According to the Tsunami Laboratory at Novosibirsk in Siberia, there were 796 tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean region during the last century. Of these, only 117 caused human casualties and property damage. In the case of a majority of them, the human casualties and the property damage were near the source of the tsunami only. Only nine of them caused widespread destruction throughout the Pacific. The largest number of tsunamis in a single year was 19 in 1938, but they were all minor and caused no damage. During the last century, there was not a single year when there was no tsunami in the Pacific region.
According to the same source, 17 per cent of the total tsunamis of the last century were generated in or near Japan. This was followed by: South America, 15 per cent: New Guinea Solomon Islands, 13 per cent; Indonesia, 11 per cent: Kuril Islands and Kamchatka, 10 per cent; Mexico and Central America, 10 per cent; the Philippines, 9 per cent; New Zealand and Tonga, 7 per cent; Alaska and West Coasts of Canada and the United States, 7 per cent; and Hawai, 3 per cent. Thus, Indonesia figured fourth in the list of countries/areas most prone to tsunamis in this region.
Tsunamis in the Pacific region are categorised as purely local, regional and Pacific-wide. Local tsunamis are usually caused by submarine landslides or volcanic explosions. A local tsunami, which occurred off Alaska on July 9, 1958, generated waves, which were reportedly much higher and more forceful than the waves witnessed during the recent tsunami havoc in the South-East Asian and South Asian regions, but the damage caused was limited to the area where it occurred. There was no spread effect. The last tsunami, which caused widespread damage across the Pacific region, occurred on May, 22, 1960. Among the affected countries were Chile, the USA (Hawaii), Japan and the Philippines. A tsunami of lesser spread, but considerable damage was the 1964 great Alaska earthquake tsunami, which reportedly produced a wave of 67 metres at Shoup Bay, Valdez Inlet. There were 106 deaths in Alaska, 13 in California and four in Oregon. There was property damage, but no loss of human lives in the British Columbia area of Canada.
Before the December 26, 2004, tragedy, there have been five destructive tsunamis, which had originated in the Sumatran region--on February 10,,1797, November 24, 1833, January 5, 1843, February 16, 1861, and 1883 (month and date not available). There were about 300 fatalities in 1797 and 36,000 fatalities in 1883. The details of the fatalities in the remaining incidents are not recorded, but it was reported that there were thousands of fatalities in 1861 too. Since 1883, there have been no tsunamis originating from the Sumatran region causing thousands of fatalities till December 26, 2004.
The Sumatran-Andaman region had seen an earthquake with a magnitude 8.4 on the Richter scale in 1797, a magnitude of 8.7 in 1833, a magnitude of 8.5 in 1861 and a magnitude of 7.9 in 2000. The magnitude of the latest one, which caused havoc across South-East and South Asia, has been estimated at 9. It has been reported that there was some delay in the estimation of the magnitude of the latest earthquake by experts in many countries, including the USA.
Explaining this delay, the US Geological Survey says: "While earthquake location can be determined fairly rapidly, earthquake size is somewhat more problematic. This is because location is mainly based upon measurements of the time that seismic waves arrive at a station. Magnitude, on the other hand, is based upon the amplitude of those waves. The amplitude is much more variable than the arrival times, thus causing greater uncertainty in the magnitude estimate. For larger earthquakes, the problem is compounded by the fact that the larger the earthquake, the lower the characteristic frequency of the seismic waves. This means that surface wave arrivals, which contain lower frequency energy than the body waves, must be used to determine the magnitude. For a great earthquake, several hours of data must be recorded in order to accurately determine the magnitude. Thus, accurate estimates of the magnitude can follow an accurate estimate of the location by several hours. In the case of the 9.0 Sumatra-Andaman Islands earthquake, the standard methods were inadequate for measuring the very low frequency energy produced and had to be modified. This delayed the final determination of the magnitude until the next day."
Since the beginning of the 20th century, whenever an earthquake of large magnitude (7.5 plus) had caused a tsunami wave, the direction of spread had been towards the Pacific. This is the first time that the direction was towards the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean region.
