Fifteen years ago, the USA had promised to sell F-16s to Pakistan. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, the company manufacturing the aircraft, took the necessary advance for it. Then there were sudden changes in the global and regional strategic environment. The Jehadi war in Afghanistan got over and Pakistan started diverting Jehadism into Jammu and Kashmir. The Cold war also was over. The US President could no longer certify that Pakistan was innocent and not manufacturing a nuclear bomb covertly. The US Congress imposed the Pressler Amendment. That blocked the sale of F-16s to Pakistan.
On March 24, 2005, the USA, despite strong protests by India and nuclear proliferation and terrorism watchdogs within USA, took the decision to reverse its earlier stand. It has rewarded its new Non NATO Ally with F-16s; not to combat terrorism but to improve its conventional security. Alongwith this reward to Pakistan, in order to neutralize and overcome the anticipated protests, India has been offered (a) cooperation in the field of nuclear energy generation (b) sale of F-16s, F-18s and other sophisticated defence equipment alongwith transfer of technology and licensed production, and (c) a dialogue on global issues to increase India's role in international institutions and in strategic partnership.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has expressed 'great disappointment' over the US decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan. I believe the US decision is more than that. It is ill timed and badly conveyed. It has cast an unnecessary shadow on the emerging dawn in Indo-Pak and Indo-US relations and raised mutual suspicions in the India-Pakistan-USA triangle. Instead of making India a global player, it will revive hyphenation, and may fuel an arms race.
No one denies the Pakistani right to its national security. If Pakistan feels insecure and threatened by India, procurement of 70, 80, or 130 F-16s will no doubt narrow the conventional military capability gap and balance between India and Pakistan. But that will neither be substantial nor for long. Qualitatively, Mirage 2000 and Su-30s of the Indian Air Force can match the new fourth generation multi role F-16s, even if Pakistan pays heavily to get those. In fact, many experts feel that the Su-30s are more versatile than the F-16s. And there should be no doubt that India will now hasten its decision-already under consideration-to replace the older vintage MiG aircraft and complete its fighter aircraft inventory. Will Pakistan then indulge in the arms race and purchase more aircrafts?
Just when the Indo Pak relations were showing signs of improvement, thanks to cricketers, people to people contacts and discussions on trade, commerce and developmental economics, the F-16 deal has re-introduced militarism on the sub continent with all its ill affects. The focus will shift from people to establishments, from concessions to demands, and from sports and development to sporting F-16s and military toys. Already, General Pervez Musharraf is back to giving ultimatums on Kashmir. He feels bold to talk about Kargil, an initiative that nearly cost him his life, burial of democracy in Pakistan, and much military and diplomatic embarrassment to his nation. He exhorts militancy and terrorism, and no longer talks about his assurance 'not to permit any territory under Pak control to be used to support terrorism in any manner'. Terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir is already showing an increase. It is well known that the Pak Army has a history of miscalculations and misperceptions about Indian defence capabilities a few years after every war with India. A repeat of such a history will be disappointing, not only to people of India and Pakistan, but also in USA.
As far as US-Pak relations are concerned, they are evidently returning to the days when the US looked after the Pak military elite and its requirements. It has taken a back seat on its democratic ideals, madrassas, and terrorism. The US line that the sale of F-16s will ensure greater security for Pakistan is hollow. If it believes in that, why does it not then accept Pakistan's nuclear status, which the Pakistanis believe has given them maximum security?
The simultaneous and placatory effort towards India by the US reflects revival of Indo Pak hyphenation. Also, a naivety that creates more doubts than confidence in the US Administration. If the decision is in the US national interest, which the US Administration will vouch that it is, is it necessary to clad it with 'promissory notes' and a visit to India by the new Secretary of State? One expected that the Indo US relations by now have developed greater trust and confidence. Coming soon after refusing visa to an elected Chief Minister of an Indian state suddenly, this action is unlikely to endear the US to Indian public or its political class.
The substance of the new US conciliatory effort also India does not impress one. At least not immediately! The US has offered cooperation in the field of nuclear energy generation. Does it mean that India is now acceptable as a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group and it can shop for nuclear energy requirements anywhere in the world? Or is the US going to by-pass that and establish grounds for the Westinghouse only to market its products into India?
The offer to sell F-16s or F-18s and other defence equipment with licensed production will help to establish Lockheed Martin and Boeing companies who have recently opened their offices in India. I have nothing against the presence of these companies and welcome competition to our defence ordnance factories and PSUs. However, everyone knows that in defence equipment today, it is not a seller's market but that of buyers. With a sale incentive, even the Dassault Aviation, manufacturer of Mirage fighters, will be happy to enter India. The Sukhoi Aviation is already doing that.
The promise to hold Indo-US dialogue on global issues 'to increase India's role in international institutions' will mean much more if the US declares that it would support India's candidature in the UN Security Council and as a new member of the APEC.
The new US promises may sound good in diplomacy and on paper. They do little to dependability and reliability factors, which frequently dogs the Indo US strategic and defence relations. Strategic partnership relations cannot be built with tactics and promises that remain suspect.
* Former Chief of Army Staff. Currently, President, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi
Courtesy: The Tribune, Chandigarh, April 1, 2005
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
