Our sudden decision to resume talks with Pakistan at Foreign Secretary level can be justified if we can show that it will encourage Pakistan to bring to justice more expeditiously those responsible for 26/11, spur its government to suppress jihadi groups targetting India, strengthen those lobbies in Pakistan that, anguished by the internal spread of extremism and terrorism, seek peace with Indian democracy, and give a boost to Pakistan’s civilian government against the revived hegemony of the armed forces.
This unexpected initiative would find further justification if, by meeting long-standing western wishes, in particular those of the US, to re-engage Pakistan, it can be translated into tangible diplomatic gains for us by way of enhanced external pressure on Pakistan to credibly act against anti-Indian jihadi groups on its soil, holding back of US arms supplies to Pakistan, or securing our position in Afghanistan now threatened by western overtures to the Taliban.
In reality, Pakistan has shown inadequate political will to act against the Mumbai conspirators and has found tactical refuge in legal niceties to take minimum action. The West has only put proforma pressure on Pakistan to act on Mumbai as its priority has been to press Pakistan to act against the Pakistani Taliban, and until now, the Afghan Taliban. As regards the wider question of jihadi groups, Pakistan’s provocative handling of Hafiz Saeed in response to Prime Minister’s initiative last year to resume dialogue at his level with Pakistan laid out the limits of what India could expect from Pakistan in return for political engagement. The permission given to JuD to stage a massive rally in POK on February 5, with Hafiz Saeed and HuM’s Salahuddin in high gear and the JuD number two threatening to carry the terror war to Pune, Delhi and Kanpur, after India had already proposed resumption of FS level talks, reconfirmed Pakistan’s rejection of any linkage between bilateral talks and curbs on jihadi groups.
Overtures to Pakistan are unlikely to bring gains in terms of protecting our interests in Afghanistan either. After excluding India from the Istanbul meeting on Afghanistan and after the London Conference endorsed reaching out to the Taliban, Pakistan may feel it has outmanoeuvred India, and has successfully graduated from being the villain of the piece in Afghanistan to becoming central to the exit solution the West wants. It may now believe that it is in a position to have its special strategic interests in Afghanistan recognized and can circumscribe India’s presence there. Pakistan will step up its opposition to India’s presence in Afghanistan, dialogue or no dialogue.
General Kiyani’s personal stature in Pakistan has grown greatly after he appears to have extricated Pakistan from a difficult situation by convincing the US and Nato not to press for Pakistani operations against the Afghan Taliban, by persuading them that a national government is required in Afghanistan, that the legitimate interests of Pakistan and the international community in Afghanistan should be reconciled and that a soft strategic depth in Afghanistan is critical for Pakistan’s survival in the context of the unresolved conflict with India etc.
Significantly, the statements from the civilian government in Pakistan have become more shrill towards India and echo the military’s hardened line. The civil society, which was exhorting India to resume dialogue as a sophisticated reponse to the existence of multiple lobbies in Pakistan, is praising Kiyani and has remained muted in welcoming India’s initiative. Triumphalism has marked Pakistan’s reaction to India’s step, with the Pakistanis making clear that india cannot set the agenda, that terrorism is not the central issue for them, that they will raise Kashmir and water issues, and that India must return to the format of the composite dialogue. Far from strengthening the civilian government vis a vis the military, our step will be seen by the Pakistani establishment as an avowal of failure to exploit Pakistan-West fissures over terrorism/Afghanistan and an admission of our own isolation, with the credit for this diplomatic success going to Kiyani’s astuteness in handling Pakistan’s interests.
The terrorist attack in Pune has put us on the mat. If a Pakistani link is discovered and we proceed with the talks, we would have reaffirmed again our willlingness to delink dialogue from terrorism, giving in effect a virtual carte blanche to Pakistani elements to continue using terrorism to bleed India and expose our helplessness. If the meeting is called off, it would open the government to criticism for taking the initiative to resume talks when it was all too clear that a terrorist attack could occur at any time. For not sufficiently thinking through the initiative the government would end up by earning discredit rather than any credit for bold diplomacy. The Pakistani elements behind the attack are conveying a strong message to India that engaging Pakistan will not give us a respite from terrorism as their war with India will continue. Our great failure is that we have already disarmed ourselves politically and psychologically in fighting terror and hope for a solution through talks with an adversary uninterested in making real peace with us.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
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