In view of the frequent occurrence of tsunami waves in the Pacific region, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) was established in 1949 in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, to provide advance warnings of likely tsunamis to most countries in the Pacific Basin as well as to Hawaii and all other US interests in the Pacific outside of Alaska and the US West Coast. The Alaska and the US West Coast areas are served by the West Coast / Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska. The PTWC is also the warning center for Hawaii's local and regional tsunamis.
An International Tsunami Information Center (ITIC) was established in 1965 by the IOC (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission) of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to create tsunami-awareness and to improve tsunami-preparedness through networking with scientific research and academic organizations, civil defense agencies, and the general public in the areas which are prone to tsunamis. It performs, inter alia, the following tasks: To monitor international tsunami warning activities in the Pacific; to assist member-states in establishing national warning systems, and disseminate information on current technologies for tsunami warning systems. It is located in Honolulu, Hawai.
An International Coordination Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ICG) was set up in 1968 to ensure that tsunami watches, warning and advisory bulletins are disseminated throughout the Pacific to member states in accordance with the procedures outlined in a communication plan for the tsunami warning system. The ICG is a subsidiary body of the UNESCO and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC).
The Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (TWSP) presently has the following 26 member-states: Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Thailand, the Russian Federation and the USA. It is reported that all these countries have also their national warning systems.
Despite this, not only Indonesia and Thailand, but also Western countries such as the US, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and Japan from where thousands of tourists spend their Christmas-New Year holidays in Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Maldives seem to have been taken by surprise by the tsunami waves, which caused the death of over 1,20,000 people of this region and 2,000 plus foreign, mainly Western, tourists. The deaths of Western tourists have been reported mainly from Thailand and Sri Lanka.
The Western countries, particularly the USA, issue advisories to their nationals travelling abroad about the likelihood of any danger to their lives, whether from terrorism or natural disasters. How come no advisory seems to have been issued to their nationals holidaying in their thousands (estimate 40,000) in this region, particularly in Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, after the occurrence of the seaquake off Aceh in Indonesia?
How did the Pacific warning system in general and the national warning systems of Indonesia and Thailand in particular fail to forewarn their nationals and foreign tourists of the impending tsunami disaster? How did the Western countries and the sophisticated systems set up by them since 1949 apparently fail to provide advance warnings when the direction of spread was towards the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean region? No satisfactory explanation has so far been forthcoming.
An unnamed member of the Thai meteorological department has been quoted as alleging that a tsunami alert was not issued for fear of hurting the country's important tourism industry in case it turned out to be a false alarm. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has promised an investigation into the matter.
India has not been a member of any of the tsunami warning systems. Past proposals for India to set up is own national warning system and to join the international (mainly Pacific) network was given low priority apparently due to the high financial implications (Rs.1,000 million--Rs.45 equal to one US dollar) and the fact that India had not been a victim of tsunami waves for a little over 100 years.
India's vulnerability to tsunami-caused destruction was estimated as very low, if not non-existent. As a result, not only was there no effort to set up an advance warning and international networking system, but tsunami-vulnerability was not one of the factors taken into account in the determination of the location of our nuclear and space launching establishments and in designing their safety features. Similarly, this vulnerability was not taken into consideration while determining the location of our military establishments in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and their safety features.
According to Indian officials, our nuclear establishments, including the power station at Kalpakam near Chennai, the new Russian-aided power station under construction at Koodankulam on the southern coast in Tamil Nadu and the space complex at Srihari Kota in Andhra Pradesh have escaped any damage.. Five members of the staff of Kalpakam were tragically killed along with members of their families when the waves entered the residential township located near the sea.
Factoring in the tsunami-vulnerability aspect in all our future planning of sensitive establishments of national security value and upgrading the safety features of the establishments set up in the past is a task needing urgent attention, whatever be the cost.
The Government of India has also announced its decision to set up an advance warning system and join the international warning network. This would definitely increase our capability to anticipate future disasters and minimise the loss of human lives and material damage provided we pay equal attention to the human factor. Gadgets, technologies and international networking definitely help us by providing better technological inputs, better quality of information etc, but ultimately how effective we are in the prevention or mitigation of a disaster or a crisis would depend on the quality of the human mind that analyses, assesses and makes use of the data and how well-prepared it is and how fast it reacts. An alert, observant, analytical, proactive, far-seeing human mind is a thousand times more valuable than gadgets and technologies in the prevention and mitigation of disasters and crises.
