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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh concerned about the looming energy crisis, is determined to expand the contribution of civilian nuclear power to India’s energy budget. For this it is necessary to remove the shackles imposed by the United States and its friends on international nuclear transactions. Dr Singh should be applauded for his efforts to take advantage of whatever opportunities are available to move our country into a high-growth trajectory.
India has endured 30 years of technology embargoes and efforts to isolate its nuclear scientific establishment from any kind of foreign collaboration. These attempts at throttling civilian nuclear technology certainly slowed down the country’s civilian nuclear programme and adversely affected its developmental efforts. Indian scientists and engineers, faced with adverse circumstances, managed not only to prolong the life of the Tarapur reactor and build the half-completed Rajasthan reactor, but went on to produce several new power plants that are in operation. They succeeded in mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, with the exception of Tarapur and Rajasthan reactors and related facilities that are under facility-specific pre-NPT safeguards, India’s entire nuclear fuel cycle has been indigenous, autonomous, and free from foreign inspections.
The Prime Minister, however, faced two major problems— the absence of any provider of enriched fuel for Tarapur, and the inability to purchase natural uranium on the international market because of the restrictive non-proliferation regime. He succeeded in persuading President Bush to recognise India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. It was an indirect admission of its status as a nuclear weapon power: a belated recognition of an accomplished fact.
The Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 providing the framework for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear power is, like the proverbial curate’s egg, good in parts. While Washington has promised to persuade the US Congress to make changes in its domestic legislation, and to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make suitable adjustments in its regulations, New Delhi has to take some irreversible decisions. The problem lies in the sequencing of steps Washington and New Delhi are committed to take.
India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities are to be segregated in a phased manner, placing civilian facilities under voluntary IAEA safeguards that will require a declaration to be submitted to the Agency. India would have to sign an Additional Protocol to the safeguards, continue the unilaterally declared nuclear test moratorium, and work with the United States in concluding a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. In international nuclear transactions, India would need to adhere to the missile technology control regime and the guidelines of the NSG. The Joint Statement states that India has reciprocally assumed “the same responsibilities and practices and the same benefits and advantages as the other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.” American Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns is the point man to coordinate with Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran the modalities of implementation. President Bush, during his projected visit early next year, will review progress with Prime Minister Singh.
As for India’s moratorium on nuclear testing, there is no reciprocity. The United States has always retained the right to conduct further nuclear tests. In fact, American public documents reveal that efforts are on to reduce the time lag between the decision to resume testing and the ability to do so. What was the need to include this commitment in a bilateral document? Does it imply that once the Americans decide to resume explosive testing, we would also be free to do so? Or is reciprocity with regard to non-explosive nuclear testing?
There have been some discordant voices within our nuclear establishment. According to the former director of BARC, Mr. A. N. Prasad, “segregating nuclear facilities into military and non-military is impractical”. The former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr P.K. Iyengar, has raised an important issue not mentioned in the Joint Statement. “The spent fuel from Tarapur, right from the seventies, is lying around,” he says. The Americans don’t want it back and India is debarred from reprocessing it. “If you calculate that approximately 60 tonnes of spent fuel was produced in Tarapur alone every year for 30 years, there is a great danger that the material will get degraded.” Moreover, the tanks containing this corrosive material are leaking.
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