The recent announcement of the appointment of Xi Jinping, Vice- President of China as the Vice- Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) reaffirms his position as the front- runner to take over from Hu Jintao as the Party Head in 2012 and as the President of the Republic in 2013. The announcement was made at the end of a five day Plenum of the CPC’s Central Committee.
Xi Jinping belongs to a generation of leaders who are called “Princelings” ie. Sons and daughters of former leaders. His father Xi Zhongxun had his own ups and downs in his political life. He was a close associate of Mao, but was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The family went through difficult times with the young Xi being separated from his father.
Xi was 22 when the Revolution ended and when Deng Xiaoping picked his father to be in his team for the Reform and Opening-up. Xi would go on to acquire a degree in Chemical Engineering from Tsinghua University and rise rapidly in the Party ranks. He had the right combination of qualities for this rise, namely being a good technocrat and a loyal party worker.
Xi earned a name for himself as the Governor of the coastal Province of Fujian in 1999. Later as the Acting Governor of Zhejiang, he took effective measures against corrupt officials. The Province also registered a phenomenal 14% growth during his tenure. This achievement catapulted him to the powerful position of the Party Chief of Shanghai. After that there was no looking back. In 2007, he was inducted into the nine- member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)—the highest decision making body in the country. Following this was his appointment as the Vice- President in 2008, which is the sixth highest post in the country.
Given such an impressive rise, his appointment to the CMC was to be expected any time. When this did not happen last year there was considerable speculation regarding his relations with Hu Jintao. It was rumored that Hu did not favour him because of his former closeness to Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin. It is true that Hu had serious differences of opinion with Jiang and the so-called “Shanghai Clique”on strategies of development. But the fact remains that even though Xi was the Party Chief in Shanghai, he was not associated with the Clique. After Hu’s take over, Xi has been whole-heartedly promoting the new strategy of shifting the economic growth from the coastal areas to the rural interior.
Without this appointment, it would have been practically impossible for Xi to succeed Hu. The CMC of the Party( to keep the distinction between the different organs of the State, there is a corresponding CMC in the Government and the membership of both are identical) is the second most powerful body in the country, next only to the PBSC. In times of emergencies and grave crisis, CMC assumes even greater importance. One might recall that the final decision to use force against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 was taken by Deng Xiaoping in his capacity as Chairman of CMC. The Commission oversees the 2.3 million strong PLA and the Chairman thus becomes the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces. It has 11 members, most of whom are senior Generals and two Vice- Chairmen. Xi has been inducted as a third Vice- Chairman rather than replacing an existing one.
When the change of guard takes place in 2012, it will be the second smooth transition of power. Of course, there will be major changes in the leadership. As many as seven PBSC members are expected to stand down in 2012 having completed two consecutive terms.
Xi is known to be reserved and low profile. In fact, his wife Peng Liyuan, a very popular singer was better known than Xi in the 1990s. He is also known to be reform friendly on the economic side but rather cautious on political reforms. He is a strict follower of the three fundamental principles of national strength, economic growth and social stability. It is significant that along with his appointment the Central Committee Plenum also pledged to “make steady and vigorous efforts” to promote political restructuring. This assumes importance in the context of the recent debate in the country about political reforms.
Marking the 30th Anniversary of the first SEZ in Shenzhen, both PM Wen Jiabao and later President Hu Jintao visited the southern city and referred to political reforms in their speeches. While Wen called for the need for political reforms to cement the economic gains and spoke about freedom of speech and information, President Hu was more cautious. Since then, senior leaders have expressed caution in the area of political reforms.
A commentary in the party mouth-piece, People’s Daily of 27 October ended the debate, albeit temporarily by categorically rejecting political reforms. It said “the idea that China’s political reform is seriously lagging behind its remarkable economic development is not only contrary to the law of objectivity but also to the objective facts. In promoting political reforms, we should not copy the Western model.”
In such a situation, Xi is likely to promote only administrative reforms like greater accountability of public officials, reorganizing the hukou (household registration system) and streamlining the bureaucracy. All these will not affect the control of CPC over the Nation. Western type multi-party democracy is unlikely to emerge in China for a long time.
As China gears up to the transfer of leadership in 2012, one can expect the usual posturings and maneuverings within the CPC. An old Chinese greeting says “may you live in interesting times.” For China watchers around the world it cannot get any better.
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