By declaring that his talks with Pakistani counterpart, Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri would produce nothing dramatic or drastic, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh might have robbed the event of the avoidable media hype, the like of which had attended on the 'Agra summit' earlier. At the end of it, the two-day ministerial meeting in New Delhi was a cup that was not half-full. Nor was it half-empty. In turn, this indicated that the two Governments are moving from the periphery, where gestures and concessions were possible, to addressing more substantive issues, where their respective positions are defined, if not settled. <br /> <br /> There is no denying the Pakistani contention that there could not be any permanent peace between the two nations without a permanent solution to the 'Kashmir issue'. While it may be true up to a point, there is need to look beyond the same, to evaluate if the mood in the two nations, particularly of Pakistan and its military establishment, is as yet conducive for solving the 'Kashmir issue' through mutual give-and-take. Ironically on this front, it is in a multi-polar polity like India that a political consensus of some kind seems to have emerged, what with the Left-backed Congress-led UPA Government at the Centre pursuing the 'Pakistan policy' of the predecessor Vajpayee Government. The pro-peace public mood in India is also involved, but how far is it the case in Pakistan is unclear, as yet. <br /> <br /> The formulation seems simple, if not straight. Pakistan wants the peace process to proceed on a 'K-Plus' format, which is riven with hurdles and potholes that could trap even the minor gains of the current ceasefire, in its pace. India has preferred the 'Plus-K' approach, which implies that the right mood should be created through a series of CBMs on all fronts before the all-important impediment-infested 'Kashmir issue' is tackled. While the 'Kandhahar hijack episode' and the 'Kargil War' may not have revived the forgotten animosities of an earlier generation in the two nations, the mood and methods of the 'Pakistani establishment', particularly the military-intelligence apparatus, does not seem to spring confidence in India. <br /> <br /> The 'Parliament attack' and the subsequent reluctance on the part of Islamabad vis a vis New Delhi's 'List of 20' have displayed in the Indian eye, a Pakistani reluctance for a clean break from the past. More than the Pakistani denial that none of the terrorists in the Indian list was on its territory, and such denial running up to the eve of the current ministerial meeting, it is the motives and options behind such denial that is of concern to India. <br /> <br /> The fact remains Pakistan has nothing much to talk on Kashmir even when it claims Kashmir to be the 'core issue' in bilateral relations with India. It talks only of, and for Kashmiris. There does not seem to have any specific Pakistani interest, concern or position on the 'Kashmir issue', per se. This in turn makes the Indian concerns about Pakistan's seriousness in solving bilateral issues seem real. <br /> <br /> It also raises a more basic question. If Pakistan means what it says about the "Kashmiris' concerns" as politically understood, how can it negotiate on something that is not its in the first place. Then, the question of Pakistan signing any possible settlement with India on that score - if not, Islamabad's motives on this score - would sound suspect, at best. To the extent, Islamabad may have to convince New Delhi that it's not using the Kashmiris as a bogey or shield to keep the 'Kashmir issue' alive - and continue to keep bilateral relations, hostage to the same. <br /> <br /> In comparison, India has all along insisted that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), are part of the Union. Successive Governments in New Delhi have constantly referred to parliamentary resolutions in this respect. By implication though, it could indicate a starting-point for negotiations. For the same reason, it would also underline the need for a national consensus as and when a permanent solution became plausible. <br /> <br /> It is thus that India has 'internalised' the entire exercise, where the people and their Government could shape the nation's position through internal chemistry. Pakistan, in contrast, continues with the 'external agenda'. It may not even have the kind of hold in the shaping of this agenda, after a point, particularly in these days of jihadi interference in internal affairs of Pakistan, and their interest in divisive problems as the 'Kashmir issue'. <br /> <br /> That way, Kashmir-centric 'external agenda' since Partition and Independence may have been an impediment for Pakistan's movement towards democracy and development, all along. So much so, doubts may still persist on the possibility of a peaceful elimination of the 'external factor' endangering Pakistan's nationhood. A way out could be considered by introducing a new 'internal agenda', comprising economic and societal reforms, for Pakistan. Maybe, this could have a telling effect on the societal strata being wooed by the jihadi groups for the very same reason. <br /> <br /> Yet, even diktats of the Pakistani variety for initiating such societal changes would take time for the benefits to percolate down. Time would be a factor also for emerging internal contradictions to take political form, and make electoral sense. That's when Islamabad may have prepared the nation and the people for yielding ground on the existing 'external agenda'. In the interim, the gains of the present peace process could not be frittered away. Nor could the 'K-Plus' course adopted in haste, and deadlocked into a freeze. At the end of the day, Pakistan needs to prepare itself for reaching there, and what better course than the CBM's of the kind being put in place, at present? <br /> <br /> <em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.</em>
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