Introduction
India’s northeast region (NER) occupies a prominent place in its vision of diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. The region has vast natural resources, and thereby great potential for increased industry and trade with the Indo-Pacific, since it is physically closer to the latter and has greater socio-cultural links with it than the rest of the country. This brief looks at how the potential can be realised, and the role the northeast plays in furthering India’s flagship policies such as ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighbourhood First’. It will examine the extent to which the northeast can attract foreign direct investment (FDI), boosting internal development and making it a growth hub.
However, the brief also notes, achieving the northeast’s potential is contingent upon the region—which has a troubled history—maintaining peace and stability, as well as on a more nuanced Indian foreign policy strategy. It cannot be assumed that the northeast can be pivotal to India’s Indo-Pacific policy simply based on its potential. Foreign-policymakers must take cognisance of local resistance to development projects, as well as suspicions of the Centre’s mainstreaming designs. India must reorient its approach to link domestic-focused bureaucratic structures with those involved with foreign policy, so that they jointly approach the northeast in a more sensitive manner. The northeast is India’s domestic responsibility as well as its foreign policy asset. Both regional sentiment and industrial potential should get equal attention.
The Northeast in the Pan-Indian Matrix
How should the history of the NER, in the context of its significance for India, be viewed? The eight states of the northeast—Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura—cover 7.98 percent of India’s total geographical area but account for only 3.78 percent of its population. According to the last census (in 2011), the region has 135 different tribes[1] comprising 54 percent of its population. Only 4 percent of its boundaries are with the rest of India, and the remaining abuts the countries of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and China.
For many years after India’s independence, the government endorsed the same territorial boundary arrangements for the northeast that had been mandated by the former British administration and kept much of it deliberately isolated from the pan-Indian project of nation-building. During this phase, insurgencies seeking separation from India broke out in a number of the northeastern states—first in the Naga Hills and Mizo Hills districts of Assam (which were later carved out into the full-fledged states of Nagaland and Mizoram, respectively), and thereafter, in various other parts of Assam, Manipur, and Tripura. They were fomented by various domestic and sub-regional factors, such as large-scale illegal immigration from East Pakistan, which subsequently became the new country of Bangladesh (which wrought the fear of indigenous people being reduced to a minority in their own land), frustration with inadequate political representation, poverty, lack of ideological identification with mainstream India, and severance of geographical and socio-cultural ties with pre-1947 territories due to borders being redefined.
The insurgencies, in turn, led to the Indian state sending in vast numbers of military and para-military forces to respond, and the promulgation of draconic laws to assist in doing so—notably the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958, and the Disturbed Areas Act, 1976. The region also became a hotbed of inter-ethnic violence and illegal movements of insurgents across borders for both arms and shelter. Owing to the long years of isolation, there was often widespread local sympathy for the insurgents, as opposed to any confidence in the state or national government.
In the post-liberalisation period of the 1990s, even though the insurgencies had yet to be completely controlled, Indian foreign policy began to appreciate the advantages of the northeast’s strategic location for improving connectivity with Southeast Asia. The ‘Look East’ policy, initiated in 1991, offered a framework for including the northeast in India’s foreign policy.[a] The northeast was rebranded as a region overflowing with natural resources and geo-strategic potential which could significantly contribute to national as well as regional economic development.
Since 2014, when he first became prime minister, Narendra Modi was mindful of the strategic value of the northeast to the extended neighbourhood in the East. The prime minister invested political capital in drawing the region closer to the Indian mainstream. With ‘Look East’ being re-launched as the ‘Act East’ policy in 2014, the northeast is now seen as India’s territorial frontier for eastward engagement. The geostrategic advantages of the northeast and its connectivity with Southeast Asia can bolster India’s bargaining position for its expanding role and presence in the Indo-Pacific, compared to that of other global powers.
The northeast’s abundant natural resources, if carefully harnessed, can easily make it a hub for both manufacturing and service industries. Its oil and natural gas, rich mineral deposits, agro-horticultural and forest resources, and hydroelectric potential, make it extremely attractive for industrial houses. So far, the primary industries in the northeast include agro-industries, food processing, and mineral extraction, with notable businesses in bamboo, natural gas and oil, as well as plastic, coal, silk, jute and tea. In recent years, notable investments have also been made in sectors such as cement, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, infrastructure, tourism, hospitality, education,[2] and capacity building.
