The 2004 annual piracy report published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) had noted that the Tsunami tidal waves that hit Sumatra in Indonesia might have destroyed the piracy related infrastructure. Some of the pirates may have even perished in the disaster. Besides, there was also a large naval presence and may have acted as a deterrent against piracy activity in the Malacca Straits.
However, three attacks in just four days have heralded the return of piracy in the Malacca Straits. The first was an aborted attempt in the Singapore Straits on March 11, 2005 in which pirates in three boats attempted to board a bulk carrier that was underway. The alert crew raised alarm, activated fire hoses and switched on deck lights and the pirates dispersed after 15 minutes of attempted boarding.
The second attack took place on March 12, south east of Berhala Island, in the Straits of Malacca. 35 pirates armed with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) boarded the Indonesian-owned M T Tri Samudra product tanker with methane gas while the vessel was underway. The master and chief engineer were taken hostage and ransom was demanded. The vessel was directed not to proceed to Belawan , the next port of call. Ship's owners believe that pirates are Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement rebels who are fighting for independence for Aceh province in the Sumatra Island.
The third attack took place on March 14 in the Straits of Malacca. An unspecified number of pirates, armed with guns in three fishing boats boarded a Japanese-flag ocean tug M V Idaten towing a large construction barge Kurooshia, for Mynamar. They kidnapped the Japanese Master, Chief Engineer & Filipino 3rd Engineer. Later, the Royal Malaysian Police patrol boats escorted the tug and towed the vessel to Penang. Reportedly, the crew has been released but Japan's Foreign Ministry declined to say whether ransom was paid.
Meanwhile, pirates released the Malaysian Captain & Indonesian Chief Officer of the tug that was attacked on February 28 off Penang in Malaysia. The two landed safely in Port Klang in a fishing boat on March 8. It is believed that ransom was paid, but no details are available.
Three issues need to be understood carefully.
First. Post Tsunami, the Aceh rebels are back in business. The rebels have been active in the area for quite some time now. In December 2002, a joint Indonesian navy-military patrol seized a barge manned by seven Indonesian crewmen, some ten kilometers off the coast of East Aceh, northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The vessel was reportedly carrying explosives and detonators from Penang in Malaysia to Aceh. A search of the barge yielded 46 detonators and 55 sticks of 'power gel' an explosive material that is usually combined with other explosives. A month before, the Indonesian navy's western fleet had destroyed two ships carrying smuggled arms for the GAM. The separatists had seized the vessels from Thai fishermen to smuggle arms to Aceh province. The action was taken after the rebels controlling the ships opened fire. The crew, who were held hostage by the rebels, had been freed.
In August 2001, a general cargo carrier M V Ocean Silver, while transiting through the Malacca Strait, was captured by the GAM rebels. The six crewmembers of the vessel were taken hostage. In an attempt to rescue the vessel and the crew, the Indonesian security forces engaged in a gun battle with the insurgents, that resulted in one soldier and three rebels dead. But, the hostages could not be rescued. What was more disturbing was the fact that the GAM issued a warning that all ships transiting through the straits between Sumatra Island and Malaysia must first get permission from the insurgents.
Second issue is related to the practice of demanding ransom for the kidnapped crew. The 2004 annual piracy report has noted that eighty-six shipping crew were kidnapped and pirates had demanded ransom for their release. Thirty-six crew were kidnapped in the attacks in Malacca Straits. But the most worrying part of the 2004 report is that the number of crew killed increased to 30 as compared to 21 in 2003. Overall there were a total of 325 piracy attacks on shipping in 2004. This figure is lower than the reported 445 attacks in 2003. Many of these attacks were serious and involved vessels being fired upon.
And the third issue that needs urgent consideration by the regional countries is about the possible linkage between piracy and terrorism. In recent times, the distinction between piracy and terrorism seems to be eroding. The GAM case offers a classical example. But strategists differ in their understanding of the two phenomena. According to Brian Jenkins, an expert on terrorism and security, it is incorrect to conclude that an increase in piracy will result in an increase in the terrorist threat. He also notes that there is no indication that terrorists and pirates are operating in close cooperation. Their aims are different. Similarly, Captain Mat Taib Yasin, a former Royal Malaysian Navy Officer, and Senior Fellow at the Maritime Institute of Malaysian (MIMA) has noted, "The pirate wants to enjoy his loot. The terrorist wants to destroy the enemy, get political mileage - and he's prepared to die." It has also been argued, "How far little money might go in convincing pirates to assist terrorists. After all, money loot is the pirate's language, and the terrorists who may be eying the Strait are well funded".
It will be fair to argue that although sea piracy and maritime terrorism have common characteristics, and both may employ similar tactics of ship seizures and hijackings. Also, poverty, political instability and poor law enforcement allow piracy and terrorism to flourish simultaneously. However, there are clear distinctions in the final purpose of these activities. The terrorist seek attention for their cause and inflict as much harm and damage as possible to achieve their political objectives whereas the pirates simply seek economic gains.
Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper no. 1300, March 23, 2005.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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