If someone thought that the just-concluded 'World Classical Tamil Conference' would add to the vote-share of the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu in the Assembly elections due next year, it is unlikely to be. Yet, the conference, which was steeped in controversy from the very beginning, may have served a larger purpose than just project Chief Minister M Karunanidhi as an acknowledged leader of the Tamil-speaking community the world over. It has returned to Tamil Nadu, hence India, the focus of Tamil language and culture, the eternal tools of pan-Tamil polity, after it had gravitated towards the LTTE in a 'virtual world', at the height of the Sri Lanka's 'ethnic war'.
Given the pre-conference mood of a substantial sections of the Tamil-speaking community the world over on the perceived role of India and Tamil Nadu in the concluding months of the 'ethnic war' in Sri Lanka, the issues of language and politics got inter-wined as never before. Even the 'anti-Hindi' agitation in Tamil Nadu during the Sixties was confined to the Indian shores, and mostly to the then Madras State. It was not the case with the Sri Lankan war, where the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora took it away from language and society, to the realm of politics and diplomacy. It was but inevitable that the identities of the Indian State and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and those of the Tamil language and globalisation of pan-Tamil politics, got intertwined and enmeshed.
The dye had been cast long before the 'ethnic war' had reached a decisive stage. Once the Sri Lankan armed forces had pushed the LTTE to a position where it could not bounce back, international intervention would have done precious little to change the mood and methods of the Sri Lankan State. It also proved to be the case. However, having given in to the LTTE propaganda, the Tamil-speaking community would fix the blame on India and Tamil Nadu. They were selective in naming names, but once the war was over, they would bunch together most, if not all, political leaders of all hues in Tamil Nadu, leveling unsubstantiated charges of complicity against some, complacency against others and confusion in a few more. All along, the blame was squarely with the LTTE.
'Language, not Politics'
In the months preceding the formal commencement of 'Eelam War IV', pro-LTTE, pan-Tamil activists from the Sri Lankan Diaspora had descended on Tamil Nadu in a big way, when there was no compelling reason for them to do so. It came after the 'Maavilaru operations' in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, but the Diaspora interlocutors were already talking about days without the LTTE and days after Prabhakaran. They were clear in their enunciation that they needed Tamil Nadu only for keeping the Tamil language alive for them to inculcate it in their overseas generation. Their tool was not literature but contemporary Tamil fiction, political and cultural magazines, and Tamil filmdom. They were unconcerned about Tamil Nadu's political and societal support for the LTTE's 'Eelam cause', which anyway was not forthcoming in the aftermath of the 'IPKF experience' and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
All these changed when the 'ethnic war' reached a conclusive stage. They were as desperate as the LTTE in wanting India's outright support. Not having understood the politics of Indian diplomacy, defence and foreign policies, they too had concluded – like many people nearer home – that Tamil Nadu would be able to dictate terms to New Delhi, if not decide India's 'Sri Lanka policy'. They also cheapened India's Sri Lanka policy parameters by linking it exclusively to the 'Rajiv Gandhi assassination', even while in their own favour, they would cite 'Chinese presence', the 'Kachchativu Accord' and the problems of Indian fishermen in the Sri Lankan waters. Having failed in their perceptions and having to face the consequences, they needed whipping boys for the accumulated failures of the LTTE on the political, strategic and tactical fronts.
The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and political leaders manning these Governments and guiding them, became the safe victims. Having lost all arguments, and losing the war in Sri Lanka constantly and continuously, it was no wonder the LTTE was out to besmirch fair names. They had liquidated most names that could have served their purpose, with the result they had to look across the Palk Strait for perceived villains to their cause. So much so, they even blamed a 'Malayalee clique' in New Delhi for the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The reference was to the linguistic background of then National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, Prime Minister's Principal Secretary T K Nair, and then Foreign Secretary, Shivshanker Menon. Sonia Gandhi as president of the Congress Party and by extension Chairperson of the ruling UPA at the Centre, was not spared. The worst however was reserved for Tamil Nadu's DMK Chief Minister M Karunanidhi. There is no denying the fact that sections of the Tamil Nadu polity and even from the national scene did not do India any proud by joining this chorus.
