An Indian Prime Minister's visit to China has always been of strategic significance. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 following Wangdung episode resulted in the formulation of Mutual Understanding, Mutual Accommodation and Mutual Adjustment for a long-term Sino Indian boundary solution. It brought back normalcy along the North Eastern border. In 1993, Narasimha Rao signed the Peace and Tranquility Agreement in Beijing.
An appropriate and conducive stage has been set up for Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China on June 22-26, 2003. The Defence Minister George Fernandes visited China recently during which he appears to have been 'de-fanged' and persuaded to change his China outlook. The Prime Minister himself has had a brief meeting with the Chinese President Hu Jintao at St Petersburg on May 31, 2003.
What are the new strategic challenges and opportunities available to the Indian Prime Minister during this visit?
Let us first be clear about Chinese strategic perceptions and outlook. The Chinese respect 'comprehensive national strength'-justifiably. They make no secret of the fact that economic development is their strategic goal as well as means for achieving other national objectives. Their strategic goals are (a) Economic development (b) State security, and (c) International engagement as a potential, responsible world power.
In the last decade, regional and global strategic environment has undergone a sea change, mostly in favour of India. This should give Prime Minister Vajpayee and his team greater confidence and room for maneuver during their discussions with Chinese leaders.
Most important of these is India becoming a nuclear power; does not matter if the world gives it a formal approval or not. In fact one of the reasons for India giving up 'nuclear ambiguity' in May 1998 was the Chinese nuclear challenge; its insistence that the CTBT would not come into force without India's signature and incorporation of this provision into the Treaty.
Since the May 1998 nuclear and subsequent missiles tests, India has been able to address the Sino Indian strategic asymmetry. It has successively overcome the tests related criticism. There has been a qualitative transformation in its international diplomacy and image.
Since 9/11, counter terrorism at the regional and global level has become an important platform for Sino Indian strategic convergence. China considers itself as one of the victims of Jehadi terrorism. This articulation was preceded by a noticeable concern and distancing from Pakistan over J & K, when the latter initiated Kargil war in Jehadi garb in May1999.
India, despite all the efforts by the West and China, can no longer be boxed with Pakistan, or perceived only through the Indo-Pak prism. It already has the most 'comprehensive national strength' in Southern Asia, and it is likely to continue the pursuit of becoming an autonomous, non-hegemonic power.
Many Chinese strategic thinkers view the growing relationship between USA and India as part of American policy to contain China. The quick Indian endorsement of the NMD and increasing Indo US military interaction in the recent years has reinforced China's concerns on this score.
Both India and China have been advocates of a multi-polar world order.
During his visit to India in January 2001, Chairman Li Peng of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress had made this an important issue for 'deepening understanding, fostering friendship and strengthening cooperation'. India is considered an important player for countering US unilateralism, which after the Iraq war has become a source of concern as well as resentment. There is greater recognition of India's economic and technological potential. China appreciates that Indian economy is growing at a reasonable rate and its techno-economic performance, particularly in IT sector, has been impressive. In the next two decades, demographically, China will age rapidly while India will remain young. The conventional wisdom is that young people usually spearhead high-tech advances that make rapid technological breakthroughs. India with its positive age structure has the potential to grow rich and powerful.
In this positive atmosphere, what are the do-ables on the Sino Indian strategic front?
he Vajpayee visit will give another opportunity to review important strategic changes, particularly those related to the new world order, counter terrorism, situation in Central Asia, Iraq (including possibility of sending an Indian Stabilization Force) and the North Korean nuclear stand off. China and India have already issued statements indicating resolve to further strengthen leadership and institutional level interaction. India and China have 'reaffirmed that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means or seek unilateral military superiority' and committed to work on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) contained in the 'Agreement on CBMs in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)' of 1996. Unfortunately, till now there is no accepted delineation or even an agreed perception of each other's LAC on the maps.
Consequently, there is often local tension in some areas when troops from either side carry out road building, bunker construction/ repairs, or even patrolling. Most other CBMs, including future deployment of troops and heavy weapons as given in Article 3 of the Agreement, are related to distances from the LAC. These are not actionable till there is an agreed delineation of the LAC without prejudice to a subsequent boundary solution. This process is moving very slowly. It needs to be expedited with a view to avoiding local tensions and also implementing the remaining articles of the Agreement.It is high time that like rest of the world, China recognizes Sikkim and (the Indian part of) J & K as part of India. Since it recognizes Pak Occupied Kashmir, and Chinese officers are known to visit that area frequently, then why not the Indian part of J & K? Some years ago, after agreeing to visits of senior Army officers to opposite sectors with us, the PLA refused to send its Ali Military District Commander to Leh. Also, after Kargil war when most Defence Attaches (DAs) in Delhi were keen to and did visit Kargil, the Chinese DA did not go. In Sikkim, Indian and Chinese officials visit each other's Conference Huts across the demarcated boundary. Both countries would like to increase the border trade across Natu La. But China refuses to give official recognition to Sikkim as part of India!
India and China have been in touch with each other over the Indian request for a less hazardous and easier route for the Indian pilgrims to visit Kailash - Mansarovar. This will further reduce tension in the area and would be economically beneficial to locals on both sides. These are some antiquated sensitivities and aberrations in the Sino Indian relations, which create uncertainties in India about China and need to be quickly resolved for a durable cooperative and progressive relationship.
There is also the question of India's candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. China, forgetting that India had spearheaded its entry into the United Nations, has yet to declare its support to India.
Although the Sino Indian dialogue is expected to cover a wider canvas, India need not feel shy to point out the regional impact of Talibanisation taking roots in Pakistan through the guided democracy of its military rulers and its militarist attitude towards the regional developmental agenda. The Chinese armament support to Pakistan that encourages it to compete with India has already run its full course. In future, it can only expedite Pakistan's economic bankruptcy.
India and China have registered a 10- fold increase in the two- way trade volume in the past decade. Bilateral trade grew by 33 per cent in 2002 and for the first time, India has a trade surplus of $350 millions. There is a huge potential yet to be exploited bilaterally and through multilateral cooperation like the Kunming Initiative that envisages a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India grid for the economic and trade benefits for all the countries. Further economic cooperation needs to be institutionalised.
Pragmatic and dynamic relations between India and China will be beneficial to both countries in the new global equations. Prime Minister Vajpayee's forthcoming visit to China offers yet another opportunity for a durable cooperative peace, and to establish confidence-building measures, which will ensure that this remains tension free.
General Malik, former Chief of the Army Staff is President, ORF Institute of Security Studies
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