Originally Published 2003-12-11 09:19:05 Published on Dec 11, 2003
More than ever before, the United States needs the continued support of the European Union (EU) in defence and security matters, especially in the war against terrorism. A draft security strategy prepared in June 2003 by Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) delineated the threats to security in Europe; international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states.
The Trans -Atlantic Defence Dilemma
More than ever before, the United States needs the continued support of the European Union (EU) in defence and security matters, especially in the war against terrorism. A draft security strategy prepared in June 2003 by Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) delineated the threats to security in Europe; international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. To the US, a consensus on this issue among the member states of the EU is of immense support and encouragement. What is not of support to the US however, is the growing discussion in Europe on plans to build a closer defence structure which might in the future be separate from that of NATO's.

In some ways, the current debate on shaping a common security and defense policy within the EU impinges on issues that have been part of an on-going debate, especially since the end of the Cold War. For one, the EU has found it markedly easier to implement a monetary union whereas similar success on the CFSP has been slow and at times uncertain. Secondly, NATO has been the most solid and enduring feature of stability, peace and prosperity in Europe. This is the main reason why the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the termination of the Warsaw Pact and the near-absence of a threat from a strong Germany did not spell the end of NATO. The Anglo-American alliance notwithstanding, the Europeans have been trapped in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, members of the EU have been keen on the continued military support of the NATO, realising their overall inferiority in that sphere as compared to the US. On the other, the Europeans within NATO have been averse to committing themselves to military operations that they see as indicative of America's growing hegemony in the world.

A rift between the US and some of the major European powers, primarily France and Germany, was palpable during the war in Iraq. Both countries refused to send troops or money in support of the US effort in bringing Iraq into the democratic fold. However, reconciliation seems to be in the air. Not only have the Europeans revised their plans on building a separate defence structure from NATO, they have also accepted that any mutual defence among EU members will be 'consistent' with NATO commitments. In bridging the gap, the UK has proved to be the strongest link between EU bigwigs France and Germany and the US. The UK is integral to the United State's Iraq effort, but at the same time, the UK is also important to the EU. France and Germany have had to assure the British that any future EU military operation would not take place without NATO's participation. Therefore, the Europeans have watered down their plan of constructing a separate EU military headquarters in Belgium. Instead, they have decided on a small operational planning unit within the existing EU military staff headquarters.

The US is supportive of a larger peacekeeping responsibility for the EU. While the EU assumed the NATO peacekeeping operation in Macedonia in March 2003, other operations that the US envisages for the EU to assume command of is the Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) and eventually the Kosovo Force (KFOR). However, it is interesting to note that the US envisages a defence role for the EU that is additional and consequent to that of NATO's. The US emphasis on the EU taking over peacekeeping operations within Europe has two aims. One, it allows the US to use NATO to focus on security threats elsewhere (beyond the borders of Europe) and secondly, it ensures that any EU-defence role will not be competitive to US-led NATO efforts as the US realises that small beginnings can lead to big things, especially where the EU is concerned. However, any consensus on defence policy within the EU is still a far cry. There is no unanimity among members on a range of issues. While France has always been more virulent in its attack on the US, countries like Italy and Spain are keener to appease the US in order to forestall the growing importance of regional powers like France and Germany. At an EU foreign ministers meeting at Brussels on December 8, 2003, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden strongly objected to the proposed 'mutual defence' clause in the draft constitution.

Since 9/11, the US has worked towards broadening the scope of NATO in addressing military threats in the world. Steps such as development of a NATO Response Force giving it a high-end military capability and the decision to have NATO assume command and control of the International Affairs Assistance Force in Afghanistan in August 2003 are indicative of this endeavour. The United States is interested at this moment on drawing public opinion to security issues that threaten both shores of the Atlantic alike. Issues such as the need to liberalise trade, the need for moral, economic and military support in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East, the need to bring peace and prosperity to the East European countries, in curbing the proliferation of WMDs and in expanding the extent of the democratic world remain at the top of the list.

At a time when the US is being heavily criticised for its involvement in Iraq, the US needs to hang onto its friends. The US is incurring huge expenditures in Iraq and to a certain extent in Afghanistan that it cannot sustain indefinitely. The US will do all it can to strengthen NATO's capability in responding to peace enforcement situations like the one in Iraq. Having marginalised the role of the UN, the US has increasingly projected NATO as more "effective" in peace enforcement than the UN. At the same time, the US cannot alienate its European friends. The US will not stand in the way of the EU strengthening its military capability in responding to conflicts, albeit within the EU, especially its eastern fringes. At the same time, the US will prefer to gradually taper its unilateral military involvement in conflicts abroad and gain the support of other like-minded countries to assist it in economic and military ways. Working within NATO and with the support of EU members is the only way that the US can ward off some of the criticisms being heaped upon it from various corners of the globe. For this it will require the support of the EU, within and outside NATO.

* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Observer Research Foundation.
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