Benefits
The millions that thronged the venue of the World Classical Tamil Conference in the textile city of Coimbatore in the third week of June were mostly DMK cadres, but they had instructions not to make it look like a party function. The Tamil Nadu Government footed the entire bill, which should run into crores, but all that may have served two purposes. One intended, the other not necessarily so. The palpable benefit was a kind of scholarly acknowledgement of Karunanidhi as a Tamil litterateur par excellence. Though not part of the organisers' agenda, it did turn global Tamil attention to the conference, both for the acclaim it attracted and the criticism it faced. Considering that Tamil Nadu was in the focus of contemporary politics of the Tamil-speaking community across the world, it naturally became the cynosure of global Tamil media, starting with Sri Lanka. In the 'IT'era, it had greater and immediate reach than the World Tamil Conferences held thrice in Tamil Nadu, and elsewhere too.
The Coimbatore conference helped in re-focusing global Tamil attention towards Tamil Nadu, and more so, away from Sri Lanka in general and the LTTE in particular. It is also possible that the conference may have drawn a delineating line between Tamil language and politics. The two had not been separated in the past, and got intermingled at the height 'Eelam War IV' in Sri Lanka, leading to the politics of alienation. Having identified the pan-Tamil politics of the DMK in the earlier century with the progress and growth of Tamil Nadu, the party could do precious little when the LTTE hijacked the twin-agendas, that too at a time when the leadership was toying with alternatives that would appeal to the 'Twenty-first century Tamil' in India. A beginning may have been made to reverse this trend.
No more an 'Internal affair'
Having got caught in the politics of the Tamil-speaking people over the past decades of LTTE's dominance in general, and the past years of 'Eelam War IV' in particular, Chennai and Delhi may have to start building on the Coimbatore initiative. It is not going to be easy, but then, India cannot ignore the politics of the 'Tamil-speaking people' the world over, often confined to their host nations and domestic conditions. It has acquired a new idiom in the twenty-first century, where India cannot ignore them any more. Nor could it remain as non-committal, as Jawaharlal Nehru, as the nation's first Prime Minister, had declared that the issues of 'Indian Origin Tamils' in Sri Lanka were an 'internal affair' of that country.
In recent years, the Malaysian Tamils had brought their domestic plight to India, where the predominance of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue provided them with an opportunity to highlight their problems even while getting overshadowed by the pro-LTTE propaganda, which obviously did not want to share the limelight. Yet, a point had been made that New Delhi did not care much for overseas Indians of relatively distant origin if they were not of the elite, rich NRI types who are well-settled in wealthier nations of the West. If nothing else, the LTTE's supply chain and propaganda machinery had established linkages where none existed. Barring Sri Lanka, in every other country where the Tamil-speaking people are at the receiving end of political, constitutional and administrative neglect, they have been of Indian origin, often taken to those countries by the British colonial rulers as labour. That many of them worked closely and also identified with their better-off Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts, and also identified themselves with the LTTE's methods, if not the cause, should not be lost sight of.
How, New Delhi would have to dovetail emerging realities with existing foreign policy parameters is something that would serve the nation well as other sections of the Indian Diaspora from other States and linguistic and cultural backgrounds start facing problems in their adopted countries – as they did in the Fiji Islands, for instance. For, any future pan-Tamil politics of the Sri Lanka kind would still be centred on Tamil Nadu, and hence India – now that the LTTE is not around but desperate sections of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora are still keen on keeping their 'ethnic flame' burning.
If someone thought that the just-concluded 'World Classical Tamil Conference' would add to the vote-share of the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu in the Assembly elections due next year, it is unlikely to be. Yet, the conference, which was steeped in controversy from the very beginning, may have served a larger purpose than just project Chief Minister M Karunanidhi as an acknowledged leader of the Tamil-speaking community the world over. It has returned to Tamil Nadu, hence India, the focus of Tamil language and culture, the eternal tools of pan-Tamil polity, after it had gravitated towards the LTTE in a 'virtual world', at the height of the Sri Lanka's 'ethnic war'.
Given the pre-conference mood of a substantial sections of the Tamil-speaking community the world over on the perceived role of India and Tamil Nadu in the concluding months of the 'ethnic war' in Sri Lanka, the issues of language and politics got inter-wined as never before. Even the 'anti-Hindi' agitation in Tamil Nadu during the Sixties was confined to the Indian shores, and mostly to the then Madras State. It was not the case with the Sri Lankan war, where the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora took it away from language and society, to the realm of politics and diplomacy. It was but inevitable that the identities of the Indian State and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and those of the Tamil language and globalisation of pan-Tamil politics, got intertwined and enmeshed.
The dye had been cast long before the 'ethnic war' had reached a decisive stage. Once the Sri Lankan armed forces had pushed the LTTE to a position where it could not bounce back, international intervention would have done precious little to change the mood and methods of the Sri Lankan State. It also proved to be the case. However, having given in to the LTTE propaganda, the Tamil-speaking community would fix the blame on India and Tamil Nadu. They were selective in naming names, but once the war was over, they would bunch together most, if not all, political leaders of all hues in Tamil Nadu, leveling unsubstantiated charges of complicity against some, complacency against others and confusion in a few more. All along, the blame was squarely with the LTTE.
