The tripartite meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US representatives on August 2 took place against the backdrop of souring relationships, killing of Osama bin Laden and President Barak Obama's 2014 withdrawal plan. Despite such a grim scenario, the fact that the three countries decided to talk on issues of mutual concern was in itself positive. It shows that at least the US was not ready to give up its central role in bringing the suspicious neighbours together for a peace process.
But can this single burst of positive feeling undo a growing crescendo of suspicion and bickering among the key stakeholders in the Afghan peace process?
The meeting was attended by Afghan Foreign Minister Jaweed Ludin, his Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir and US envoy to AfPak Marc Grossman. They discussed issues such as regional economic development, echoing Hillary Clinton's vision of a new Silk Road encompassing the whole region. But obviously what figured high on the agenda of the talks was the Afghan peace process. Afghanistan was keen that Pakistan must bring the Haqqani group to the negotiation table. Grossman was less enthusiastic about such a development and said "Pakistan fully supports the reconciliation process in Afghanistan".
The rehearsed bon homie could barely hide the profound mistrust and lassitude between the two 'allies'. The US, stung by Pakistan's duplicity and brazenness in preventing its diplomats and officers from working freely inside Pakistan, was not keen on Pakistan playing a bigger role in the reconciliation process. The ISI's role in supporting and sustaining terrorist groups on both sides of Durand Line raises serious questions about the army leadership's intentions in the peace process. The US policy makers, echoing the words of the late Richard Hoolbroke, believe that Pakistan has "to stop this war in Afghanistan".
Nonetheless both the US and Pakistan know that they simply cannot ignore each other if they want stability in Afghanistan. And here lies the first bone of contention. While the US is pushing forward with an exit strategy that includes talks with Taliban and a process of gradual transition where select areas would be handed over to the Afghan security forces, Pakistan nurses other ideas which undermines the Afghanistan's sovereignty. The Pakistan Army is widely acknowledged as a key stumbling block in the process of peace building and reconciliation in Afghanistan. By waging covert actions in Afghanistan through the Haqqani network, the Army wields considerable influence to ensure that Pakistan's core interest in Afghanistan, that is to deny India any major foothold, is protected.
By adopting this posture, the military leadership in Pakistan is infuriating at least some of the key policy makers in the US. The recent revelations made by Amrullah Saleh, a former Afghan Intelligence Chief, about the ISI sheltering Taliban chief Mullah Omar, will only sharpen the trust deficit between Islamabad and Washington.
Pakistan's refusal to give up its 'terror strategy' will grossly undermine the peace process in Afghanistan. Pakistan would do its utmost to ensure that its agents, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his network retain a key role to play in Afghanistan. Pakistan will also do all it can to impede any engagement in the reconciliation that comes from India. Pakistan's policy is to keep India and the US at an arm's length in future Afghanistan story. With the deadline of 2014 well in mind, Pakistan is ready to take over as the main actor in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the fact that few in Afghanistan – and even fewer among the international community – are ready to see the Taliban entering Kabul for a second time.
Guillaume Gandelin is Research Intern, ORF
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