One must avoid an over-interpretation and an over-assessment of the suspected car bomb explosion outside the Australian Embassy at Jakarta on September 9,2004, which caused the death of nine persons and injuries to over a hundred others, most of them innocent civilians. <br /> <br /> The post-9/11 breed of Al Qaeda watchers tend to hype every act of terrorism and project it as the outcome of a grand strategy of the Al Qaeda and as evidence of its octopusian nature, thereby creating an unwarranted perception of its continuing anti-State potency and the seeming helplessness of the State in countering it. By doing so, they tend to play into its hands and give it an image, which would help it in its self-perpetuation. <br /> <br /> While the death of even a single individual at the hands of terrorists is shocking and ought to be a matter of concern to the State and the international community, one has to underline that in the scale of characterisation of terrorist incidents, the Jakarta blast would fall into the category of low-medium or, at the most, medium gravity. Such incidents have been taking place at frequent intervals in India since 1956. We treat them with a sense of balance and consciously avoid over-reaction and over-projection, which would be counter-productive. <br /> <br /> Presuming that the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was the perpetrator of the blast, what is really significant is not that it was able to organise it despite the stepped-up anti-terrorism security in Indonesia in general and in Jakara in particular since the blast in a Jakarta hotel in August last year, but that it took it more than a year to find a suitable volunteer for another suicide mission and to procure the necessary material required for it. <br /> <br /> This speaks well of the post-Bali counter-terrorism drive of the Indonesian Government. One should avoid projecting the blast as the outcome of any weaknesses in its policies and action. The lessons emerging from the blast are: <br /> <br /> The motivation of the jihadi terrorist organisations of Indonesia, whether it is the JI or any other organisatiion, and their urge to give vent to their anger through acts of terrorism remain strong. <br /> <br /> A reservoir of potential suicide bombers is still available to them, but there is no evidence to show that this is an expanding reservoir. <br /> <br /> Despite the measures taken by the Indonesian Government to strengthen its intelligence collection capability and the assistance received by it from Australia, the USA and other countries, it continues to have gaps in its intelligence coverage. Such gaps are inevitable and cannot be totally eliminated. <br /> <br /> There are continuing pockets of anger in the Indonesian society, which are exploited by the jihadi terrorists. In some instances, this anger is directed against their own Government either because of its perceived anti-Islam policies or because of its co-operation with Australia and the US. In other instances, it is directed against external powers such as the USA and Australia, which are viewed as anti-Islam. The anger against Australia is stronger because of its alleged role in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia, its perceived anti-Islam immigration policy and its support to the US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The jihadi terrorists wanting to remain active and in media headlines exploit this anger. <br /> <br /> The terrorist strike does not appear to have had any strategic objective. It was a pure and simple tactical strike to let the world know that the jihadi terrorists remain alive and kicking. <br /> <br /> The gravity and impact of the strike would have been greater and the reverberations arising from it would have been felt far beyond Indonesia, if the jihadi terrorists had succeeded in their tactical objective of harming Australian lives and interests. The escape of the Australian mission is not only a tribute to its physical security , but is also a proof of the validity of the counter-terrorism adage that where physical security is strong and effective, terrorists cannot prevail even if intelligence be weak and where physical security is weak, terrorists might succeed even if intelligence be strong. <br /> <br /> There is no evidence so far to connect the blast with the Al Qaeda or with the observance of the third anniversary of 9/11 or the forthcoming Presidential elections in Indonesia or the parliamentary elections in Australia. The impact of the blast on the elections, either in Indonesia or in Australia, would be minimal, if not nil, unless this blast turns out to be the precursor of more to come in the coming days. President Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia and Prime Minister John Howard and his party in Australia may still lose the elections, but their defeat, if it comes about, will not be because of this blast, but because of their sins of commission and omission in many other matters. <br /> <br /> Australia has not yet been able to rid itself of its image as a regional surrogate of the US. The over-reaction of its leaders to incidents such as the blast, their unwise statements and actions such as the high-profile visit of Mr.Alexander Downer, its Foreign Minister, to Jakarta immediately after the blast and their habit of throwing their weight around in the name of counter-terrorism co-operation with ostentatious offers of financial and professional help in dealing with terrorism add to the darkness of its image. <br /> <br /> That the JI is alive and kicking should not be a matter of surprise. It has much deeper roots in the Indonesian society than the Al Qaeda has in the society of any Islamic country. To expect its early withering away would be over-optimistic. <br /> <br /> Australian police officials have been quoted by the media as warning of another possible terrorist strike directed at Australia in Indonesia. An equally strong possibility is a JI strike in Malaysia, directed against the local Government or against the nationals and interests of the US and Australia. The Pakistan-based jihadi components of the International Islamic Front (IIF) have maintained a high level of virulence in their rhetoric against not only their own Government, but also against Indonesia and Malaysia ever since the arrest of some Malaysians and Indonesians, including a brother of Hambali, the projected operational chief of the JI, from a madrasa at Karachi run by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) some months ago and their handing-over to the Malaysian and Indonesian authorities. <br /> <br /> <br /> The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail:
[email protected] <br /> <br /> <br /> Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper no. 1113, September 12, 2004. <br /> <br /> <strong>The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-mail:
[email protected]</strong> <br /> <br /> <em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.</em>
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
