the Cold War: China aligned with the then Soviet Union, while Shah Reza Pahlavi remained within the US-led Western bloc. However, since Shah’s removal in 1979, both countries upheld a collaborative relationship, notably seen in their joint efforts to counter the erstwhile Soviet Union and, since 1991, to address the American hegemony (Fan, 2011, pp. 48–50; Xi, 2016).
They have engaged in energy trade and explored economic and military realms. Energy became a key component of their relations, especially since 1993, when China became a net importer of crude oil; for example, in 2023, China purchased 90% of Iranian oil indirectly, to calm American concerns (Hanafusa et al., 2024). Throughout this period, they have consistently acknowledged each other’s capabilities and positions, recognizing the mutual advantage stemming from their complementary economic strengths (Garver, 2006, pp. 3–7). The Silk Road remains a source of pride for both China and Iran and depicts their ancient greatness, though their cooperation is primarily motivated by shared national interests rather than lofty notions of solidarity. China’s arms sale is yet another measure to reinforce their historical bonhomie.
During Shah’s rule, Iran did not figure prominently in the Chinese arms trade. Until 1979, the Iranian armed forces were among the preferred markets for the United States and the Western military–industrial complex. The Shah of Iran, a skilled pilot, had a strong interest in the latest defense technology and weapon platforms, particularly for its air force, with aspirations to establish Iran as a major non-nuclear armed force (Pace, 1977).
After the 1973 oil crisis, Iran was flushed with petrodollars, providing the Shah with substantial funds to invest in military goods for his armed forces. As a result, he procured the latest radars, artillery, AWACS planes, naval craft, American M-60 and British Chieftain tanks, armored personnel carriers, aerial tankers, and a large inventory of F-4 and F-5 fighters from the United States and its allies (The New York Times, 1977). In addition to petrodollars, the Shah had other reasons to continue purchasing from the West.
After the 1973 oil crisis, Iran was flushed with petrodollars, providing the Shah with substantial funds to invest in military goods for his armed forces.
The Arab-Israeli War in 1973 underscored the importance of technology and military doctrines. The Shah’s rivalry and competition with Iraq was another factor, and he utilized arms purchases to counterbalance Iraq’s substantial weapon acquisitions from the former Soviet Union (Bergquist, 1988, p. 24). Furthermore, the oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz was vital for his economy, making it imperative to prevent its disruption (McGlinchey, 2013; Pace, 1977). Additionally, the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and the subsequent liberation of Bangladesh unsettled the Shah, who viewed it as an organized armed intervention in a fellow UN member state (Malik, 2024). As a result, he endeavored to ensure that Iran remained strong enough to prevent such occurrences in the future.
As expected, by 1978–1979, the Iranian armed forces were equipped with significantly more advanced and sophisticated weaponry and military platforms compared to China and its inventory of ex-Soviet reverse-engineered materiel. Chinese military exports, in comparison to Iranian imports, were relatively basic and unremarkable (Wang, 2011). Therefore, Iran showed no interest in acquiring any weapons or military platforms from China during this period, as indicated in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Table 1: China’s Arms Exports 1981-2023: Global Vs. Iran (Million US$)
Figure 1. Chinese arms export to Iran
Source: SIPRI, USIP Iran Primer
In the three-and-a-half-decade-long history of China’s arms transfers to Iran after Shah, two main features emerge vividly. First, China remained eager to sell Iran weapons that were either Soviet-sourced, reverse-engineered, or low-tech during 1980–1998, at full price. It even assisted Iran in establishing local production centers for these crucial military platforms, namely cruise missiles, artillery, armored vehicles, naval crafts, and multi-launcher rockets (Garver, 2006, p. 187). Additionally, Iran received significant assistance in its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs from Beijing during the initial phases (Garver, 2006, pp. 146–147).
Although this support dwindled amid international sanctions, it is undeniable that for a significant duration during 1980–1998, China was a major industrial source for Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs. China also played a crucial role in supplying illegal spare parts for Iran’s US-manufactured weapons through smuggling. Yet, China showed marked reluctance in cooperating or selling indigenous high-tech military goods, namely advanced drones or advanced fighter aircraft.
The arms trade between states signifies a substantial level of trust in the quality and reliability of weapons, as well as confidence in obtaining adequate technological and service support throughout the weapons’ service life. China’s major customers, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, exemplify these traits. However, Iran has not exhibited the same level of enthusiasm. It has been facing comprehensive US-led international sanctions since 1979, which have hindered Iran’s ability to sell energy resources and procure weapons, thus impacting its economy and regional influence. Therefore, China could be the supplier of last resort to Iran for both general and crucial strategic weapons.
However, the real situation diverges significantly from the assumed scenario. China discontinued entering into arms export agreements with Iran in 2005, although it fulfilled deliveries from existing contracts until 2015. The imposition of UNSC sanctions (with a positive Chinese vote) on Iran in 2007 underscored a significant and binding commitment by China. It ceased signing new arms agreements with Iran in 2005 and did not resume arms sales even after the expiration of UN sanctions in October 2020 (Yang, 2020). Indeed, since 2015, there have been no credible records of any Chinese arms sales to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the past two decades, China has not significantly influenced Iran’s conventional weapons inventory. Tehran has predominantly favored local or Russian options and has retained a minor manufacturing role in the aviation and defense sectors, facing challenges in reverse-engineering advanced technology-based weapons. Furthermore, Iran has not sought assistance from China in its drone production sector, where Tehran has established itself as a significant producer. Finally, although China has played a significant role in Iran’s military advancement and procurement, Iran’s primary power resides in its own domestic production capabilities. Despite common beliefs stemming from the recent Iranian strike on Israel, Iran’s regional deterrence and anti-access/area-denial abilities may take cues from China but are not dependent on or supplied by Beijing.
China on its part, aims to avoid international isolation and has refrained from deep involvement in Iran’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons sectors. Beijing’s compliance with UN Resolution 1747 in 2007 led to the cessation of overt arms trade with Iran. Despite the expiration of sanctions in October 2020, there has been no credible evidence of a resurgence in Chinese arms supplies to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This article has been excerpted from China’s Arms Transfer to Iran: More Noise, Less Substance published in the journal Contemporary Review of the Middle East and the full article is available at this weblink.
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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