A number of special schemes and packages have also been launched to accelerate the region’s development. These include: the Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR) scheme of 1998 to overcome infrastructure gaps; the Social and Infrastructure Development Fund (SIDF) of INR 500 crore[b] provided in the 2008-09 budget; and the Prime Minister’s Development Initiative for the North East (PM-DevINE) scheme for infrastructure, social development, and job-creation for women and youth, announced in the 2022-23 budget.[3],[4]
Linking NER to the Indo-Pacific
Since 2018, India’s Look East and Act East policies have veered towards accommodating the Indo-Pacific strategy. Unlike in the 1990s, when the eastern thrust was largely for economic purposes, the present emphasis is also due to the challenges of a rising China, which has been positioning itself as an alternative security provider for countries in India’s backyard. Chinese influence on, and aid for, various insurgent groups has been a factor in the historical challenges that India has had with its northeast security situation. For New Delhi, the Indo-Pacific offers opportunities to strengthen its strategic position; it is a balancing strategy to counter China. Earlier, in 2015, India and the United States had issued a joint vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. Even the use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, however, was rare in Indian official parlance until Modi used it in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue[c] in 2018.
Greater involvement in the Indo-Pacific will require India to forge partnerships with strategic allies such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia and the US. Prabir De, in his book, Act East to Act Indo-Pacific: India’s Expanding Neighbourhood, argued that greater involvement with the Indo-Pacific is India’s best bet to achieve its goal of becoming a US$5-trillion economy by 2025.[d] The northeast is a pivot for India’s connectivity plans and commercial interests in the Bay of Bengal region. India is thus keen to bolster both multimodal and intermodal connectivity between its northeast and Southeast Asia, which could be a facilitator of Indo-Pacific relations in the coming years.[5] Its Indo-Pacific initiative is focused on numerous areas, including security, ecology, preservation and utilisation of resources, capacity building and resource sharing, disaster risk reduction and management, science and technology, academic cooperation, trade connectivity, and maritime transport.
Japan was the first country with which India began to discuss the Indo-Pacific as a region.[6] The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been working with India for decades, on various connectivity projects including providing technical and capacity knowhow on building highways in mountainous terrains, but in September 2017, the two countries set up the India-Japan Act East Forum which is specifically mandated to identify and facilitate developmental infrastructure and cultural connectivity projects in India’s northeast. The UK too, may soon be drawn in—in October 2020, India’s then minister for the development of the northeast region, Jitendra Singh, solicited UK investment in the region during a virtual meeting with British High Commission officials and received positive response. The UK can help, for example, in branding the handicrafts, fruit, vegetables and spices of the northeast and selling them globally, as well as setting up cold chains in the region.[7]
Domestic Pitfalls
The northeast is the only region in India whose development is the specific mandate of a Union government ministry.[8] This started in 2001 with a Cabinet-level Department for Development of the North-Eastern Region being set up to fast-track economic development of the area, which was elevated to a full-fledged ministry in 2004. The northeast forum of NITI Aayog also plays a role, while security is handled by the northeast section of the internal security division in the Ministry of Home Affairs. As noted earlier, while initially in the 1990s, it was the effort of these agencies to engineer economic development and build connectivity linkages, their current reinvigorated effort to expand the boundaries of engagement to the wider theatre of the Indo-Pacific should advance cautiously. Such endeavour should be based on a realistic assessment of the impact of development in the northeast in the past two decades.
Despite all the effort, in terms of productivity and ability to contribute to foreign trade, the northeast remains one of India’s ‘economically laggard’ regions.[9] The potential of the region to contribute to the Indo-Pacific policy is intertwined with the extent to which its internal infrastructure is developed, as well as its ability to quell insurgency and political turmoil. A roadmap of its proposed progress is needed. At present, the national security discourse on the northeast largely comprises ethnic insurgencies, cross-border terrorism, and proxy wars; how can opening up of borders, essential for transnational economic activity, be envisaged in such an environment? Some analysts maintain that foreign policy thinking has been hijacked by the military and security establishment, and remains insulated from the debates between the Centre and the region itself.[10] Others have also noted that although many of the northeastern states are currently ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), either on its own or in a coalition,[11] this only reflects the calculations of electoral politics and the advantages of being aligned with the central government; and not “grassroots sentiment”.[12]
Despite the ambitions of fostering connectivity in the northeast, there are few overt signs of policy reorientation towards the region, or indeed of any awareness that the persistence of armed conflicts and consequent restrictions on the everyday business of travel, land and labour markets for ordinary citizens are formidable hurdles to the region becoming an actual ‘gateway’. Baruah has observed that in the past, Indian foreign policy hoped to convince the local population of economic gains through proposed measures and thereby reduce sympathy for anti-state, rebel groups;[13] this could well still be possible.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that the existing restrictions on land ownership and labour migration, for instance, are perfectly in consonance with the ideological orientation of a large section of the local communities, which have not demonstrated a desire to be mainstreamed. The law and order situation, though much better today, is still far from normal—Manipur alone witnessed 163-insurgency related fatalities in 2023.[14] Not surprisingly, the government, in March-April 2024, extended the AFSPA to Arunachal Pradesh, four districts of Assam, eight districts of Nagaland, and the entire state of Manipur.[e] The incompatibility of hostile ground-level realities with the vision of a dynamic transnational Indo-Pacific space is obvious.
