Iranians take their soccer seriously. Iran's victory over Bahrain last week in the World Cup qualifier resulted in an outburst of rejoicing rarely seen in Teheran. Men and women (some without head scarves) danced on the streets and tore up posters of candidates in the June 17 presidential elections. The police did not interfere. Credible foreign observers have not confirmed reports of police brutality carried by some opposition news channels in the United States.
Even those who entertain sentiments of hatred towards Iran concede the regularity of elections since the 1979 Revolution. This break from the tradition of an absolutist monarchy is to be recalled as the country prepares for its ninth presidential election. Article 6 of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that the country "must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by means of elections" at different levels.
The President is elected for a four-year term by direct vote. Article 115 prescribes his qualifications: Iranian origin, Iranian nationality, administrative capacity and resourcefulness, a good past record, trustworthiness and piety, convinced beliefs in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic and the official religious creed of Iran. He is elected by an absolute majority of the votes polled. If a clear majority is not obtained, a second round is held for the two candidates obtaining the highest number in the first round.
The percentage of eligible voter turnout in previous elections tells its own story: 67.8 (1980), 64.9 (1981), 54.9 (1985), 54.6 (1989), 50.6 (1993), 83.5 (1997), and 63.0 (2001). The first President, Beni Sadr, was removed from office for "political incompetence" and fled the country. The second, Mohammad Ali Rajai, was assassinated. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in his two terms (1989 and 1993) got a bare majority casting their votes. Mohammad Khatami, who started on a high note in 1997 with 83 per cent voting, saw the percentage slip to 63 in 2001.
Despite being the head of the executive, the President concedes primacy to the Leader of the Revolution who under the system developed by Imam Khomeini (Rule of the Jurist) pronounces policy, heads the armed forces, and makes the senior-most appointments. This makes Iran a hierocracy of the Shia clergy and dilutes the democratic features of the system.
Revolution under scrutiny Twenty-six years after the Revolution the concept itself, and the role of the clergy in governance, is the subject of critical scrutiny. Even in 1979, and while the Constitution was being drafted, some senior clerics had cautioned against the proposed inroads into its democratic essence: "We should not render sovereignty of the people empty. The people may be silent and accept this article today, but later they will abolish the constitution."
The reform debates in the Khatami era, and his inability to push them beyond a point, demonstrate the debilitating impact of this approach. Despite it, change has taken place. Political debate is freer, there is greater social freedom and less of surveillance. The reformist agenda has become more radical with some calling for a referendum on the Constitution itself. They seek to derive support from the referendum clause in the Constitution (Article 59) but seem to overlook the stipulation that any such exercise cannot cover "the Islamic character of the political system."
On one count, more than 20 factions are involved in electioneering for June 17. Five of the eight candidates are being supported by various conservative groups; the faction support for the reformists is less clear and their hope lies in a large voter turnout to tilt the result in their favour.
The most prominent candidate supported by some (but not all) conservative factions is Hashemi Rafsanjani. His experience, record of service and negotiating skills make him in the eyes of many, the man of the hour for Iran. The diversion of votes to other conservative candidates could however harm him. His 14-point programme is focussed on economic and social change and "smaller government." Iran, in his view, can benefit from globalisation and needs to open up to international organisations. He is careful about the youth who constitute the majority: "There is no use imposing tastes, being strict and going backward. Whoever becomes the President cannot work without considering the demands and conditions of the society."
The former Minister for Higher Education, Mustafa Moin, is the candidate on whom the reformists pin their hopes. He was disqualified by the Guardian Council but was allowed to contest on the intervention of the Leader. Cynics say this was a Machiavellian devise to downsize him! Mr. Moin has modelled his campaign on Mr. Khatami's in 1997. His slogan is simplistic but appealing: "Democracy is the only answer to threats against Iran." It is also essential for economic growth and sustainable development. He advocates a free press, an end to "extensive corruption", to Internet censorship, and favours cultural diversity, respect for ethnic languages and all religious groups.
The candidates and their programmes are silent or evasive on the core issues of public concern: employment, investment, housing, foreign relations, nuclear enrichment. Of these, the most pressing is unemployment. Estimates put it in the range of 10.4 per cent to 11.8 per cent.
A substantial number of young people in technical and professional cadres (figures range from 100,000 to 250,000) are leaving Iran every year. With an annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent, the economy is unable to cope with the problem. According to one estimate, a growth rate of 9.5 per cent is required to bring unemployment below 10 per cent. Massive urbanisation, and absence of labour-intensive employment schemes, does not help matters. A direct result of this is disenchantment among youth.
Foreign policy The un-stated major factor in elections is foreign policy, principally relations with the U.S. Ending the economic-investment gridlock, and the key to higher growth rates, lies in ending Iran's isolation. The system too is conscious of it and is playing the limited cards at its disposal carefully. Time is the critical factor. Some in the U.S. appreciate the geo-political imperative of having a friendlier Iran in relation to American strategy in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia; others (and more influential ones) feel greater pressure would land "the rotten apple" (Khrushchev's phrase) in their lap.
Iran's history in the 20th century has many examples of dexterous handling of overwhelming external pressure. Will the June 17 election produce the situation and the statesman for responding to the challenge? How will the balance between the demands for greater democracy and freedom, on the one hand, and mature handling of national affairs, on the other, be arrived at? Will voter apathy prevail over the exuberance of youth for a change, or will it be the other way round?
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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