It has been five years since General Pervez Musharraf came to power in Pakistan in a bloodless coup on October 12. One questionable referendum staged in April 2002, the less-than-credible parliamentary elections in October the same year, a controversial constitutional amendment and two changes of government this year later, Gen Musharraf is still the numero uno. Barring a coup or death, natural or violent, odds are that the general will be in charge of the state for at least the next eight years. That is, winning yet another term as President of the Islamic Republic in 2007, and two extensions as Chief of the Army Staff. If this eventuality comes to pass, it will be bettering of Gen Zia ul Haq#146;s record 11-year-long rule by mere two years.
He may not be as wily an operator in the political terrain as Gen Zia before him, but Gen Musharraf has outclassed him in the art of manipulation. The regime changes he has affected in the middle of this year--comings and goings of three governments in just as many months--is a tribute to his crafty style of political management. It is a standing joke, however, when he insists that these changes have been brought about by people#146;s representatives in parliament. Facts are not important here. What matters is how changes are experienced in the make-believe democratic theatre.
Gen Musharraf#146;s approach towards democracy is both puzzling and hypocritical. While he talks about genuine democracy, enlightened moderation and sustainable economic development and has propped up a National Security Council, a rubber-stamp parliament and a government headed by a technocrat to back it up, in addition to gingerly confronting religious extremism, real chances of any of this vaunted goals happening have slipped away under his watch. By his own admission, he was a reluctant coup-maker, a valid argument to a great extent, who wanted to cast himself in the reformist Kamal Ataturk mould, which is quite admirable, if you think of the mess Pakistan had been in when he came to power. An unhinged, corrupt civilian set-up with authoritarian streak seeping to its core, the country in October 1999 had been teetering on the brink of a financial meltdown. State institutions were fast losing their standing while religious extremism as well as state conduct accelerated the risk of the country being branded a terrorist state by major powers of the world. Gen Musharraf promised to reverse every wrong trend.
Five years later, the tragedy is that the essence of his political outlook still remains khakhi, economic vision opaque and social philosophy mired in contradictions. He has failed to honour any of the seven promises he had made when he took power. So much double standards and selectivity has discredited the accountability process. The law and order situation is more parlous than it were five years ago. The national reconciliation process has not helped even the working out of a Federal-provincial resource allocation formula. Stronger civil institutions have not taken root. Instead of genuine democracy he prefers, under what is described as the national interest, to live in the half-way house of controlled democratic order as he scrambles to retain the post of Chief of Army Staff indefinitely. More to the point, the first in the interests of the army and the second, in his own. Ever heard of the quip that Pakistan is not a nation with an army, but an army with a nation? Recent months have shown that the slur has acquired a dangerous edge. Militarisation of national institutions has caused a deep wedge in the Centre's relations with lesser provinces of the Federation while politicisation of the military has gone to such extent that some elements in it were found complicit in the plot to kill Gen Musharraf and some of his top commanders. The twin processes are not over yet.
It was the windfall benefits of 9/11 that Gen Musharraf has much to thank for his transformation from the "military dictator" of a "pariah" state to a "true and responsible leader" of the international community. Of course, he took the right decision to align his country with the fight against Al-Qaida terror and Taliban obscurantism, yet it was not taken out of his free, rational will. It was a tactical policy reversal informed by the fear of antagonising the US. The rewards that came in the shape of billions of US aid and debt rescheduling by international financial institutions have indeed helped resuscitate the economy. However, the improvement has so far been more cosmetic than real. It did not solve the problems of poverty, unemployment, human underdevelopment or investment-over 30 per cent of all Pakistanis still live below the poverty line and about 25 per cent are barely above it. The "trickle down economics" has simply not materialised.
Gen Musharraf began the enlightened moderation project in Pakistan on October 17, 1999 when, in his first major address to the nation, he urged the religious right in his country to "curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith". However, on every reckoning, except perhaps the freer press he has allowed to flourish, Pakistan under his rule has slouched further towards regression, and it shows. The rise in the profile of right-wing forces and the jehadi-sectarian mayhem that stalks Karachi, Quetta, Sialkot, and lately in Multan and Lahore, are its symptom, but the malaise runs much deeper. It is a result of Pakistan#146;s meddling in Afghanistan since the 1980s, the state sponsorship of jehadi networks in Kashmir, the state#146;s deliberate fostering of the religious orthodoxy, promotion of a literalist interpretation of Islam, debasement of humanistic values of society and the marginalisation of progressive democratic forces. Gen Musharraf#146;s intellectual wizardry can hardly obscure the fact that he has failed to address these high-octane factors. That is precisely the reason why his project is standing on its head. It is not rooted in reality.
Source : South Asian Media Network.
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