Open for Business
In September 2023, the NER ministry (formally known as the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region) concluded the Northeast Global Investors Summit, the first summit of its kind jointly organised by the eight northeastern states and the Centre. The publicity projected all the states as tourist destinations with specific business strengths,[f] and the summit as an ideal platform for forging business partnerships and acquiring a better idea of the investment opportunities available. It invited investors to participate in the NER’s transformation into a manufacturing and services hub and promised access to emerging markets in the subcontinent and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Top business houses participated;[g] road shows were organised in seven Indian cities and in Bangladesh to showcase the region’s investment potential; and roundtables were conducted in the capitals of the northeastern states. Incubation programmes were showcased,[h] as well as efforts of the North-East Development Finance Corporation which has handheld several start-ups.[15]
Disappointingly, however, the summit received scant media coverage nationally, and even its official website does not provide any information related to the summit’s outcomes or further updates. Yet, buoyed by its apparent success, another summit is being organised in 2025, again to provide a platform for networking with industry leaders, policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders from the region.[16]
Identifying Divergences
India is offering its northeast to Indo-Pacific partners as a “lure” for investments. This might not be sustainable in the long-term, however, unless the insecurities of the northeast are mitigated. At present, India’s foreign policy narrative and its Indo-Pacific vision do not directly address these anxieties. There seems to be excessive optimism in the scholarship and assessments related to the northeast’s industrial potential, as reflected in published policy reports and briefs by foreign divisions. It might be prudent to temper the optimism with caution.
Even as the Indo-Pacific vision was gaining ground in 2015, then Home Minister (and now Defence Minister) Rajnath Singh had identified insurgency as the “the biggest problem in the region,”[17] since insurgents invariably disrupt transit networks. There are other problems too—in 2023, for instance, the ethnic clashes between the Meities and Kukis of Manipur went on for months, bringing economic activity to a standstill in the state, especially in the phases when the internet was shut off or when curfews were imposed.[18] In other places, there have been local protests against both resource extraction and development projects, fearing either their adverse environmental impact or that such activities will only bring in more ‘outsiders’ without benefitting the local populations in any substantive way.
There is apprehension that mainstreaming may destroy the informal trade networks—some of them cross-border—that have existed for ages.[19] At present, informal trade is high but formal trade remains low. NITI Aayog figures indicate that 95 percent of India’s formal trade with its eastern and southeast Asian neighbours is in products originating from regions other than the northeast.[20] Further, knowledge of technological advances in agriculture and facilities for storage and preservation of agricultural products are insufficient; roadways and railway networks are inadequate. To be sure, there is official awareness of this– chairing a meeting of NER tourism ministers in September 2023 in Shillong, Union Minister for Tourism and Culture Gajendra Singh Shekhawat acknowledged the need to improve connectivity and develop more homestays in the region.
If India’s Indo-Pacific policy is to be realised, it must be made more sensitive to the myriad challenges plaguing the northeast. A holistic understanding of these variegated domestic compulsions and their likely impact on Indo-Pacific initiatives is essential.
Recommendations
India’s Indo-Pacific vision is still evolving. Outreach initiatives are nascent and the bedrock of bilateral and quadrilateral partnerships are being built. It is the right time for India to refurbish the inclusion of the northeast in the Indo-Pacific theatre of engagement. In June 2018, Prime Minister Modi had referred to the eight states of the northeast as ‘Ashtalakshmi’ or the eight representations of the goddess of wealth.[21] Soon after, President Droupadi Murmu too had forecast that the northeast would play a role in making India a five trillion-dollar economy by 2025.[22] But a sharper focus on internal peaceful development in convergence with the Indo-Pacific vision is needed. Such an approach would facilitate the creation of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The reorientation should be four-fold. First, Indian foreign policy must stop treating the region as a homogenous collective for representational convenience. This not only diminishes the uniqueness of each state but is also a serious error. Their inclusion in the Indo-Pacific vision must be disaggregated and state-specific assessments of potential and performances drawn up as inputs to policy planning, followed by state-specific initiatives and plans. It may even be prudent to encourage comparative studies among the states to inculcate a sense of competitiveness based on an environment of efficiency and entrepreneurship.
