For over seven decades the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took justifiable pride in the stability of its political system, the tranquility of its social scene, and the in the overall loyalty of its citizenry. The compelling simplicity of the Saudi flag reflected the cohesion. Occasional murmurs of discontent, and an eruption or two in recent decades, did not belie this judgment. All this underwent a dramatic, and drastic, change on the night of May 12 in Riyadh. Why did it happen? Who undertook it? What were the objectives of the bombers? Did they succeed? What are the wider implications of the event, particularly in the context of the Casablanca bomb blasts that followed? On the face of it, and within weeks of the "victory" in Iraq and days after the announcement of the closure of U.S. air bases in Saudi Arabia, the spectre of violent Islamism has returned to haunt the United States and its friends in the Arab world from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.
The choice of the kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Morocco is significant. The head of the first is the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines and, until 1970s, also carried the title of the Imam of Muslims. The second is formally addressed as Amir-ul-Momineen. The assault, in one aspect, is thus on the formal power of official Islam in these two countries. Why? The critics argue that the Saudi(and Moroccan) governments have failed to protect Islam and Muslims. Another ostensible reason is their close alliance with the U.S. The first argument surfaced as early as 1979 at the time of the occupation of the Haram in Makkah. The small but technologically vociferous Saudi opposition abroad articulated both view in the decade after the Kuwait war of 1991. Both were regarded as manageable by the government. The Moroccans, in turn, even went ahead with a modest political reform package that was upheld as a model by the Americans for similar changes in Saudi Arabia.
Curiously enough, reports and analyses on the two sets of bombings have not referred to the possibility of the attacks emanating from Baathist cells responding to the destruction of the Iraqi regime. Instead Al Qaeda has been identified as the culprit even though it has not, as per its practice, claimed credit. It has not been clarified whether the suspect is Al Qaeda the organization or Al Qaeda the ideology. The finger of suspicion has also been pointed at elements in the Saudi National Guards, a tribal army long considered as more reliable than the regular one. Crown Prince Abdullah has commanded it for four decades and has for long been assisted by a training mission of the U.S. Army. Why has sedition crept into the ranks of this loyal body of men?
The official reaction to the bombing was to be uncharacteristically candid about details, admit lapses in security, assure full cooperation to the Americans, and predict more attacks. On the political plane the King called for through soul searching and promised reforms at all levels -political, administrative, economic and social. Crown Prince Abdullah announced on May 21 the setting up of a special committee to "propagate moderate views of Islam". He reiterated the strong ties with the United States: the Americans "have never asked us to do specific things". He too spoke of reforms. Columnists have spelt these out in specific terms, have spoken about "the dawn of a new Saudi Arabia", and thus set benchmarks that the government would ignore at its peril. The public outrage at the killing of fellow citizens, and fear of more violence, has found expression. One writer said the "Saudis have become hostages of the backward agenda of a small minority of bin Laden supporters who in effect have hijacked our society", adding that "we Saudis must acknowledge that our real enemy is religious fanaticism". These people, wrote an influential editor, "are products of the sick ideas that first appeared during the Mghanistan war". The ulema and other traditional guardians of conservatism have refrained from joining the debate -at least for the moment.
One thing is clear. The Saudi leadership has accepted, with an evident sense of urgency, the need for reforms in the structures of the state as also the need to counter extremism in the name of religion and promote instead moderate views of Islam. Is it a coincidence that these perceptions are almost identical to what President Bush visualized in his National Security Strategy statement of September 17, 2002 as "moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation" and what Colin Powell more specifically advocated a few months later in a speech and a newspaper interview on December 12?
Whatever the impulse, change is torturous business, rarely achieved easily and invariably painful. Is the commitment to change tactical or strategic? How far would the Saudi system go, and with what speed? Would the existing social contract governing the distribution of power, wealth and social services, be modified? Would the youth, in the age group 15 -30 and constituting the most important political constituency in the country, be listened to? Would the educational system, particularly at the school level, be modernized? What practical changes will be made in the status of women? Would the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice be given drastically different guidelines? Would the system be more accommodative towards other faiths? What would be the response to all this of the traditional guardians of Saudi virtue -the senior princes, the ulema, the tribal sheikhs, the big businessmen -who are unlikely to speak with one voice given that change will affect them unevenly?
Someone may well ask uncomfortable questions. Why wait for so long to do the obvious? Alternatively, how well rooted are the beliefs and practices that are now to be jettisoned in such haste?
M.H. Ansari is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a Visiting Professor in the Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia. <22.05.2003>
Published in AALAMI SAHARA weekly (Urdu). New Delhi. June 7. 2003RR 8-9.
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