It’s been more than three months since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan and the situation in that country continues to worsen by the day. The ongoing humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by the standoff between the Taliban and the Islamic State Khorasan or IS-K, the lack of access to food, medicines and cash reserves. The Taliban, now in a position of ultimate power, have shown the world that they can defeat the military might of the United States by simply outlasting them. However, they are struggling on the governance front — in their ability to demonstrate to the Afghan people, the international community and to their fighters across the country that they have the capability to lead a nation, maintain law and order and provide a functioning economic system.
One of the foremost security challenges for the Taliban government comes from IS-K. There remain between 2,000 to 3,000 IS-K fighters in Afghanistan, with majority of them concentrated in eastern Nangarhar province, where they occupy some of the key drug smuggling routes into Pakistan, traditionally controlled by the Taliban. The IS-K remains an amalgamation of former Taliban, al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other smaller jihadist group fighters coming together under the established brand-name of the Islamic State, challenging the Taliban on their home turf. As traditional rivals, the IS-K views the Taliban’s coming to power in Kabul in August 2021 as an
opportunity to frame them as deceitful and illegitimate, given their collaboration with the United States and their links with the Pakistan state. While the Taliban has been an insurgency group for decades, in an ironical twist they must now demonstrate their counter-insurgency capabilities as IS-K violence rages across the country in an effort to paint the Taliban as ineffective governors.
Although, the Taliban has sent more than 1,300 fighters to Nangahar to “increase the
tempo of operations” against the group, the nature of the militancy across the Durand Line is such that given the history of systemic violence and state-fuelled terrorism, groups often have overlapping allegiances and commitments to the militant-criminal nexus that helps serve them. The Haqqani Network, a loyal proxy of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, have been allies of the Taliban with the group’s founder’s son Siraj Haqqani now serving as the interior minister in the Taliban government. The Haqqanis have also in the past partnered with the Islamic State, providing technical assistance to them for carrying out attacks, including the brutal attack on the
gurdwara in Kabul in March 2020. While the Haqqani Network remains extremely close to the Taliban, who in turn are at odds with the Islamic State, the rationale for the Haqqanis assisting the Islamic State has been to provide cover to the Taliban, as the chosen counter-terrorism experts and “keepers of the peace”. Pakistan has in fact encouraged the Haqqani Network to build on its ties with the IS-K in order to retain its leverage in Afghanistan and ensure that the IS-K can front attacks for the Haqqanis or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) while Pakistan can claim
plausible deniability. This complicated dynamic between Taliban, IS-K and Haqqani Network ensures that whatever the situation, the Pakistani deep state maintains a strong degree of influence in Afghanistan.
Another challenge for the Taliban government has been securing desperately-needed humanitarian assistance. Since they came to power and faced the brunt of an international embargo, the Taliban have had to control the economic fallout of their rule. Aside from the obvious implications of the embargo the Afghan people have been forced to deal with— acute shortages of food, medicinal drugs, lack of cash reserves leading people to have no access to their savings, all while millions remain displaced amid growing
impoverishment. According to UN reports, one in two Afghans faces emergency levels of acute
food insecurity and more than 3 million under 5-year-olds are expected to face acute malnutrition by the end of the year. The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic along with the humanitarian crisis have wreaked havoc across the country, as a direct result of the Taliban and US policy decisions. With each side quick to blame the other, the onus falls on regional nations, including India to attempt to mitigate a worsening disaster.
India recently hosted a security conference with national security advisors of regional nations, including the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Iran, underscoring New Delhi’s continuing salience in the Afghan matrix. The
Delhi Declaration brought together like-minded nations, all of whom remain eager for an inclusive government in power in Afghanistan, rather than the current one that enjoys Pakistani patronage. Notably absent from the regional grouping, were Pakistan and China, who remain against any Indian involvement in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the Delhi Declaration highlighted the “
extraordinary degree of convergence” between a large and important group of regional countries on the future of Afghanistan. Soon after the conference,
Pakistan was prompted to allow Indian humanitarian assistance, in the nature of 50,000 MT of wheat to transit over land to Afghanistan. While this remains a small gesture, much more will have to be done to help alleviate the suffering of millions.
As winter approaches, the suffering of the people of Afghanistan will worsen. Cut off from the world and having to contend with an orthodox and repressive Taliban government, Afghans are facing the brunt of Pakistan’s decades old policy of nurturing militant groups. As Islamabad and Rawalpindi continue to play one group against the other and use Afghanistan as their playground to achieve their warped security goals, the suffering of innocent Afghans is hardly a priority for them.
This commentary originally appeared in Business Standard.
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