The decision of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Government to involve the representatives of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as part of the dialogue process on Kashmir is strategic in principle. Though it may not be entirely wrong to question the extent of public support the Hurriyat leaders enjoy in Kashmir, it would be equally short-sighted to exclude them from any dialogue concerning Kashmir.
The importance of inviting the Hurriyat leaders should be seen in a broader context. Agreed that the Hurriyat has been espousing secession or similar sentiments for quite sometime and has not exactly been in favour of talking to the Union Government without involving Pakistan in the process.
It is also not a secret that the Hurriyat, at best of times, is a divided house, with each leader, howsoever minuscule the support he might draw from the people, changing their stand at every turn. They are given to rank opportunism. Their utility, ironically, is in their nuisance value. They may not do any thing positive for the people of Kashmir but they can certainly incite passions and violence, and spoil the atmosphere for a peaceful rapprochement on Kashmir.
Leaving the Hurriyat out of the dialogue process will only fuel militant tendencies, a factor which we can do without at this given point of time. The Government, therefore, needs them on its side. Without the Hurriyat on its side, it would be difficult for the Government to bring about a consensus on the contentious issues that have been bedevilling the state for more than a decade-and-half.
Two points need to be kept in mind in understanding the Government's decision. First, the Government has made it quite clear, even to the Hurriyat, that the dialogue will be broad based and not confined to the Hurriyat leadership. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's reference to "Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh" in his opening remarks at the February 25 round table of Kashmiri leaders, is a clear pointer to such a possibility. Not to be ignored is the Hurriyat protest in inviting other leaders like Sajjad Lone and Yasin Malik. Second, the attempt on the part of the Government is to persuade the Hurriyat and others who stayed away from contesting elections to take part in the State Assembly elections which are due in 2007.
Two consequences can be visualised by having the Hurriyat on the negotiating table. First, it would be extremely difficult for the Hurriyat to turn back once it has committed to the dialogue. In the past, it might have done it, only because it had the advantage of being the "sole" representative of the Kashmiri people. Second, if the Hurriyat leadership gets out of the negotiations, it would upset its own political equations in the Valley in the days to come. These two consequences need to be viewed in the context of Pakistan's changed stance on Kashmir.
On Kashmir, Pakistan, in the past two years, has shifted its stand quite dramatically. The UN resolution calling for a plebiscite is history and is no longer talked about. The question of an "independent" Kashmir has been settled quite clearly with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declining, politely but firmly, to change the status of borders. President Pervez Musharraf's proposal for "self rule", even if taken on the face value and open to debate, only emphasises the climb down.
This softening of the Pakistani stand has rendered organisations like the Hurriyat unsure about its future. Its current leadership, which is younger and ambitious, and therefore accommodative, has come around to accept the changed dynamics. This change is even reflected in Syed Ali Shah Geelani, known for his radical views on Kashmir and India. Geelani, who has not yet been persuaded to come to the lunch table, recently lent his support to the return of the Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley. This is a dramatic change from his known stand on the issue. This publicly stated view is a harbinger of altering perceptions in the Valley.
The Government's conciliatory approach is keeping in tandem with a conscious attempt to steer clear of the Cold War approach to conflict resolutions. There are no bad guys. There are only guys who do not agree with you. The challenge is to persuade those who are lined up against you to come to your side, and if not, at least not to oppose you. The case of Hurriyat should be seen in this perspective.
If the Government is able to convince and persuade the Hurriyat to sit on the negotiating table, it will send out positive signals to other actors in the arena to come to terms with the new equations. Talking to the Hurriyat will not solve the Kashmir problem but it will certainly go quite a long way in clearing the stumbling blocks to the peace process which has been long held hostage by cloak-and-dagger games.
The author is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
Source: The Pioneer, New Delhi March 5, 2006.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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