Lok Ranjan, Secretary in the NER ministry said as much while concluding the Northeast Global Summit, urging the states to develop a culture of healthy competition.[23] Pilot studies could be launched for states with areas of unexplored potential. Manipur, which has promise in developing a network of good hospitals, for example, could be promoted as a hub of medical tourism for other Indian states and neighbouring countries like Myanmar.[i] The state’s research and development facilities should be expanded to leverage its biodiversity.[24]
An awareness of a state’s economic potential should also be tempered by sensitivity towards its traditional identities and socio-cultural distinctiveness. Following the enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act[j] in December 2019, for instance, several pressure groups in Meghalaya demanded an extension of the Inner Line Permit[k] system for entry into their state—even for all Indian citizens who are not permanent residents of the state—to travel to Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur.[l] Meghalaya has also long resisted the introduction of railways in the state fearing it would bring in hordes of ‘outsiders’. The demand is an expression of the perennial apprehension of northeast residents that their indigenous identity could be undermined by excessive entry of outsiders from the rest of India, let alone illegal immigrants from other countries.[25]
To overcome this, cultural exchanges among Indo-Pacific partners and the northeastern states could be initiated. Former Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla had once stated that the shared culture, history, and mutual social threads that bind the region to the rest of India should also be highlighted to foster regional cooperation and attenuate needless suspicion about India’s motives.[26]
The second reorientation would require putting more emphasis on the regional and sub-regional groupings which fall under the rubric of the Indo-Pacific. Rajiv Bhatia, former Indian Ambassador to several countries, has noted that while the concept of the Indo-Pacific may appear distant to Indians, looking at it as the outer circle of the Bay of Bengal and its littorals, brings it closer home.[27] The Northeast is a crucial link to nine sub-regional and regional groupings: ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (ASEAN+6), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation. The potential of each of these groupings, with overlapping partners, must be maximised to foster a cross-current of reciprocal responsibilities and commitments.
The third reorientation would need to diversify the development and connectivity options of the northeast. So far there has been an overwhelming emphasis on land-based connectivity, even though the northeast is endowed with multiple rivers. It has an estimated 1,800 km of river routes navigable for steamers and large country boats,[28] and can offer the advantages of riverine connectivity to enhance cultural and commercial ties with Southeast Asia. With the Indo-Pacific seeking a vast maritime theatre for partners to counter the rise of China’s dominance of the seas, the use of waterways, sea lanes of communication and development of shipping routes emanating from the northeast would be crucial in entrenching the region in Indo-Pacific policy.[29] This could be complemented with economic modernisation projects, connectivity corridors, and the upgrade of existing roadways, railways, bridges, and hydroelectric power stations.
Finally, a reorientation is needed to make the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and domestic ministries work more closely together as far as the northeast is concerned. The delicate complexities of the region along with India’s stakes in the Indo-Pacific cannot be handled competently if foreign and domestic policies are kept in watertight compartments. So far, there have only been broad and ambiguous policy articulations in this respect. Structural, procedural and substantive policy coordination between the two will be crucial in transforming potential to performance. Knowledge-sharing and congruent projections of deliverable projections will be required.
In October 2021, Prime Minister Modi launched the PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan for Multi-modal connectivity, which requires 16 ministries, including railways and roadways, to coordinate with one another in improving multi-modal infrastructure;[30] similarly the MEA could build dedicated channels of input and coordination with the home ministry and the NER ministry, which would lead to greater recognition of internal security challenges in official policy discourse. Fencing on the India-Bangladesh border can be improved through smarter surveillance and comprehensive border management techniques, which would further curb illegal immigration, while completion of the India-Myanmar border fence will restrict the movement of insurgents and arms between the two countries.