This is as true of the crises created by threats to national security as it is of natural and man-made disasters. We saw it during the sequel to the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984, before the Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and before the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the USA. For weeks before the Kargil conflict in India and the 9/11 catastrophe in the USA, there were enough indicators of the impending conflict/ disaster. The human mind, which was expected to analyse the available data correctly and in time and act to prevent it, failed to do so.
In retrospect, one could see that even in the case of the tsunami tragedy of epic proportions, which overtook us on December 26, 2004, there were enough tell-tale indicators such as the power magnitude of the seaquake not only off Sumatra, but also off Andaman & Nicobar, which is our own territory, the striking of the tsunami waves against Car Nicobar much before they struck Thailand and their striking Thailand before they struck Southern India and Sri Lanka. One would have expected that a professional and alert mind would have immediately taken notice, rang the alarm bell and activated the crisis management machinery at New Delhi. According to media reports, the crisis management machinery got going only around 2 pm, about five hours after the monster waves struck the coast of Tamil Nadu.
As the cliche goes, it is easy to be wise after the event. True. But it is important to be wise at least after the event, even if we were not before. Otherwise, we will re-live similar disasters time and again. To be able to be wise at least after the event, one needs a clinically objective critical analysis of our inadequacies. According to the media, sources in the Ministry of Science and Technology have claimed that an immediate alert of the Sumatra seaquake was not issued because it had occurred in foreign territory and not in or in the vicinity of Indian territory. According to these sources, the present procedures call for such an alert only if a powerful quake takes place in Indian territory or in its vicinity. It is surprising and shocking that these officials seem to have overlooked the fact that the Andaman & Nicobar is our territory and that the seaquake had struck in the vicinity of our territory and our nationals in Car Nicobar were the first to be struck by this tragedy.
India has a long-built expertise in Natural Disaster Management for dealing with disasters such as floods, cyclonic storms and earthquakes, but the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984 brought out serious inadequacies in our expertise and capability to deal with disasters of the kind we had not encountered in the past. A comprehensive and constantly-updated disaster management system was found lacking.
It goes to the credit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, that he openly admitted the inadequacies instead of covering them up and initiated measures to rectify them. He attached a senior officer, with expertise in this matter, to the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Govt. of India at New Delhi to revamp our natural disaster management system. After the tsunami struck the southern region of India and Andaman and Nicobar on December 26, 2004, the local administrations down to the lowest level rose to the occasion in organising rescue and relief work. Considerable credit for the excellent reflexes exhibited by them should go to the ground work done by Rajiv Gandhi. But, unfortunately, as it often happens, after his exit from the Government in 1989 due to the defeat of his Congress Party in the elections, this subject did not receive the same attention from the succeeding Governments as it did under Rajiv Gandhi. It is to be hoped that at least now greater priority would be given to the urgent task of revamping our disaster management system, whether natural or man-made.
The aftermath of the tsunami havoc must have brought home to the policy-makers that natural disasters can have enormous consequences not only for the lives and welfare of the human beings and the economy, but also for national security as seen in the Andaman & Nicobar. The joint service headquarters set-up in the islands forms an important component of our naval defence set-up and our capability to go to the assistance of the South-East Asian countries in matters such as joint patrolling and surveillance of the Malacca Straits and the protection of the ships and oil tankers from pirates and terrorists. Repair of the damage suffered by our military capabilities in the islands is another aspect needing immediate attention, irrespective of the cost.
The delay in India joining the advance tsunami warning system and setting up its own national capability due to financial reasons underlines once again the difficulties faced by our national security and disaster managers due to the short-sighted approach of our financial experts, who reject such proposals on the ground that those are based on the likelihood of vulnerabilities and not on the possibility or certainty of actual threats. They are often reluctant to approve proposals, which are sought to be justified on the ground that we have to forearm ourselves against a danger which could arise. Such a negative attitude could prove counter-productive. The fact that what could arise did not arise does not mean that those who drew attention to what could happen were fools or that the expenditure incurred on preventing it or mitigating its effect was a waste of the tax-payers' money.
The writer is Additional Secretary (Rretd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-mail:
[email protected]
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper No. 1209, January 3, 2005.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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