'Language, not Politics'
In the months preceding the formal commencement of 'Eelam War IV', pro-LTTE, pan-Tamil activists from the Sri Lankan Diaspora had descended on Tamil Nadu in a big way, when there was no compelling reason for them to do so. It came after the 'Maavilaru operations' in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, but the Diaspora interlocutors were already talking about days without the LTTE and days after Prabhakaran. They were clear in their enunciation that they needed Tamil Nadu only for keeping the Tamil language alive for them to inculcate it in their overseas generation. Their tool was not literature but contemporary Tamil fiction, political and cultural magazines, and Tamil filmdom. They were unconcerned about Tamil Nadu's political and societal support for the LTTE's 'Eelam cause', which anyway was not forthcoming in the aftermath of the 'IPKF experience' and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
All these changed when the 'ethnic war' reached a conclusive stage. They were as desperate as the LTTE in wanting India's outright support. Not having understood the politics of Indian diplomacy, defence and foreign policies, they too had concluded – like many people nearer home – that Tamil Nadu would be able to dictate terms to New Delhi, if not decide India's 'Sri Lanka policy'. They also cheapened India's Sri Lanka policy parameters by linking it exclusively to the 'Rajiv Gandhi assassination', even while in their own favour, they would cite 'Chinese presence', the 'Kachchativu Accord' and the problems of Indian fishermen in the Sri Lankan waters. Having failed in their perceptions and having to face the consequences, they needed whipping boys for the accumulated failures of the LTTE on the political, strategic and tactical fronts.
The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and political leaders manning these Governments and guiding them, became the safe victims. Having lost all arguments, and losing the war in Sri Lanka constantly and continuously, it was no wonder the LTTE was out to besmirch fair names. They had liquidated most names that could have served their purpose, with the result they had to look across the Palk Strait for perceived villains to their cause. So much so, they even blamed a 'Malayalee clique' in New Delhi for the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The reference was to the linguistic background of then National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, Prime Minister's Principal Secretary T K Nair, and then Foreign Secretary, Shivshanker Menon. Sonia Gandhi as president of the Congress Party and by extension Chairperson of the ruling UPA at the Centre, was not spared. The worst however was reserved for Tamil Nadu's DMK Chief Minister M Karunanidhi. There is no denying the fact that sections of the Tamil Nadu polity and even from the national scene did not do India any proud by joining this chorus.
Benefits
The millions that thronged the venue of the World Classical Tamil Conference in the textile city of Coimbatore in the third week of June were mostly DMK cadres, but they had instructions not to make it look like a party function. The Tamil Nadu Government footed the entire bill, which should run into crores, but all that may have served two purposes. One intended, the other not necessarily so. The palpable benefit was a kind of scholarly acknowledgement of Karunanidhi as a Tamil litterateur par excellence. Though not part of the organisers' agenda, it did turn global Tamil attention to the conference, both for the acclaim it attracted and the criticism it faced. Considering that Tamil Nadu was in the focus of contemporary politics of the Tamil-speaking community across the world, it naturally became the cynosure of global Tamil media, starting with Sri Lanka. In the 'IT'era, it had greater and immediate reach than the World Tamil Conferences held thrice in Tamil Nadu, and elsewhere too.
The Coimbatore conference helped in re-focusing global Tamil attention towards Tamil Nadu, and more so, away from Sri Lanka in general and the LTTE in particular. It is also possible that the conference may have drawn a delineating line between Tamil language and politics. The two had not been separated in the past, and got intermingled at the height 'Eelam War IV' in Sri Lanka, leading to the politics of alienation. Having identified the pan-Tamil politics of the DMK in the earlier century with the progress and growth of Tamil Nadu, the party could do precious little when the LTTE hijacked the twin-agendas, that too at a time when the leadership was toying with alternatives that would appeal to the 'Twenty-first century Tamil' in India. A beginning may have been made to reverse this trend.
No more an 'Internal affair'
Having got caught in the politics of the Tamil-speaking people over the past decades of LTTE's dominance in general, and the past years of 'Eelam War IV' in particular, Chennai and Delhi may have to start building on the Coimbatore initiative. It is not going to be easy, but then, India cannot ignore the politics of the 'Tamil-speaking people' the world over, often confined to their host nations and domestic conditions. It has acquired a new idiom in the twenty-first century, where India cannot ignore them any more. Nor could it remain as non-committal, as Jawaharlal Nehru, as the nation's first Prime Minister, had declared that the issues of 'Indian Origin Tamils' in Sri Lanka were an 'internal affair' of that country.