Finally, stakeholder voices from the northeast and eastern India should be regularly heard, with events being organised at the local, sub-regional and regional levels. The progressive inclusion of northeast communities in decision-making is essential to make the goals of the Indo-Pacific vision more tangible. The northeast should not become a mere convenient leverage in the Indian foreign policy matrix to advance its subjectively framed goals in a top-down manner, or a disposable variable when the strategic interests do not coincide. The region itself must be empowered and helped to overcome its limitations to fruitfully utilise relevant and strategic opportunities for inclusive development.
Endnotes
[a] This was not sufficiently recognised at the start of the policy, but there has been course correction since.
[b] The package was later raised to INR 586 crore.
[c] The Shangri La Dialogue is an annual meeting of defence and security experts from around the globe, organized by the Bahrain-funded think tank International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) at the Shangri La Hotel in Singapore since 2002.
[d] India’s current economy size is US$3.9 trillion (2024), according to Statista.
[e] In 2023, AFSPA was in force in several districts of Nagaland, northeast Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Although it was removed from some parts of Manipur, it was extended in parts of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh for a period of six months, by the Ministry of Home Affairs. For details, see https://www.deccanherald.com/india/a-look-at-the-status-of-afspa-in-northeast-states-1221678.html and https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/centre-extends-afspa-in-parts-of-nagaland-arunachal-pradesh-for-another-six-months/article67350475.ece
[f] These include bamboo, dairy, pisciculture, tea, organic businesses, pharmaceuticals, and technology.
[g] They included Dabur, Amul, Parle Agro, PepsiCo, ITC, Britannia, Hindustan Unilever, Sun Pharmaceuticals, JSW Energy, Indian Oil, Adani Ventures, and Mahindra Holidays.
[h] Some examples are Assam’s Incubator Nest, Mizoram’s Entrepreneur Development Scheme, and Arunachal Pradesh’s Mission and Investment Park.
[i] Manipur hosted a medical tourism conclave in 2023, where it was highlighted that the state’s health indicators are good and the hospitals are at the forefront of kidney transplants. It is a favoured destination for patients from Nagaland and Myanmar. In 2017, Chief Minister Biren Singh had expressed commitment to transform Manipur into a healthcare and medical tourism hub of the region, serving the northeast and Myanmar. For more details, see https://northeastlivetv.com/around-ne/manipur/manipur-to-host-medical-tourism-conclave/ and https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/imphal/cm-n-biren-singh-wants-manipur-to-be-medical-hub-of-region/articleshow/59190244.cms.
[j] The Indian Citizenship Act 1955 debarred illegal immigrants into the country from ever becoming its citizens. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of December 2019 changed this to allow non-Muslims from the neighbouring countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan who were fleeing religious persecution, to apply for and obtain Indian citizenship by naturalisation once they have lived in the country for over six years. The act became hugely controversial for having excluded Muslims. The north eastern states, where illegal immigration from Bangladesh has been considerable, fear that their demographic composition could be significantly impacted by such immigration. Local sentiment was strongly opposed to the CAA amendment, not for excluding Muslims – as in the rest of the country – but for making citizenship easier for the other religious communities.
[k] The Inner Line Permit, introduced in 1873 under British rule, requires all visitors to parts of the northeast – including those from the rest of India – to obtain a permit (akin to a visa) before doing so. The practice was continued after Independence. Currently four of the eight north eastern states – Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur – have imposed the inner line permit system.
[l] They have been encouraged by the success of Manipur, which had voiced the demand earlier, and had it finally granted in December 2019 as well.
[1] Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region and North Eastern Council, Government of India, North-East Council Yearbook, 2024, https://necouncil.gov.in/sites/default/files/NEC%20year%20book%202024.pdf
[2] Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Northeast Investors Summit: The New Frontier of India’s Growth, 2023, https://northeastgis.in/
[3] Housing and Urban Affairs, Directorate of Town and Country Planning, Government of Assam, “Non-lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR) Scheme,” https://tcp.assam.gov.in/portlets/non-lapsable-central-pool-of-resourcesnlcpr-scheme
[4] Ministry of Development of North-East Region, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1942061
[5] Prabir De, Act East to Act Indo-Pacific: India’s Expanding Neighbourhood (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2020).
