Trilateral meetings involving Afghanistan and Pakistan in a third country, and the optimism that follows, have become regular features of late. In the past six months alone, three such meetings have been held -Istanbul, London and Brussels. The latest of these, the Afghanistan-Pakistan-US meeting in Brussels, held at the end of April, was described by John Kerry as being "very productive and constructive".
As the outcome of such summits seems to have become a foregone conclusion, these events seem nothing more than exercises in futility. Not only do these summits not achieve anything tangible other than pledges and commitments, the bilateral relations soon succumb to some fresh tensions, thereby, undoing all the hope generated by such endeavours.
A major problem with such dialogues is that they are not immune to the hostile and aggressive atmosphere in which the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations tend to be conducted. Thus, all progress that Afghanistan and Pakistan make during these dialogues is soon negated by events soon after such dialogues. For instance, though it was agreed at London that the two would work towards achieving a peace agreement within six months, along with cooperation in a range of areas, the optimism soon gave way to each accusing the other of supporting terrorists. Afghanistan claimed that cross-border firing from Pakistan destroyed property in its eastern provinces and consequently cancelled a visit by army officers to Pakistan.
In fact, the build up to the Brussels meeting was not free of tensions either as the Afghan government resorted to aggressive rhetoric against Pakistan. Hamid Karzai accused Pakistan of cross border attacks to pressurise Kabul into accepting the Durand Line as an international border. Similarly, his office threatened to work independent of Pakistan if it was not more cooperative in meeting the Afghan government's demands. Reports of Pakistan developing infrastructure along the Durand Line had also provoked massive protests in Afghanistan and the issuance of orders from Karzai for all Pakistani military installations to be dismantled. The heated exchange of words soon sparked off a military confrontation between the troops of the two countries in the Nangarhar province. There is no sign of a thaw in tensions, even after the summit, which have in the recent weeks witnessed massive anti-Pakistan protests in different Afghan provinces.
Such rhetoric, along with the frequent cross-border firing, tends to further intensify an atmosphere that is not conducive to mutual trust and cooperation to begin with making collaboration between the two countries even tougher.
Another problem lies with the expectations from Pakistan itself. This includes both what Pakistan is capable of doing, and what it is willing to do. There is a clear gap in the interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This includes perceptions regarding the role of India in the region. Karzai claimed that Pakistan wanted his government to cut off all ties with India as a prerequisite for Afghanistan to expect any cooperation from Pakistan. Moreover, differences over the Durand Line have created the perception - rightly so - in Afghanistan that Rawalpindi is keen to have a regime in Kabul that would be pliant to its interests. This gap, buttressed by past experiences, has created a great degree of suspicion regarding Pakistan's objective vis-a-vis the Afghan endgame.
It is for this reason that the apparent 'strategic shift' in Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan is viewed with scepticism. These doubts are further attested by Pakistan's refusal to dismantle the terror infrastructure on its soil, which in the past has been used to target India and even Afghanistan. Moreover, while Pakistan may not want a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, it still sees the group as a strategic asset and possibly as the only Afghan political faction that could secure its interests there. In light of such suspicions, it is difficult to overcome the domestic opposition in Afghanistan to the prospects of having a strategic agreement with Pakistan or Rawalpindi training the Afghan National Army.
Pakistan's attempt to maintain strict control over the release of the prisoners also highlights its attempts to safeguard its own interests at the expense of what the Afghan government wants. So far it has only released those prisoners, who Pakistan believes can be controlled and manipulated into safeguarding and furthering its interests. The refusal of Pakistan to release Mullah Baradar despite the repeated demands of Afghanistan should be seen in this light. Not only did Baradar attempt to bypass Pakistan and reach out to the Afghan government independently, but he is also supposed to be staunchly opposed to Pakistan.
This explains the frustration of the Afghan government with Pakistan and justifies to an extent the Afghan rhetoric questioning Pakistan's sincerity in cooperating with the Karzai administration. According to reports, Karzai - despite his public declarations on the presidential website - warned General Kayani at Brussels that they should not expect any further talks with Pakistan if its demands are not met.
Finally, there seems to be a problem of expecting Pakistan to do something - irrespective of its levels of willingness - that it may not be capable of doing. The belief is that Pakistan wields enormous control over the Taliban. This was reflected in the overoptimistic six month timeframe for a peace agreement with the Taliban -despite their absence from the process or any indication of acceptance of such a deal on their part - of the London summit, based as it was on a cooperative Pakistan.
However, Taliban-Pakistan relations have been tenuous at best. Even during the 1990s when the Taliban was in power it resented Pakistan's attempts to pull its strings. Additionally the military's volte-face following 9/11 is greatly resented by the group, which sees it as an act of betrayal. Consequently Rawalpindi's sway must not be overestimated. Quite possibly current leverage depends only on the provision of sanctuaries and is a tactical arrangement. It is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to do anything more than it is already doing.
Pakistan's real importance lies in its ability to play the spoiler. It can and has scuttled repeated attempts at peace, by variously denying access to the Taliban or arresting people like Baradar, or by selective support to pliant factions. For example the Haqqani network is favoured over Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura and is used for carrying out high profiles.
There is no denying the fact that Pakistan is an important player as far as determining the outcome of a post-2014 Afghanistan is concerned and should be engaged with. But to expect it to play a productive role or to expect Afghanistan and Pakistan to reconcile their differences and jointly work towards stability is a tall order that is unlikely to be achieved, at least anytime soon.
(The writer is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
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