In recent years, the Malaysian Tamils had brought their domestic plight to India, where the predominance of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue provided them with an opportunity to highlight their problems even while getting overshadowed by the pro-LTTE propaganda, which obviously did not want to share the limelight. Yet, a point had been made that New Delhi did not care much for overseas Indians of relatively distant origin if they were not of the elite, rich NRI types who are well-settled in wealthier nations of the West. If nothing else, the LTTE's supply chain and propaganda machinery had established linkages where none existed. Barring Sri Lanka, in every other country where the Tamil-speaking people are at the receiving end of political, constitutional and administrative neglect, they have been of Indian origin, often taken to those countries by the British colonial rulers as labour. That many of them worked closely and also identified with their better-off Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts, and also identified themselves with the LTTE's methods, if not the cause, should not be lost sight of.
How, New Delhi would have to dovetail emerging realities with existing foreign policy parameters is something that would serve the nation well as other sections of the Indian Diaspora from other States and linguistic and cultural backgrounds start facing problems in their adopted countries – as they did in the Fiji Islands, for instance. For, any future pan-Tamil politics of the Sri Lanka kind would still be centred on Tamil Nadu, and hence India – now that the LTTE is not around but desperate sections of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora are still keen on keeping their 'ethnic flame' burning.
If someone thought that the just-concluded 'World Classical Tamil Conference' would add to the vote-share of the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu in the Assembly elections due next year, it is unlikely to be. Yet, the conference, which was steeped in controversy from the very beginning, may have served a larger purpose than just project Chief Minister M Karunanidhi as an acknowledged leader of the Tamil-speaking community the world over. It has returned to Tamil Nadu, hence India, the focus of Tamil language and culture, the eternal tools of pan-Tamil polity, after it had gravitated towards the LTTE in a 'virtual world', at the height of the Sri Lanka's 'ethnic war'.
Given the pre-conference mood of a substantial sections of the Tamil-speaking community the world over on the perceived role of India and Tamil Nadu in the concluding months of the 'ethnic war' in Sri Lanka, the issues of language and politics got inter-wined as never before. Even the 'anti-Hindi' agitation in Tamil Nadu during the Sixties was confined to the Indian shores, and mostly to the then Madras State. It was not the case with the Sri Lankan war, where the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora took it away from language and society, to the realm of politics and diplomacy. It was but inevitable that the identities of the Indian State and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and those of the Tamil language and globalisation of pan-Tamil politics, got intertwined and enmeshed.
The dye had been cast long before the 'ethnic war' had reached a decisive stage. Once the Sri Lankan armed forces had pushed the LTTE to a position where it could not bounce back, international intervention would have done precious little to change the mood and methods of the Sri Lankan State. It also proved to be the case. However, having given in to the LTTE propaganda, the Tamil-speaking community would fix the blame on India and Tamil Nadu. They were selective in naming names, but once the war was over, they would bunch together most, if not all, political leaders of all hues in Tamil Nadu, leveling unsubstantiated charges of complicity against some, complacency against others and confusion in a few more. All along, the blame was squarely with the LTTE.
'Language, not Politics'
In the months preceding the formal commencement of 'Eelam War IV', pro-LTTE, pan-Tamil activists from the Sri Lankan Diaspora had descended on Tamil Nadu in a big way, when there was no compelling reason for them to do so. It came after the 'Maavilaru operations' in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, but the Diaspora interlocutors were already talking about days without the LTTE and days after Prabhakaran. They were clear in their enunciation that they needed Tamil Nadu only for keeping the Tamil language alive for them to inculcate it in their overseas generation. Their tool was not literature but contemporary Tamil fiction, political and cultural magazines, and Tamil filmdom. They were unconcerned about Tamil Nadu's political and societal support for the LTTE's 'Eelam cause', which anyway was not forthcoming in the aftermath of the 'IPKF experience' and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
All these changed when the 'ethnic war' reached a conclusive stage. They were as desperate as the LTTE in wanting India's outright support. Not having understood the politics of Indian diplomacy, defence and foreign policies, they too had concluded – like many people nearer home – that Tamil Nadu would be able to dictate terms to New Delhi, if not decide India's 'Sri Lanka policy'. They also cheapened India's Sri Lanka policy parameters by linking it exclusively to the 'Rajiv Gandhi assassination', even while in their own favour, they would cite 'Chinese presence', the 'Kachchativu Accord' and the problems of Indian fishermen in the Sri Lankan waters. Having failed in their perceptions and having to face the consequences, they needed whipping boys for the accumulated failures of the LTTE on the political, strategic and tactical fronts.