[6] Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theatre of Opportunity,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/06/india-in-the-indo-pacific-new-delhis-theater-of-opportunity?lang=en
[7] “Minister Jitendra Singh Asks UK to Explore Biz Opportunities on Northeast,” Business Standard, October 19, 2020, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/minister-jitendra-singh-asks-uk-to-explore-biz-opportunities-in-northeast-120101901405_1.html
[8] Sanjib Baruah, ed., Beyond Counter-Insurgency; The Impasse in Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[9] RIS, Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, and North Eastern Council, “Expansion of Northeast India’s Trade and Investment with Bangladesh and Myanmar: An Assessment of the Opportunities and Constraints,” October 2011, https://mdoner.gov.in/contentimages/files/RIS_Border_Trade_Report_final.pdf
[10] Baruah, Beyond Counter-Insurgency, pp. 2-3.
[11] Also see Shashi Shekhar, “BJP Remains a Dominant Force in Northeast,” LiveMint, March 5, 2023, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/bjp-remains-a-dominant-force-in-northeast-11678038170324.html
[12] Pradip Phanjoubam, “How Successful Has the Integration of the Northeast Been as India Turns 75,” Imphal Review of Arts and Politics, August 20, 2022, https://imphalreviews.in/how-successful-has-the-integration-of-the-northeast-been-as-india-turns-75/
[13] Baruah, Beyond Counter-Insurgency.
[14] South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Insurgency North-East: Assessment 2024,” https://satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-insurgencynortheast
[15] “Nagaland State Round Table of North East Global Investors Summit 2023 Held,” Nagaland Tribune, June 3, 2023, https://nagalandtribune.in/nagaland-state-round-table-of-north-east-global-investors-summit-2023-held/
[16] Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Northeast Investors Summit: The New Frontier of India’s Growth, 2025, https://northeastgis.in/
[17] “Rajnath Singh Asks NE Insurgents to Shun Violence,” Indian Express, February 14, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/rajnath-singh-asks-ne-insurgents-to-shun-violence/
[18] “Manipur Violence: Internet Ban and Curfews Hit Businesses, Entrepreneurs Rethink Future Plans,” Outlook, July 3, 2023, https://www.outlookindia.com/national/manipur-violence-internet-ban-and-curfews-hit-businesses-entrepreneurs-rethink-future-plans-news-299947
[19] Snehashish Mitra and Ranabir Sammadar, “India’s Look East Policy and the Northeast: Bridging Spaces or Widening Schisms?,” The Wire, January 7, 2017, https://thewire.in/politics/bridging-spaces-widening-schisms-look-east-policy-northeast
[20] Roshan Saha and Soumya Bhowmick, Enhancing Trade and Development in India’s Northeast, Observer Research Foundation Special Report, June 17, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/enhancing-trade-and-development-in-india-s-northeast
[21] “PM Regards Northeast as ‘Astha Lakshmi’, It Will Soon Become Biggest Contributor to GDP: Shah,” Business Standard, June 18, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/pm-regards-northeast-as-ashta-lakshmi-it-will-soon-become-biggest-contributor-to-gdp-shah-118061800970_1.html
[22] “Northeast to Play Important Role in Making India $5-Trillion Economy: President Droupadi Murmu,” The Economic Times, October 12, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/northeast-to-play-important-role-in-making-india-5-trillion-economy-president-droupadi-murmu/articleshow/94817223.cms?from=mdr
[23] “Nagaland State Round Table of North East Global Investors Summit 2023 Held”
[24] Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Northeast Investors Summit: The New Frontier of India’s Growth, 2025, https://northeastgis.in/
[25] “Demand for Inner Line Permit Gains Momentum in Meghalaya After CAA,” Morung Express, March 19, 2024, https://morungexpress.com/demand-for-inner-line-permit-gains-momentum-in-meghalaya-after-caa
[26] Rajiv Bhatia, “Connecting India’s East with the Indo-Pacific,” Gateway House, December 8, 2022, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/connecting-indias-east-with-the-indo-pacific/
[27] Bhatia, “Connecting India’s East with the Indo-Pacific”
[28] Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, In Search of the Sea: Opening India’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal, Observer Research Foundation Special Report, June 21, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-search-of-the-sea-opening-indias-northeast-to-the-bay-of-bengal#:~:text=It%20is%20relatively%20more%20environment,and%20the%20wider%20Indo%2DPacific
[29] Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, In Search of the Sea: Opening India’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal, Observer Research Foundation Special Report, June 21, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-search-of-the-sea-opening-indias-northeast-to-the-bay-of-bengal#:~:text=It%20is%20relatively%20more%20environment,and%20the%20wider%20Indo%2DPacific
[30] National Portal of India, Government of India, “Vision of PM Gati Shakti,” April 5, 2024, https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/pm-gati-shakti-national-master-plan-multi-modal-connectivity
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