The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu on the one hand, and political leaders manning these Governments and guiding them, became the safe victims. Having lost all arguments, and losing the war in Sri Lanka constantly and continuously, it was no wonder the LTTE was out to besmirch fair names. They had liquidated most names that could have served their purpose, with the result they had to look across the Palk Strait for perceived villains to their cause. So much so, they even blamed a 'Malayalee clique' in New Delhi for the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The reference was to the linguistic background of then National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, Prime Minister's Principal Secretary T K Nair, and then Foreign Secretary, Shivshanker Menon. Sonia Gandhi as president of the Congress Party and by extension Chairperson of the ruling UPA at the Centre, was not spared. The worst however was reserved for Tamil Nadu's DMK Chief Minister M Karunanidhi. There is no denying the fact that sections of the Tamil Nadu polity and even from the national scene did not do India any proud by joining this chorus.
Benefits
The millions that thronged the venue of the World Classical Tamil Conference in the textile city of Coimbatore in the third week of June were mostly DMK cadres, but they had instructions not to make it look like a party function. The Tamil Nadu Government footed the entire bill, which should run into crores, but all that may have served two purposes. One intended, the other not necessarily so. The palpable benefit was a kind of scholarly acknowledgement of Karunanidhi as a Tamil litterateur par excellence. Though not part of the organisers' agenda, it did turn global Tamil attention to the conference, both for the acclaim it attracted and the criticism it faced. Considering that Tamil Nadu was in the focus of contemporary politics of the Tamil-speaking community across the world, it naturally became the cynosure of global Tamil media, starting with Sri Lanka. In the 'IT'era, it had greater and immediate reach than the World Tamil Conferences held thrice in Tamil Nadu, and elsewhere too.
The Coimbatore conference helped in re-focusing global Tamil attention towards Tamil Nadu, and more so, away from Sri Lanka in general and the LTTE in particular. It is also possible that the conference may have drawn a delineating line between Tamil language and politics. The two had not been separated in the past, and got intermingled at the height 'Eelam War IV' in Sri Lanka, leading to the politics of alienation. Having identified the pan-Tamil politics of the DMK in the earlier century with the progress and growth of Tamil Nadu, the party could do precious little when the LTTE hijacked the twin-agendas, that too at a time when the leadership was toying with alternatives that would appeal to the 'Twenty-first century Tamil' in India. A beginning may have been made to reverse this trend.
No more an 'Internal affair'
Having got caught in the politics of the Tamil-speaking people over the past decades of LTTE's dominance in general, and the past years of 'Eelam War IV' in particular, Chennai and Delhi may have to start building on the Coimbatore initiative. It is not going to be easy, but then, India cannot ignore the politics of the 'Tamil-speaking people' the world over, often confined to their host nations and domestic conditions. It has acquired a new idiom in the twenty-first century, where India cannot ignore them any more. Nor could it remain as non-committal, as Jawaharlal Nehru, as the nation's first Prime Minister, had declared that the issues of 'Indian Origin Tamils' in Sri Lanka were an 'internal affair' of that country.
In recent years, the Malaysian Tamils had brought their domestic plight to India, where the predominance of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue provided them with an opportunity to highlight their problems even while getting overshadowed by the pro-LTTE propaganda, which obviously did not want to share the limelight. Yet, a point had been made that New Delhi did not care much for overseas Indians of relatively distant origin if they were not of the elite, rich NRI types who are well-settled in wealthier nations of the West. If nothing else, the LTTE's supply chain and propaganda machinery had established linkages where none existed. Barring Sri Lanka, in every other country where the Tamil-speaking people are at the receiving end of political, constitutional and administrative neglect, they have been of Indian origin, often taken to those countries by the British colonial rulers as labour. That many of them worked closely and also identified with their better-off Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts, and also identified themselves with the LTTE's methods, if not the cause, should not be lost sight of.
How, New Delhi would have to dovetail emerging realities with existing foreign policy parameters is something that would serve the nation well as other sections of the Indian Diaspora from other States and linguistic and cultural backgrounds start facing problems in their adopted countries – as they did in the Fiji Islands, for instance. For, any future pan-Tamil politics of the Sri Lanka kind would still be centred on Tamil Nadu, and hence India – now that the LTTE is not around but desperate sections of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora are still keen on keeping their 'ethnic flame' burning.
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